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The security of information is an indispensable element of a communication system when
transmitted signals are vulnerable to eavesdropping. This issue is a challenging problem in
a wireless network as propagated signals can be easily captured by unauthorized receivers,
and so achieving a perfectly secure communication is a desire in such a wiretap channel.
On the other hand, cryptographic algorithms usually lack to attain this goal due to the
following restrictive assumptions made for their design. First, wiretappers basically have
limited computational power and time. Second, each authorized party has often access to
a reasonably large sequence of uniform random bits concealed from wiretappers.
To guarantee the security of information, Information Theory (IT) offers the following
two approaches based on physical-layer security.
First, IT suggests using wiretap (block) codes to securely and reliably transmit mes-
sages over a noisy wiretap channel. No confidential common key is usually required for the
wiretap codes. The secrecy problem investigates an optimum wiretap code that achieves
the secrecy capacity of a given wiretap channel.
Second, IT introduces key agreement (block) codes to exchange keys between legitimate
parties over a wiretap model. The agreed keys are to be reliable, secure, and (uniformly)
random, at least in an asymptotic sense, such that they can be finally employed in sym-
metric key cryptography for data transmission. The key agreement problem investigates
an optimum key agreement code that obtains the key capacity of a given wiretap model.
In this thesis, we study the key agreement problem for two wiretap models: a Dis-
crete Memoryless (DM) model and a Gaussian model. Each model consists of a wiretap
channel paralleled with an authenticated public channel. The wiretap channel is from a
transmitter, called Alice, to an authorized receiver, called Bob, and to a wiretapper, called
Eve. The Probability Transition Function (PTF) of the wiretap channel is controlled by a
random sequence of Channel State Information (CSI), which is assumed to be non-causally
available at Alice. The capacity of the public channel is C
P1
∈ [0,∞) in the forward direc-
tion from Alice to Bob and C
P2
∈ [0,∞) in the backward direction from Bob to Alice. For
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, 0) in this thesis. We
also study the key generation over the Gaussian model when Eve’s channel is less noisy
than Bob’s.
In the DM model, the wiretap channel is a Discrete Memoryless State-dependent Wire-
tap Channel (DM-SWC) in which Bob and Eve each may also have access to a sequence
of Side Information (SI) dependent on the CSI. We establish a Lower Bound (LB) and an
Upper Bound (UB) on the forward key capacity of the DM model. When the model is less
noisy in Bob’s favor, another UB on the forward key capacity is derived. The achievable
key agreement code is asymptotically optimum as C
P1
→ ∞. For any given DM model,
there also exists a finite capacity C∗
P1
, which is determined by the DM-SWC, such that the









, and thus increasing the public channel capacity beyond C∗
P1
makes
no improvement on the forward key capacity of the DM model. If the CSI is fully known
at Bob in addition to Alice, C∗
P1
= 0, and so the public channel has no contribution in key
generation when the public channel is in the forward direction.
The achievable key agreement code of the DM model exploits both a random generator
and the CSI as resources for key generation at Alice. The randomness property of channel
states can be employed for key generation, and so the agreed keys depend on the CSI in
general. However, a message is independent of the CSI in a secrecy problem. Hence, we
justify that the forward key capacity can exceed both the main channel capacity and the
secrecy capacity of the DM-SWC.
In the Gaussian model, the wiretap channel is a Gaussian State-dependent Wiretap
Channel (G-SWC) with Additive White Gaussian Interference (AWGI) having average
power Λ. For simplicity, no side information is assumed at Bob and Eve. Bob’s channel
and Eve’s channel suffer from Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN), where the corre-
lation coefficient between noise of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel is given by ̺.
We prove that the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is independent of ̺.
Moreover, we establish that the forward key capacity is positive unless Eve’s channel is
vi
less noisy than Bob’s. We also prove that the key capacity of the Gaussian model vanishes
if the G-SWC is physically degraded in Eve’s favor. However, we justify that obtaining a
positive key capacity is feasible even if Eve’s channel is less noisy than Bob’s according to




) → (∞,∞). Hence, the key capacity
of the Gaussian model is a function of ̺.
In this thesis, an LB on the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is achieved.
For a fixed Λ, the achievable key agreement code is optimum for any C
P1
∈ [0,∞) in both
low Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) and high SIR regimes. We show that the forward
key capacity is asymptotically independent of C
P1
and Λ as the SIR goes to infinity, and
thus the public channel and the interference have negligible contributions in key generation
in the high SIR regime. On the other hand, the forward key capacity is a function of C
P1
and Λ in the low SIR regime. Contributions of the interference and the public channel in
key generation are significant in the low SIR regime that will be illustrated by simulations.
The proposed key agreement code asymptotically achieves the forward key capacity of
the Gaussian model for any SIR as C
P1
→ ∞. Hence, C
K
(∞, 0) is calculated, and it is sug-




, 0). Using simulations, we also compute the minimum required
C
P1
for which the forward key capacity is upper bounded within a given tolerance.
The achievable key agreement code is designed based on a generalized version of the
Dirty Paper Coding (DPC) in which transmitted signals are correlated with the CSI. The
correlation coefficient is to be determined by C
P1
. In contrast to the DM model, the LB
on the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model is a strictly increasing function of C
P1




= 0 and a fixed Λ, the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model exceeds the
main channel capacity of the G-SWC in the low SIR regime. By simulations, we show that
the interference enhances key generation in the low SIR regime. In this regime, we also
justify that the positive effect of the interference on the (forward) key capacity is generally
more than its positive effect on the secrecy capacity of the G-SWC, while the interference
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The security of information is a challenging problem in communication systems where
transmission signals are exposed to eavesdroppers. The secure communication plays a
crucial role in a wireless network where propagated signals are easily accessible by (hid-
den) antennas of unauthorized receivers (wiretappers). Hence, a milestone in design of a
wireless communication system is to guarantee that the transmitted information over a
given communication channel [1] is reliably decoded [1,2] by authorized receivers such that
the wiretappers remain ignorant about that information after interception of transmitted
signals [3, Ch. 17].
In this thesis, we assume that the communication channels are authenticated which
means wiretappers are not able to tamper with messages, communication signals, and la-
bels of communication signals in any sense. We are also interested in scenarios with one
authorized transmitter, called Alice, and two receivers: an intended receiver, called Bob,
and a (passive) wiretapper, called Eve.
This chapter is organized as follows. We give an overview of the notion of channel
coding in Section 1.1. We demonstrate the concept of security in cryptography and its
advantages and drawbacks in Section 1.2. We introduce the physical layer security in Sec-
tion 1.3 and Section 1.4: in the former, we define wiretap channels and the secrecy problem;
in the latter, we define the concept of key agreement problems in information theory and
1
privacy amplification, and we review the main related work in these fields. As this thesis
is regarding wiretap channels with random states, we introduce the fundamental classes of
state-dependent channels with the corresponding results and applications in Section 1.5.
Next, we review seminal articles and methodology in the field of state-dependent wiretap
models in Section 1.6; we then focus on wiretap models with random states. Motivations
of this work are justified in Section 1.7. Also, the challenges of our models are given in this
section. In Section 1.8, we briefly express the models together with the main contributions
of this thesis. Finally, we state the organization of next chapters in Section 1.9.
1.1 Communication over Noisy Channels
In a real communication system, communication channels are often noisy. Shannon [4]
represented a mathematical model for a noisy communication channel. According to this
work, noisy channels are modeled by a set of input alphabet(s), a set of output alphabet(s),
and a probability transition function (PTF) [1–3], which expresses the probability of ob-
servation of a channel output signal given a channel input signal. As an example, the
mathematical model of a point-to-point communication channel is defined as follows.
Definition 1.1. The mathematical model of a point-to-point communication channel is
determined by triple (Xn,Yn,Py|x), where
• n is the number of transmissions over the channel, or equivalently, it is called the
block length of an input vector (the input signal to the channel) and that of the
output vector (the output signal from the channel);
• Xn is called an (n-tuple) input alphabet, i.e., x ∈ Xn, where x is the input random
vector with length n;
• Yn is called an (n-tuple) output alphabet, i.e., y ∈ Yn, where y is the output random
vector with length n;
• Py|x is called a probability transition function, which is the conditional probability
distribution function y given x.
2
An important class of communication channels is the class of memoryless channels [1,2]
in which channel output symbol at any time instant i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depends on only the
channel input symbol of the time instant i and it is conditionally independent of other input
symbols and output symbols at any time τ 6= i, where τ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In the following, a
memoryless channel with finite input and output alphabets is defined.
Definition 1.2 (Discrete memoryless channel). A point-to-point channel (Xn,Yn,Py|x) is
called a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) [1, 2] if
∀ (x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn : Py|x(y|x) =
n∏
i=1
PY |X(yi|xi) , (1.1)
where PY |X is the conditional probability of a symbol Y ∈ Y given symbol X ∈ X. PY |X
is called the probability transition function (PTF) of the DMC. For simplicity, the DMC
is characterized by triple (X,Y,PY |X).
Now, assume Alice wishes to send message M through the DMC to Bob such that he
can retrieve message M̂ with a desired level of reliability determined by average probability
of error P{M̂ 6= M}. To achieve this goal, she maps M to an n−length vector x by an
(encoding) function F , which is called an encoder. Then, she sends the codeword x to Bob
by n times transmissions over the communication channel. Finally, Bob maps the received
signal y to message M̂ by a (decoding) function D, which is called a decoder. The pair of
functions (F ,D) is also referred to as a coding scheme. The mathematical model of this
communication system is sketched in Figure (1.1) based on Shannon’s study [4].
According to Shannon’s work [4, 5], a communication channel is said to be perfectly
reliable (zero-error) if
P{M̂ 6= M} = 0 .
Shannon [5] proved that it is possible to send a positive rate over a point-to-point DMC
with perfect reliability if and only if (iff) for every y ∈ Y there exists (x, x′) ∈ X2, where
x 6= x′, such that PY |X(y|x′)PY |X(y|x) = 0. This result shows that achieving a perfectly









ChannelM x = F(M) y M̂ = D(y)
Figure 1.1: A communication system with a point-to-point noisy channel.
of the average probability of error is considered in general to examine the reliability of a
communication system as follows.
Definition 1.3 (Asymptotic reliability (AR) condition). Let M = {1, . . . , ⌈2nR⌉}, where
R ∈ R+ ∪ {0} and n ∈ N. Assume message M ∈ M is a uniformly distributed random
variable and RV M̂ ∈ M is the decoded message at Bob. Define Perror(n) , P{M̂ 6= M}.
The communication from Alice to Bob over the point-to-point channel (Xn,Yn,Py|x) is
said to be asymptotically reliable if there exists a pair of functions (F ,D) with1
F : M → Xn (1.2a)











P{M̂ 6= i} = 0 , (1.3)
where M̂ = D(y), x = F(M), and conditional probability of y given x is Py|x. Further, the
information rate R is called an achievable rate with respect to the asymptotic reliability
(AR) condition (1.3).
In information theory, a fundamental objective of channel coding problem is to find the
1The encoder and the decoder are assumed to be deterministic functions. In fact, randomization at
either the encoder or the decoder does not increase channel capacity of the point-to-point channel [3, 6].
4
channel capacity as follows.
Definition 1.4. (Channel capacity) The supremum of all achievable rates with respect to
the asymptotic reliability (AR) condition (1.3) is defined as the channel capacity of the
point-to-point channel (Xn,Yn,Py|x).
Assuming rate R is an achievable rate, we sometimes need to examine how Perror(n) → 0
as n → ∞. Specially, this issue has a practical importance when a negligible positive
error is tolerable due to the application because large block length leads to delay in the
decoding step. On the other hand, a trade-off between the finite block length and the
average probability of error is an essential issue to design an encoder-decoder for a given
channel. The reliability-exponent is utilized to measure how the average probability of
error converges to zero.
Definition 1.5. The reliability condition 1.3 is said to be achievable with reliability-





log(Perror(n)) ≥ εr . (1.4)








[T (λ,PX)− λR] , (1.6)





) is the mutual information function
between RVs X and Y , and














CI = Qa(K,M) M̂ = Qb(K, Y )
H(M |Z)






Figure 1.2: Shannon’s model: Noise-free secrecy system.
1.2 One-Time Pad System
The problem of secure transmission of messages, which is known as a secrecy problem, was
mathematically formulated by Shannon [7] in 1949. As shown in Figure 1.2, Shannon’s
model [7] consists of two noise-free communication channels: a main channel from Alice
to Bob, and a wiretap channel from Alice to Eve. A third party, known as a key generator,
distributes a common secret, called a key, to Alice and Bob before they launch commu-
nication such that Eve has no access to the key. In Shannon’s model [7], Alice and Bob
exploit the symmetric-key cryptography [8] to keep the data transmission secure 2.
Specifically, assume M, K, and CI are the message set, the key set and the cipher
set, respectively, such that each set has a fixed finite size. Also, denote the message, the
key, and the cipher, which are random variables (RVs), by M , K, and CI respectively.
Define the function Qa : K×M → CI as the encryption function at Alice and the function
Qb : K×Y → M as the decryption function at Bob, where Y is the output alphabet set of
the main channel.
Alice wishes to send the message M ∈ M to Bob reliably (M̂ = M) in the presence
of Eve such that Eve is unable to reduce her ambiguity about the message M having Z
2For definition of asymmetric key (public key) cryptography, see [9].
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from the wiretap channel. To achieve this goal, Alice computes cipher CI = Qa(K,M)
and sends it to Bob. Bob, who receives Y = CI from the noise-free main channel, retrieves
the message M̂ ∈ M by M̂ = Qb(K, Y ). Eve obtains the same copy of the cipher as Bob
does, i.e., Z = Y = CI. Then, she does her best to reduce her level of ambiguity about
message M .
The perfect security condition guarantees that Eve is unable to reduce her ambiguity
about message M with having intercepted signal Z, no matter how much time, memory
and computational power she needs. Shannon [7] mathematically formulated this condition
by the (Shannon) entropy function [4] (see also (2.1) and (2.2)) as follows.
Definition 1.6 (Perfect security (Shannon’s criterion for security [7])). Recalling Shan-
non’s model in Figure 1.2, the communication system is said to be perfectly secure against
Eve, if there exist functions Qa and Qb such that
H(M) = H(M |Z) , (1.8)
where function
H(M |Z) , H(M,Z)−H(Z)
is called the equivocation function.
Shannon [7] proved that condition
H(K) ≥ H(M) (1.9)
is a necessary condition for the perfect security of symmetric-key cryptography (Shannon’s
model in Figure 1.2). That is, the uncertainty of the key must be at least as large as the
uncertainty of the message. Shannon [4] proved that a one-time pad system, which was
originally proposed by Vernam [10], can implement a perfectly secure communication if
a key-stream generator [8, Page 21] with H(K) = H(M) is provided. As an example of
the one-time pad system, the perfect security of Shannon’s model with Modulo-Additive
functions [8] is established in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1.1 (Modulo-Additive functions for the one-time pad system [7]). Let M = K =
{1, . . . , N0}, where N0 ∈ N. Let Qa and Qb be addition functions modulo N0 3, i.e.,
CI=Qa(K,M)=K +M (mod N0) (1.10a)
M̂=Qb(K, Y ) =K + Y (mod N0) . (1.10b)
Assume that the message M ∈ M is picked up at random according to an arbitrary distri-
bution. If K ∈ K is a uniformly distributed random variable whose realization is given by
the key generator to both Alice and Bob, then Shannon’s model is perfectly secure according
to Definition 1.6.
Although ease of implementation of the encryption and decryption functions in a one-
time pad system, distribution of a confidential key with H(K) ≥ H(M), which demands
private channels from the key generator to Alice and to Bob, remains a challenging issue
in practice. Hence, the implementation of a one-time pad system is not usually practical.
The one-time pad system can also be exploited to provide security in a (noisy) wiretap
channel. To illustrate this idea, let us first define the (noisy) wiretap channel with one
sender (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Eve), where Eve is a wiretapper, as follows.
Definition 1.7 (Wiretap channel). A wiretap channel with one sender (Alice) and one
main receiver (Bob) and one wiretapper (Eve) is characterized by (Xn,Yn × Zn,Pyz|x),
where
• n is the block length;
• x is the channel input (from Alice), y is the first channel output (to Bob), z is the
second channel output (to Eve);
• Xn is the input alphabet, i.e., x ∈ Xn;
• Yn is the first output alphabet and Zn is the second output alphabet, i.e., (y, z) ∈
Yn × Zn;
• Pyz|x is the probability transition function (PTF) of the wiretap channel.



















Figure 1.3: Set-up of a one-time pad system in a (noisy) wiretap channel.
The following example shows that concatenation of a one-time pad and an encoder-
decoder can provide perfect security in a (noisy) wiretap channel if condition (1.9) is met.
Example 1.1. As shown in Figure 1.3, assume Alice is connected to Bob, the legitimate re-
ceiver, and to Eve, the wiretapper, through a (noisy) wiretap channel (Xn,Yn×Zn,Py,z|x).
A uniformly distributed key K ∈ {1, . . . , N0} is provided to both Alice and Bob by a key
generator. Alice wishes to send a message M ∈ {1, . . . , N0} over the channel to Bob with
perfect security in presence of Eve. To do this, Alice, first enciphers the message M into
a cipher CI by CI = Qa(K,M) according to (1.10a); then, she encodes CI by an encoder
F into x according to (1.2a) and sends it. Correspondingly, the receiver first decodes
the received signal y by a decoder D according to (1.2b) so that he recovers his cipher
ĈI ∈ M, and finally he calculates his message M̂ = Qb(K, ĈI) according to (1.10b). In
this case, the communication is perfectly secure according to Definition 1.6; however, the




To design a practical symmetric-key cryptographic algorithm, a key with a reasonable
size is applied which violates condition (1.9). That key must provide a given level of con-
ditional security which depends on the application and on the proficiency of the (possible)
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wiretappers. That is, cryptographic algorithms are usually designed based on computa-
tional security and/or complexity of known attacks rather than the perfect security. In
these cases, eavesdroppers are assumed to be equipped with limited processing power and
time. A computationally secure algorithm is designed based on either the assumed yet
unproven hardness of a certain problem such as discrete logarithm or a proof with certain
computational restrictions. Generally, the accurate meaning of the computational security
depends on the applications for which the cryptographic algorithm is to be designed and
on the constraints assumed for wiretappers. Despite the practical benefit of such a cryp-
tographic algorithm which demands a key with a reasonable size, it might be broken some
day due to rapid growth of computational processors. Hence, these algorithms should be
maintained with new cryptographic techniques such that they fulfill the requested level of
computational security against eavesdroppers with up-to-date technologies.
1.3 Information-Theoretic Security
The perfect security in Figure 1.3 is acquired by concatenation of a one-time pad system
and a channel encoder-decoder. That is, the enciphering-deciphering step is separated
from the encoding-decoding step. In Example 1.1, the overall channel from input terminal
of the encoder to the output terminal of the decoder is assumed to be noiseless. Hence,
condition (1.9) is applied to the design of the one-time pad system in Figure 1.3.
Now, suppose a noisy wiretap channel in which the encoding and enciphering can be
jointly implemented in one step as well as the decoding and deciphering. The question is
if condition (1.9) is still required to provide perfect security in this new model. If yes, a
perfectly secure communication system would be still practically infeasible because of the
key-distribution issue. If no, violation of condition (1.9) might result in an implementation
of a secure communication system with no key-distribution concerns.
In 1975, Wyner [11] proved that the security4 is achievable in an asymptotic sense (see
Definition 1.8) with no pre-shared key if Eve receives a noisy copy of Bob’s received signal
4We reserve term perfect security only for Shannon’s criterion for security given in Definition 1.6.
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Figure 1.4: Wyner’s model: Degraded noisy wiretap model.
from Alice. This work justified the idea that sending a positive secure rate is possible
without using any key if Bob has an advantage over Eve. The achievable security, which
is referred to as information-theoretic security, is guaranteed even if Eve has unlimited
computational power and time. As shown in Figure 1.4, Wyner’s model is based on the
fact that the legitimate receiver has a physical advantage over the wiretapper in most real
communication systems. In Wyner’s model, Bob’s advantage over Eve is that Eve receives
a degraded version [2, 6] of Bob’s signal, e.g., the eavesdropper is located further from the
transmitter than the legitimate receiver. Wyner [11] exploited this advantage rather than
a common key between Alice and Bob to securely transmit a message.
For his model in Figure 1.4, Wyner [11] assumed that the main channel and the wiretap
channel are DMCs. He developed the idea of using a (block) wiretap coding scheme to
achieve an (asymptotically) secure and reliable communication over the wiretap model.
The wiretap coding scheme consists of three components: an encoder W, a decoder D, and
a wiretap codebook [3, 6], where the block length is assumed to be n. In Figure 1.4, x, y,
and z are three random vectors which represent the emitted signal by Alice, the received
signal by Bob, and the received signal by Eve, respectively. An objective of the wiretap
coding scheme is to provide security in addition to reliability in an asymptotic sense.
When no security condition matters, in Section 1.1, we mentioned that the AR condition
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is met by using a pair of suitable deterministic encoder-decoder for a given DMC from Alice
to Bob. When security is a concern in the wiretap channel, Wyner [11] suggested using a
stochastic encoder 5, where a given message M maps randomly into a codeword x from a
set of codewords according to stochastic function W. In other words, a wiretap codebook
consists of all mappings from any message to the corresponding set6 of codewords such
that the total sets partition the set of all codewords in that wiretap codebook. Hence, the
randomized encoding function is represented by conditional distribution function W(x|M),
i.e.,
∀M ∈ M :
∑
x∈Xn
W(x|M) = 1 (1.11)
where the elements of matrix W(x|M) are non-negative. The role of the randomized
encoder in Wyner’s model is illustrated as follows.
The stochastic encoder encodes a message as if it adds (applies) an artificial random
noise to the output of a deterministic encoder. Bob considers this noise as extra noise on
top of noise of the main channel, and so he decodes the message from the noisy signal at
expense of loosing some portion of his achievable rate with respect to the AR condition 1.3.
However, this noise can exhaust the capacity of Eve’s channel as she receives a degraded
(noisier) version of Bob’s signal, and so she can attain no information about the message.
Motivated byWyner [11], the security level of a wiretap channel against Eve is measured
by equivocation rate [13] (see Subsection 2.2.1). In this thesis, we examine the security of
the communication in an asymptotic sense according to the following definition.
Definition 1.8 (Asymptotic security (AS) condition). Let M = {1, . . . , ⌈2nR⌉}, where
R ∈ R+ ∪ {0} and n ∈ N. Assume message M ∈ M is a uniformly distributed random
variable. The communication from Alice to Bob over wiretap channel (Xn,Yn×Zn,Pyz|x) is






I(M ; z) = 0 . (1.12)
5It is also known as a randomized encoder [12].
6This set is also known as a bin in information theory.
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where I(M ; z) is obtained from joint distribution function




Further, rate R is said to satisfy the AS condition.
In the field of information-theoretic security, a fundamental objective of a secrecy prob-
lem is to find the secrecy capacity [11] of a given wiretap channel as introduced below7.
Definition 1.9 (Secrecy capacity). An achievable rate R with respect to the AR condition
(1.3) in Definition 1.3 is called a securely achievable rate if it satisfies the AS condition
according to Definition 1.8 as well. The supremum of all securely achievable rates is called
the secrecy capacity.
Wyner [11] characterized the secrecy capacity of a discrete memoryless wiretap chan-
nel, i.e. the main channel and the wiretap channel are both DMCs in Figure 1.4 (see
Subsection 2.2.1 for more details). Leung-Yan-Cheong [14] simplified the secrecy capac-
ity of Wyner’s model where both the main channel and wiretap channel are symmetric
DMCs [1, Page 94]. This secrecy capacity, which is achieved at the uniform input distri-
bution on the main channel, is simplified to
C
S
= Cm − Cmw , (1.13)
where Cm and Cmw are the capacity of the main channel, from Alice to Bob, and the
capacity of the overall main-wiretap channel, from Alice to Eve, respectively.
As shown in Figure 1.5, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [13] extended Wyner’s model
to a (physically) degraded8 Gaussian wiretap channel in which the main channel and the
wiretap channel are two continuous9 memoryless (and discrete time) channels [1, Ch. 7]
7In fact, the capacity-equivocation region of the wiretap channel is the main goal of the secrecy problem
(see Subsection 2.2.1 for more details).
8See Subsection 2.2.1 for definitions of different types of degradedness.












y = x+ g1 M̂
z = y + g′2
g1
g′2
Figure 1.5: The Gaussian wiretap channel.
with independent additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [1, Sec. 7.4]. Specifically, random
vectors g1 and g
′
2 are independent Gaussian noise with independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) components having distribution N (0, σ21) and distribution N (0, σ22 − σ21),
respectively, where σ2 ≥ σ1. Alice’s transmitter is subject to average power constraint
1
n
E(xxt) ≤ Γ as well [1, Sec. 7.4]. For the Gaussian wiretap channel, the authors [13]














Csiszár and Körner [12] generalized Wyner’s result to a broadcast channel (BC) [2,15]
with a transmitter (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Eve). They [12] characterized the
secrecy capacity of the BC, where both Bob and Eve decode a common message and Bob
retrieves an extra private message from his received signal. For this model, they proved
that a non-zero secrecy capacity always exists unless Eve’s channel is less noisy [16] (see
Definition 2.9) than Bob’s channel.
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1.4 The Key Agreement Problem
Another notable problem in the field of information-theoretic security is the key agreement
problem which was introduced by Maurer [17] as well as Ahlswede and Csiszár [18,19]. In
this section, the concept of the key agreement problem is illustrated in Subsection 1.4.1.
Main key agreement models and related work are reviewed in Subsection 1.4.2. Finally, the
privacy amplification is introduced in Subsection 1.4.3 for security enhancement of agreed
keys.
1.4.1 The Concept
In an information-theoretic key agreement problem, generally, some legitimate parties on
a communication network wish to share a secret (key) reliably by using a (block) key
agreement coding scheme such that wiretappers are unable to gain any information about
the key. To do this, some signals are to be communicated between authorized parties
(subject to constraints of the network) in presence of the wiretappers. This step, which is
known as key exchange, is usually performed prior to the transmission of messages. At the
end of the key exchange step, each authorized party retrieves his/her own key by decoding
total available signals at his/her terminal. The agreed keys are finally to be exploited for
symmetric-key cryptography [8] in the step of the transmission of messages [17, 18, 20].
Hence, the keys are selected from a same alphabet (key) set with a finite size, which is
denoted by K in this thesis. Moreover, the agreed keys must satisfy the AR condition
and the AS condition in the same way as messages (M, M̂) ∈ M2 do in Definition 1.3 and
Definition 1.8, respectively.
Further to these two conditions, any key is required to look like a uniformly distributed
random variable as the third condition; thus, the key is often called a secure common
randomness in the literature, e.g., [3, 18, 19, 21]. This condition is called the asymptotic
randomness condition (ARN) as block length n → ∞. Near uniformity of a RV with a
finite size can be measured in various ways; one popular way in information theory, which
is used in our work, is to compare the entropy rate of the RV with that of a uniformly
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distributed RV with the same size [3, Ch. 17].
These conditions are clarified as follows based on the key agreement model sketched in
Figure 1.6. In Figure 1.6, assume that Alice and Bob want to share a key by key exchange
over the wiretap channel (Xn,Yn × Zn,Pyz|x) according to Definition 1.7 as well as over
a public channel [17] (see Definition 3.1 for more details). Due to the nature of a public
channel, any signal sent over this channel is accessible by Eve. Although the eavesdropper
is able to obtain the same copy of transmitted signals over the public channel, she is not
able to tamper those signals in any sense as the channel is assumed to be authenticated10.
For generalization, assume that Alice, Bob, and Eve have also access to side information
a, b, and e, respectively (see Chapter 3 for more details.). Let map the total signals
transmitted over the public channel to a random variable denoted by P . After the key
exchange step, Alice and Bob retrieve key K ∈ K and K̂ ∈ K from all available information
at her/his terminal, respectively.
For the key exchange step an admissible key agreement coding scheme, including
encoders, decoders, key generators, and a key agreement codebook, is utilized based on
restrictions of a given model (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for more details and examples).
After the key exchange step, the agreed keys must satisfy the following conditions such
that they are acceptable for symmetric-key cryptography.
Definition 1.10. Assume an admissible key agreement coding scheme with key set K =
{1, . . . , ⌈2nRK ⌉}, where R
K
∈ R+ ∪ {0} and n ∈ N. Let K ∈ K and K̂ ∈ K be Alice’s key
and Bob’s key at the end of the key exchange step. The efficiency of the admissible key
agreement coding scheme is examined by the following functions.
1. The reliability of (K, K̂) is measured by the average probability of error
Perror(n) , P{K̂ 6= K} , (1.15)
which is a function of block length n.
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Figure 1.6: Key agreement between Alice and Bob in presence of Eve.






I(K; z, e, P ) , (1.16)
which is a function of block length n.
3. The randomness of K is measured by11
X (n) , log(|K|)−H(K)
n
, (1.17)
which is a function of block length n.
A fundamental objective of a key agreement problem is to find the key capacity of a
given model according to the following definition.
11log(|K|)−H(K) = DKL(PK ||P ′K), which is Kullback-Leibler divergence function [2,3] between distri-
bution PK of K and the uniform distribution P ′K(k) = 1|K| on set K.
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Definition 1.11. A key rate R
K
is said to be achievable if there exists an admissible key
agreement code such that12
The AR Condition : lim
n→∞
Perror(n) = 0 , (1.18a)




(n) = 0 , (1.18b)
The ARN Condition : lim
n→∞
X (n) = 0 , (1.18c)







For a given key agreement problem, the supremum of all achievable key rates is called the
key capacity of the given model, and it is denoted by C
K
.
As a special case, when the public channel is one-way from Alice to Bob (forward direc-
tion), it is referred to as the forward public channel and the corresponding key capacity is
called forward key capacity. Similarly, a unilateral public channel from Bob to Alice (back-
ward direction) is called a backward public channel, and the corresponding key capacity is
called backward key capacity.
Now, suppose that Alice and Bob complete the key exchange step such that their agreed
keys satisfy conditions (1.18). Then, Alice wishes to send a message securely to Bob by
using a symmetric-key cryptographic algorithm. How much is the largest achievable secure
rate by using the agreed keys for encryption-decryption? This question is addressed by the
following lemma13.
Lemma 1.2. Let K = {1, . . . , ⌈2nRK ⌉} and N0 = ⌈2nRK ⌉. Assume that Alice and Bob
agree on keys (K, K̂) ∈ K2, which satisfy conditions (1.18). Having the agreed keys, Alice
then encrypts and sends message M ∈ {1, . . . , N0}, independent of K, to Bob according to
12In Appendix A, we prove that the AS condition for K together with the AR condition for (K, K̂)
implies the AS condition for K̂.
13This lemma is originally given in Ahlswede-Csiszár [18, Lem. 2.1] for a noiseless wiretap channel. How-
ever, we state the lemma with a slight generalization for a noisy wiretap channel according to Example 1.1.
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Figure 1.3, where
CI=Qa(K,M)=K +M (mod N0)
M̂=Qb(K̂, CI)=K̂ + ĈI (mod N0) .




} is a securely achievable rate according
to Definition 1.9, where C
S
is the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel.
In general, any securely achievable rate sent over the wiretap channel (Xn,Yn×Zn,Pyz|x)






holds for any given wiretap model. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we show that this in-
equality can be strict.
1.4.2 The Source-Type Model vs. The Channel-Type Model
For the key agreement between Alice and Bob in presence of Eve, Ahlswede and Csiszár [18]
introduced two fundamental paradigms14: the source-type model and the channel-type
model.
The source-type model [18] has a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS) with




PABE(ai, bi, ei). Source vectors a, b, e are available non-causally (prior
to the key exchange step) at Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. Moreover, there exists a
noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity for two-way communication between Alice
and Bob. The source-type key agreement model is sketched in Figure 1.7.
Ahlswede and Csiszár [18] characterized the forward key capacity of the source-type
14These paradigms are still studied by many researchers in the field of information-theoretic key agree-
ment, e.g., see publications [25–27]. On the other hand, papers [28, 29] studied the key agreement over


















[I(U ;B|W )− I(U ;E|W )] (1.20)
where U and W are auxiliary RVs such that W → U → A → (B,E) forms a Markov




≤ I(A;B|E) . (1.21)
This UB is tight for the following special cases:
1. when e is independent of (a,b), e.g., e = 0; in this case
C
K
= I(A;B) , (1.22)
2. when A → B → E forms a Markov chain; in this case C
K
= I(A;B)− I(A;E),
3. when A → E → B forms a Markov chain, then C
K
= 0,
4. when either Alice or Bob has access to Eve’s signal15, then C
K
= I(A;B|E).












Figure 1.8: Key agreement over a channel-type model.
For the first case, the authors [18] constructed the key agreement coding scheme based
on Slepian-Wolf source coding strategy [32]. In this case, the key capacity is achieved with
only one single transmission over the public channel in either forward or backward direc-
tion. Hence, the key capacity, the forward key capacity, and the backward key capacity
are all equal [18, Prop 1].
For the second case, the key capacity is achieved with only one single transmission over
the public channel in the forward direction. Hence, the key capacity and the forward key
capacity are equal [18, Thm. 1].
For the last case, the key capacity equals the backward or forward key capacity, respec-
tively, according as Alice or Bob is informed [18, Thm. 3].
In a channel-type model, the parties have access to two channels: a (noisy) discrete
memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WC) with PTF P(y, z|x) =
n∏
i=1
PY Z|X(yi, zi|xi), and a
noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity in both directions. This model is depicted
in Figure 1.8.









[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z)] , (1.23)
legitimate parties [30, 31].
21
where U is an auxillary RV such that U → X → (Y, Z). The forward key capacity equals
the secrecy capacity of the corresponding DM-WC16 [12], and no transmission over the
public channel is required for key generation [18, Thm. 2]. Also, they [18] derived a UB on






I(X ; Y |Z) , (1.24)
where P
X
is the input distribution on the DM-WC. This UB is tight for the following
special cases:
1. when the DM-WC becomes a (private) DMC from Alice to Bob as sketched in Fig-






I(X ; Y ) , (1.25)






[I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)],
3. when Bob’s channel is a degraded version of Eve’s, i.e., X → Z → Y , where the key
capacity in this case is [18, Thm. 2]
C
K
= 0 , (1.26)






I(X ; Y |Z),
5. when the outputs of the DM-WC are independent given its input, i.e., Y → X → Z;






[I(X ; Y )− I(Y ;Z)] . (1.27)
16See Section 2.2.1 for the secrecy capacity of the DM-WC.











Figure 1.9: Key agreement over a channel-type model with a private DMC.
For the first case, the DMC is intrinsically secure against Eve, and the key capacity of
the model equals the (ordinary) capacity of the DMC, which is achievable without using the
public channel at all [18, Prop. 1]. For the second case, the key capacity equals the secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel, and the public channel is not used at all [18, Thm. 2].
This means that the public channel is not required for key generation in cases 1 and 2. In
other words, for these cases, the key capacity, the forward key capacity, and the backward
key capacity are all equal.
For the fourth case, the key capacity equals the backward or forward key capacity,
respectively, according as Alice or Bob is informed [18, Thm. 3]. In this case, the known
signal of the wiretapper at one of legitimate terminals may contribute in key generation
more than the first case where the wiretapper has no access to the main channel. This is
due to the fact that the positive effect of the information gained by authorized parties from
Eve’s signal can be more than the negative effect of her presence in the key agreement.
For the fifth case, the key capacity equals the backward key capacity, which is achieved
with one single transmission over the public channel in the backward direction. Also, it
is generally larger than forward key capacity of the model [18, Thm. 2-Corol. 2]. This
case was originally studied by Maurer [17, 33]. He assumed a binary symmetric channel
(BSC) [1] as the main channel (from Alice to Bob) and a BSC as the wiretap channel (from
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Alice to Eve) such that the channels have independent noise. Using the public channel in
backward direction for key generation, he proved that achieving a positive key rate is fea-
sible even if the capacity of the wiretap channel (from Alice to Eve) exceeds that of the
main channel (from Alice to Bob).
In similar and parallel publications, Khisti et al. [34] and Prabhakaran et al. [35, 36]
merged the source-type model with the channel-type model, where the parties have access
to a DMMS further to a DM-WC. This combined model has no public channel at all.
Khisti et al. [34] achieved a lower bound (LB) and a UB on the key capacity. The bounds
coincide when the wiretap channel is a product of reversely degraded channels18 [6, 37].
Prabhakaran et al. [35,36] investigated a trade-off between the key capacity and secrecy
capacity of the model. They applied a separation strategy which converts the DM-WC into
a public bit pipe and a private bit pipe [35,36]. According to this sub-optimal strategy, an
achievable key rate is obtained by the use of the private pipe (from Alice to Bob). With
the help of these pipes, another key rate is added to the last one from the correlated source
components (see [35, Thm. 1] for more details). The strategy is shown to become optimum
when both the DM-WC and the DMMS can be decomposed into product of two degraded
BCs [37] and product of two degraded DMMS, respectively. The first sub-channel and
sub-source components are degraded in Bob’s favor, and the second ones are degraded in
Eve’s favor [35, 36].
Nitinawarat [38] as well as Watanabe and Oohama [39, 40] investigated the key capac-
ity for a source-type model where the DMMS is replaced by a Gaussian multiple source.
Specifically, Nitinawarat [38] assumed that Alice and Bob have correlated Gaussian SI and
Eve has no SI. Applying a rate limited quantization on the Gaussian SI, the author calcu-
lated the key capacity given in (1.22) for the Gaussian RVs in his model [38]. Watanabe
and Oohama [39, 40] considered three correlated Gaussian vectors generated i.i.d. accord-
ing to a fixed covariance matrix. Each vector is given to one party. They investigated
the forward key capacity over a rate limited one-way public channel with capacity C
P1
.
The forward key capacity is obtained as a function of the public channel capacity for the
18Also, it is referred to as a degraded channel in Eve’s favor [35].
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following special case.
Theorem 1.1. Consider a source-type model, which is sketched in Figure 1.7, with a
Gaussian multiple source such that its public channel is one-way in the forward direction
with capacity C
P1
∈ [0,∞). Specifically, assume (a,b, e) is i.i.d. according to (A,B,E) ∼





























where Σb|ae and Σb|e are the conditional variance of B given (A,E) and E, respectively.
1.4.3 Privacy Amplification
Comparing the security condition given in Definition 1.8 with Shannon’s criterion of secu-
rity (perfect security) given in Definition 1.6 implies that a secure communication is the
sense of Definition 1.8 is not necessarily a secure communication in the sense of Defini-
tion 1.6. That is, Definition 1.8 requires only Eve’s ratio of information about the message
to be negligible. Hence, she can gain a possibly considerable amount of information about
the message. Similarly, Condition 1.18b guarantees that only Eve’s ratio of information
about the key is negligible but not her information about any single bit of the key. On
the other hand, a pair of agreed keys according to Definition 1.11 guarantees only a secure
communication in the sense of Definition 1.8 according to Lemma 1.2.
Conclusively, Definition 1.8 and Definition 1.11 are too weak to provide privacy require-
ments [7,8] for the entire message and the entire key, respectively. Thus, the AS conditions
in these definitions are referred to as the weak sense of security in the literature [3, 41].
Also, the achievable key rate and key capacity introduced in Definition 1.11 are known as
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the weak sense of achievable key rate and that of key capacity, respectively 19.
New definition for the achievable key rate is given below to assure that the entire key
is secure. Following [3], we first combine the security and the randomness conditions of
Definition 1.11 into a security index
S(n) , log(|K|)−H(K|z, e, P ) , (1.30)
where K, z, e and P are defined in Subsection 1.4.1 according to Figure 1.6.
The reliability-exponent for the average probability of error 1.15 in a key agreement
problem can be defined in a similar way as it was given in Definition (1.5) for messages.
In the following definition, the reliability-exponent and the security-exponent for the key
agreement model sketched in Figure 1.6 are defined.
Definition 1.12. Assume an admissible key agreement coding scheme with key set K =
{1, . . . , ⌈2nRK ⌉}, where R
K
∈ R+ ∪ {0} and n ∈ N. Let K ∈ K and K̂ ∈ K be Alice’s
key and Bob’s key at the end of the key exchange step. The reliability condition (1.18a)
and security condition 1.18b are said to be met with reliability-exponent εr and security-











log(S(n)) ≥ εs . (1.31b)
where Perror(n) and S(n) are given in (1.15) and (1.30), respectively.
In the following, a strong sense of key capacity is defined. This definition guarantees
the privacy requirement [7, 8]of any single bit of the agreed keys.
Definition 1.13. A key rate R
K
is said to be strongly achievable if conditions (1.18) are
19In this thesis, we treat the weak sense of security, achievable key rate, key capacity unless otherwise
is stated.
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satisfied with reliability-exponent εr > 0 and security-exponent εs > 0, respectively. The
supremum of all strongly achievable key rates is called the key capacity in the strong sense.
Comparing Definition 1.13 with Definition 1.11, the key capacity in the strong sense
is generally a lower bound on the key capacity in the weak sense. However, Maurer and
Wolf [41] proved that the key capacity of a source-type model in the strong sense equals
the key capacity of that model in the weak sense. They [41] also established this equality
for a channel-type model with no public channel 20 (see [3, Page. 450-451] for more details).
In the following, their technique is briefly explained.
At the end of the key exchange step, Alice and Bob retrieve key K and key K̂, respec-
tively, with a weakly achievable key rate R
K
according to Definition 1.11; thus, Eve gains
substantial information about the keys. Hence, the final step of a key agreement problem
is to strengthen the security and reliability of the agreed keys. This step is called privacy
amplification which gives Alice and Bob key K ′ and key K̂ ′, respectively, with strongly
achievable key rate R′
K
according to Definition 1.13.
Privacy amplification was introduced by Bennett et al. [42] in the context of quantum
cryptography as a method to extract secrecy from weakly random (partially secure) se-
quences. Universal hashing [43] and extractors [3, Sec. 17.1] are techniques for the privacy
amplification [24, 41].
Maurer and Wolf [41] applied extractors to an achievable key rate in the weak sense to
enhance its security and reliability specifications. For the privacy amplification, they [24,41]
show that using extractors is a better technique than using hash functions in the sense that
it requires shorter messages to be communicated between Alice and Bob.
20In fact, Maurer and Wolf [41] proved that the strong sense of secrecy capacity [41] and the weak
sense of secrecy capacity (Definition 1.9) are equal for Csiszár-Körner’s wiretap channel [12]. However, the
secrecy capacity and key capacity of this model are equal when there is no public channel [18].
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1.5 Channels with Random States
In this thesis, we focus on the class of state-dependent wiretap models. Before describing
our model, we review the essential research in the field of state-dependent channels in this
section.
Physical properties of a communication channel which control its PTF can be mod-
eled by channel state information (CSI), and the corresponding channel is called a state-
dependent channel. In wireless communications, the CSI includes scattering, fading, in-
terference and power decay of a propagated signal. In wire-line communications, physical
conditions of lines, like temperature or external forces (vibrations) are modeled as the CSI.
Variations in the noise level due to interference or signal level due to fading can be also
modeled as the CSI.
The output(s) of a state-dependent channel are a stochastic function of both the chan-
nel inputs and the CSI as a random vector. Specifically, a state-dependent channel has a
collection of PTFs, where realization of the CSI at each transmission determines the actual
PTF for that transmission. State-dependent channels model a large variety of practical
channels, e.g., [6]:
• Compound channels [3]: The PTF is unknown for both sender and receiver, and it
is only known over a set of PTFs;
• Arbitrary varying channels [44, 45]: The PTF alters per symbol transmission; e.g.,
channels suffered from Jamming signals;
• Host image in digital watermarking [46];
• Wireless fading channels [47];
• Writing on defected memories [48–50].
In this thesis, we are interested in the class of channels with random states where the




PS(si). In this section, we review the capacity of memoryless channels with
random states. We consider the channels with a transmitter (Alice), a receiver (Bob), and
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PTF P(y|x, s) =
n∏
i=1
PY |XS(yi|xi, si). No feedback is assumed from Bob to Alice. Alice and
Bob each may have access to a random vector as side information (SI) . Let the SI at Alice
be a, which has the same length as that of s. If the whole sequence a is available to Alice
prior to each block transmission, the SI is said to be non-causal. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if
only sequence ai1 is known at Alice before transmission of i
th symbol, the SI is said to be
causal21. The SI is said to be fully known at the transmitter if a = s; otherwise, it is said
to be partially known.
The significant publications which study the (ordinary) capacity of the channels with
random states are as follows.
In 1958, Shannon [51] derived the ordinary capacity of a state-dependent DMC with
casually known CSI at the transmitter. He proved that the capacity of this channel equals
that of a DMC without any state, which has the same output alphabet and an extended
input alphabet. The input alphabet of this equivalent channel consists of all mappings from
the state alphabet to the input alphabet of the original channel. A particular input letter
of the equivalent channel can be considered as a particular function (strategy) from the
state alphabet to the input alphabet of the original channel. Shannon utilized strategies in
which the input to the channel depends only on the current state of the channel but not on
previous ones. He established that this type of strategies are sufficient for the equivalent
channel to achieve capacity of the original channel [52].
Goldsmith and Varaiya [47] achieved the capacity of a fading channel in two cases:
When the CSI is fully (whether causally or non-causally) known at both the transmitter
and receiver, and when the CSI is known at the receiver alone. Optimal schemes are based
on power adaption. For the former, they used a water-pouring in time domain as the
optimal power adaption.
Kuznetsov and Tsybakov [48] studied coding for a memory with defective cells, which
is an example of a DMC with non-causally known CSI at the transmitter. Although
they offered some coding techniques for this channel, they did not attain its capacity.
21If there is no feedback from the receiver to the sender, it doesn’t matter whether the SI at the receiver
is available causally or non-causally in the sense of capacity. This is due to the fact that the receiver is
assumed to decode after receiving the whole block code.
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Gélfand and Pinsker [49] as well as Heegard and El Gamal [50] investigated capacity of
a state-dependent DMC with random states, where the CSI is non-causally known at the




[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;S)] , (1.32)
where U is an auxiliary RV such that U → (X,S) → Y forms a Markov chain. Further, the
capacity of this channel when i.i.d. random vector of SI dependent on the CSI is available




[I(U ; Y,B)− I(U ;S)] , (1.33)
where B represents the SI at Bob and U is an auxiliary RV such that U → (X,S) → (B, Y )
forms a Markov chain (PY B|XS is given by the channel).
Costa [55] extended Gélfand-Pinsker’s work to an AWGN channel with additive white
Gaussian interference (AWGI), where the interference (state) is non-causally known at the
transmitter. This model is sketched in Figure 1.10. In his model, Costa assumed that the
interference, s, and the noise, g, are sequences of i.i.d. components distributed according
to S ∼ N (0,Λ) and G ∼ N (0, σ2), respectively. Also, the transmitter is subject to average
power constraint 1
n
(xxt) ≤ Γ, where x is the transmission signal. In his celebrated paper,
writing on a dirty paper [55], Costa showed that the capacity of this channel equals that








The optimum coding strategy, which is known as dirty paper coding (DPC), is to adapt
transmitted signal to the state (dirts) such that the receiver obtains maximum possible
information from contaminated signal. Costa [55] proved that equation (1.32) with U =
X+γS can be applied to his model to compute the capacity. In this strategy, X ∼ N (0,Γ)
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which is interestingly independent of Λ. Based on DPC, the trivial idea of canceling the
known interference at the transmitter is not generally optimal.
Consider the causal version of Costa’s model, i.e., a power limited Gaussian channel
with AWGN and AWGI where realizations of the interference are causally known only at
the transmitter. In [56], the authors achieved the capacity of this channel in the high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime by lattice strategy. Although an LB and a UB on the
capacity are derived in [56], the capacity of this channel is not known for all SNRs.
1.6 State-Dependent Wiretap Models
As mentioned in the last section, the class of state-dependent channels models several
important communication channels. Thus, the security issue of this class needs much con-
sideration, specially in a state-dependent wireless network where unauthorized receivers
inherently attend. To provide this demand, several research groups have studied various
state-dependent wiretap models; among them, we highlight the following major studies in
which two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob) and a wiretapper (Eve) have access to the
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channel:
The compound wiretap channel was investigated in [57–59]. The PTF of a compound
channel is determined by the realization of the CSI, which is unknown to Alice, Bob, and
Eve; however, the PTF (or the CSI) of the compound channel is known only within a set of
candidates. This channel can be treated as a multi-cast channel with multiple wiretappers.
In other words, the number of states available to Bob becomes the number of receivers
such that each state corresponds to one receiver, and the number of states available to Eve
becomes the number of eavesdroppers such that each state corresponds to one eavesdrop-
per [57, 58]. An achievable coding scheme must be able to reliably transmit a message to
all receivers such that it remains perfectly secure against all wiretappers. An LB and a
UB on the secrecy capacity is reported in [57]. The LB achieves the secrecy capacity for
a degraded compound channel [57]. When the CSI is known at the receiver, the secrecy
capacity of the semi-deterministic compound channel and the parallel Gaussian compound
channel are attained in [58] and [59], respectively.
Han Vinck’s research group studied the secrecy problem in state-dependent channels
with random states [60–62]. Mitrpant and Han Vinck [60] merged Costa’s model (Fig-
ure 1.10) with Gaussian wiretap channel (Figure 1.5) to model a Gaussian state-dependent
wiretap channel (G-SWC) with a physically degraded wiretapper. They [60] achieved an
LB on the secrecy capacity which shows the secrecy capacity of the G-SWC with known
CSI at Alice is generally larger than that of the corresponding Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel [13], which has no interference. Although known CSI at Alice gives no improvement
on the ordinary capacity in Costa’s model [55], it generally enlarges the secrecy capacity
of a G-SWC. The achievable wiretap coding scheme is constructed based on DPC [55]
with wiretap strategies [11, 31]. The scheme has not been proven yet to be optimum in
general case. However, it is optimal in low signal (power) to interference (power) ratio
(SIR) regime as well as high SIR regime; in low SIR, it equals the (ordinary) capacity of
the main channel (from Alice to Bob) as well. A UB on the secrecy capacity is also derived
in [60]. This bound is the secrecy capacity of an enhanced Gaussian wiretap channel in
which Alice is generously permitted to control both her input signal and the interference.
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In Chapter 2, this work will be reviewed in more details.
In [61,62], the authors considered a degraded discrete memoryless state-dependent wire-
tap channel (DM-SWC) with PTF P(y, z|x, s) =
n∏
i=1
PY |XS(yi|xi, si)PZ|Y (zi|yi), where s is
drawn i.i.d. according to
n∏
i=1
PS(si) and it is non-causally known at Alice. Using double
random binning [6], an LB on the secrecy capacity and an achievable rate-equivocation re-
gion (see Chapter 2) are established in this work. The LB is optimally equals the ordinary
capacity of the main channel if sending a positive (information) rate from Alice to Eve
is not possible at the capacity achieving distribution of the main channel. Moreover, two
UBs are reported in [61]: the first one is the ordinary capacity of the main channel (from
Alice to Bob), and the second one is the secrecy capacity of an enhanced channel in which
s is governed by Alice as the second input further to x. In Chapter 2, this work will be
reviewed in more details.
Liu and Chen [63] extended the results of paper [61] to a DM-SWC with two sided
non-causal SI at Alice and Bob. They [63] obtained an achievable rate-equivocation region
for their model by combining the strategies of paper [61] with those of paper [53].
Khisti et al. [64] studied the key agreement problem over a DM-SWC with P(y, z|x, s) =
n∏
i=1
PY Z|XS(yi, zi|xi, si). In their model, s is drawn i.i.d. according to
n∏
i=1
PS(si) and it is
fully known at both Alice and Bob in non-causal form. They [64] investigated the key
capacity for the following two cases:





[I(U ; Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z)] , (1.36)
where U is an auxiliary RV such that U → (X,S) → (Y, Z) form a Markov chain.
• When a public channel with unlimited capacity in both directions is available. In this
case, if noise of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel are mutually independent [64,
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[I(X ; Y |Z, S) +H(S|Z)] . (1.37)
In [64], the key agreement coding scheme generates the achievable key rate based on two
different resources: a random number generator, and the CSI. However, this result is not
surprising as both Alice and Bob already have two exactly the same copies of the CSI at
the beginning of each transmission. Hence, the CSI can be concluded as a secure common
randomness when the portion which is revealed to Eve through the wiretap channel is
removed.
Chia and El Gamal [65] investigated secrecy capacity of a DM-SWC when the CSI is
fully known at both Alice and Bob. When the CSI is available causally, they achieved
an LB on the secrecy capacity. When the CSI is available non-causally, they also derived
a UB on the secrecy capacity. As the secrecy capacity of the non-causal case is not less
than that of the causal case, they applied this UB to the causal case as well. From these
bounds, they proved the secrecy capacity for the DM-SWC if Eve’s channel is less noisy
than Bob’s [16] for every state vector s. They [65, Thm. 3] showed that the secrecy capacity
for that special channel is the same for both causal and non-causal cases. This means the
optimal wiretap coding scheme for the non-causal case of a less noisy DM-SWC does not
utilize the future instants of the given CSI for encoding at each symbol transmission. The
achievable scheme is built on the following strategy:
For encoding, any message is split into two independent parts: the first part is encoded
by wiretap coding strategy [11], and the second part is encrypted by a one-time pad
system [10] and encoded with a deterministic encoder, where the key is taken from the
CSI (The portion which is not revealed to Eve through her channel). The strategy exploits
block Markov encoding [6] because the key used for encryption of the second part has




In this thesis, we study the key agreement problem over a state-dependent wiretap channel
paralleled with a public channel. The channel state is drawn i.i.d. according to a given
distribution and it is non-causally known at the transmitter. In Chapter 3, we study
the discrete memoryless (DM) model in which the wiretap channel is a DM-SWC (see
Section 1.6). This model is an extension of Gélfand-Pinsker’s model demonstrated in
Section 1.5. In Chapter 4, we study the Gaussian model in which the wiretap channel is
a power-limited Gaussian wiretap channel with additive interference (channel state). This
model is an extension of Costa’s model sketched in Figure 1.10.
In this section, we illustrate the motivations for the key agreement problem definitions.
We express a motivation of the DM model and that of the Gaussian model in Example 1.2
and Example 1.3, respectively.
Example 1.2. An essential part of cloud computing [66] is data storage and management.
As shown in Figure 1.11, suppose that multiple users connect to a server through a wireless
internet, which writes and stores data on multiple storage devices, e.g., hard disks. If a
memory cell of a storage device is proper, the data read from it is the same as the data
written on it. The written data is also referred to as the cell state. However, in practice,
some cells of a storage device may be defected. The defected cells are those ones whose
stored data can be read with random error [6, 50]. Hence, the relation between the read
data and the written data is statistically determined by a PTF. In this scenario, the server
knows the status of all memory cells at any time. On the other hand, the noisy channel
from each user to the server is characterized by another PTF. Thus, an overall (noisy)
channel, which is in fact memoryless, can be modeled from cell states to each receiver.
An important issue in cloud computing is privacy of the data received by each user. To
apply symmetric-key cryptography for this issue, a key distribution step is required before
a data transmission step begins. One solution is to model the scenario as a key agreement
problem over a discrete memoryless state-dependent wiretap channel from the cells to the
receivers in which the cell states are non-causally known at the transmitter. Investigation
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Figure 1.11: A motivation of the discrete memoryless model.
of a generalized model of this problem is the original motivation of the key agreement
problem over the DM model in Chapter 3. Specifically, we wish to study the effects of the
known states in key generation when a public channel, e.g., a web server with unrestricted
accessibility, is available.
Example 1.3. Suppose a wireless network in which a transmitter is capable of serving
multiple users at the same time, e.g., a base station in a cellular network [67] as sketched in
Figure 1.12 for two users. In this case, the transmitter propagates an individual signal for
each intended receiver. Each receiver’s antenna collects a weighted sum of all propagated
signals, where the coefficients of the summation are determined by the characteristic of the
wireless channel. Each receiver is interested in its own signal and considers the weighted
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Figure 1.12: A motivation of the Gaussian model.
summation of the signals of other users as the interference signal. As a simple case, assume
that the wireless channel coefficients are known at the sender and they do not change in the
period of each block code transmission. In this scenario, the transmitter, who generates all
the propagated signals, knows the interference of each user in advance of the transmission.
This is due to the fact that the transmitted signal of each user can be calculated at the
beginning of each block transmission in the transmitter as a function of the user’s message.
Although the interference is an impediment for data communication, it may be exploited
37
for secure key generation between the transmitter and each receiver in presence of other
users. Investigation of a simplified model of this problem is the original motivation of the
key agreement problem over the Gaussian model in Chapter 4.
To explain why the key agreement of a state-dependent wiretap channel differs from
that of a channel-type model as sketched in Figure 1.8, let us simplify the DM model as
follows: Suppose the key agreement problem over a DM-SWC (with no public channel)
where side information is available at neither Bob nor Eve. For any sent symbol over
the state-dependent wiretap channel, the CSI leaks to Bob and to Eve, i.e., Eve and Bob
obtain some information about the current channel state. The leakage of the CSI to Bob
and that of the CSI to Eve each depends on the channel input distribution, the distribution
of the CSI, and the PTF of the wiretap channel. The leakage of the CSI to Bob makes an
advantage for key generation because he partially obtains some information about the CSI,
which is fully known at Alice. This information can be exploited as a common randomness
for the key agreement, and so it seems that Alice should select the channel input such
that this leakage is improved. On the other hand, the leakage of the CSI to Eve makes a
disadvantage for key generation because she obtains some information about the CSI and
thus about the common information of Alice and Bob. It seems that Alice should choose
the channel input such that this leakage is reduced. Hence, a trade-off between these
two effects should be carefully considered in the proposed key agreement coding scheme.
Further, Alice can govern these effects only by channel input distribution, where she can
generate the transmission signal as a function of past, current, and future channel states.
This is the main challenge of this problem which is still open in its general case. Note
that the wiretap codebook for the Wyner model, which is optimum for the key agreement
problem over a wiretap channel (channel-type model with no public channel) [18], is not
optimum for the key agreement problem over a DM-SWC because it does not take into
account the challenge of the leakage effects22.
As mentioned in Subsection 1.4.2, the key capacity over a DM-WC in parallel with a
22Similarly, the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel with interference (G-SWC) is strictly
larger than that of a Gaussian wiretap channel (with no interference) according to Figure 2.6 (see Subsec-
tion 2.2.3 for more details).
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forward public channel (the channel-type model [18]) equals the secrecy capacity of the
DM-WC as given in (2.11), and the public channel is useless in key generation. At first
glance, similarly, the key capacity over a state-dependent wiretap channel paralleled with
a forward public channel seems to be equal to the secrecy capacity of that wiretap channel
and the public channel has no benefit in key generation (at least when Bob has no SI).
Investigation of this hypothesis was an initial motivation of this research.
In this study, we prove that this hypothesis is not generally true. In fact, the public
channel contributes in key generation even if Bob has no SI. Further, the following inspiring
questions are addressed in this investigation.
• Do the i.i.d. random vectors of the CSI provide a helpful source of randomness at
Alice for key generation?
• If the CSI is fully known at Bob as well, does this common information (between
Alice and Bob) suffice to achieve key capacity of the model such that no key exchange
over the wiretap channel or the public channel is required?
• If the public channel is involved in the key exchange, is the key capacity a strictly
increasing function of the public channel capacity? What is the trade-off between
the public channel capacity and the achieved key rate?
• How does the key capacity relate to the main channel capacity and the secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel?
• For a given wiretap channel, what is the maximum key capacity no matter how
much the public channel capacity is? Is this key capacity achievable by using a finite
capacity of the public channel? If no, is there any finite public channel capacity such
that this key capacity can be achieved within a reasonable tolerance?
• Is it possible to obtain a positive key rate when Eve’s channel is less noisy than
Bob’s channel in the Gaussian model? Does it depend on the direction of the public
channel?




In this section, we briefly describe our models, contributions and methodology. The details
will be given in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
We study the key agreement problem in two models: a discrete memoryless (DM) model
and a Gaussian model. Each model has one sender (Alice), an authorized receiver (Bob),
and an eavesdropper (Eve). Each model also consists of two parallel channels: a memoryless
wiretap channel with random states, and an authenticated public channel between Alice









∈ [0,∞) are the capacity of the public channel in the forward direction
(from Alice to Bob) and in the backward direction (from Bob to Alice), respectively. The











In Subsection 1.8.1, we express the DM model and the main results and methodology,
which will be given in details in Chapter 3. In Subsection 1.8.2, we express the Gaussian
model and the related contributions and methodology, which will be given in details in
Chapter 4.
1.8.1 The DM Model
The wiretap channel in the DM model is a DM-SWC (see Section 1.6). The CSI is an i.i.d.
random vector which controls the PTF of the wiretap channel. We assume that realizations
of the CSI are non-causally known at the transmitter. We suppose that each receiver has
access to an i.i.d. random vector dependent on the CSI according to a known joint PMF.
In the DM model, we assume that the public channel is one-way in the forward direction,
i.e., C
P2





, 0) as a function of C
P1
.
The results of Chapter 3 are partially presented in paper [68]. The main contributions
of this chapter are as follows.
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, 0). At the first look, the (forward) key capacity seems
to be equal to the secrecy capacity of the DM-SWC. That is, a pair of messages (M, M̂),
where M is a uniform RV emitted from a source, in the corresponding secrecy problem
is treated as a pair of agreed keys (K, K̂) in the key agreement problem. However, this
idea is not generally true, and the secrecy capacity should be just considered as the first
achievable subkey rate of the key capacity. We will show that another achievable subkey
rate can be generally generated on top of the secrecy capacity with the help of the known
CSI at Alice (even if it is not known at Bob and the public channel capacity is zero). This
key rate is determined by the DM-SWC. Our suggested key agreement code exploits both
a random generator and the CSI as resources for the key generation. The i.i.d. channel
state vector with a large enough length guarantees the randomness of the generated key
according to the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [2, Ch. 3]. In other words, the
CSI at Alice and the leaked CSI at Bob is a resource to provide common randomness for
the key generation if the leaked CSI to Eve is removed from the common randomness. To
do this, we apply a random quantization method to map a revealed channel state vector
to a codeword from the key agreement codebook. On the other hand, the number of the
codewords can be increased as the capacity of the public channel grows. As a result, this
may lead to an increment of the achieved key rate as intuitively explained in the following:
the key agreement codebook consists of multiple enumerated wiretap subcodebooks such
that each one is constructed similar to Csiszár and Körner’s wiretap codebook [12] (there
is no CSI in their model though). At each block transmission, the released state sequence
candidates a set of codewords from the whole key agreement codebook by using a selection
rule. One codeword from that set is selected at random23, by the encoder for key and
signal generation. Similar to Csiszár and Körner’s secrecy problem [12], the index of that
codeword in its wiretap subcodebook determines Alice’s key. Then, Alice sends the index
of that wiretap subcodebook over the public channel to Bob. Hence, the number of wiretap
subcodebooks is restricted by the capacity of the forward channel. Knowing this wiretap
subcodebook, Bob can retrieve the codeword and achieve a secure key rate determined by
23We call it random quantization method.
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that wiretap subcodebook. The encoder and decoder utilize strong (letter) typicality (see
Subsection 2.1.1) to generate or to retrieve their keys, respectively. The random coding
arguments [2, 6], Markov lemma (see Lemma 2.1), Fano’s inequality [2, Thm. 2.10.1] and
Wyner’s wiretap strategy [11] are frequently used to establish the AR, AS, and ARN
conditions for the agreed keys.








, 0) are derived in this thesis.
Each UB is offered in the form of an optimization (maximization) problem subject to a
constraint given by the capacity of the public channel. For each upper bound, we derive
two inequality equations. The first one bounds the key capacity of the DM model, and
the second one gives a condition based on the public channel capacity for the first one.
The first UB is valid for any DM model in general, while the second UB is derived based
on the assumption that the DM model is less noisy in Bob’s favor. This UB can be also
considered as a (loose) UB for the general model as well because the less noisy assumption
makes an enhanced model in the sense of the key generation between Alice and Bob. We
have frequently used Fano’s inequality [2, Thm. 2.10.1], Csiszár-Körner’s sum identity (see
Appendix D), data processing inequality [2, Thm. 2.8.1], the chain rules for the entropy
and mutual information functions, and the time-sharing strategy [2, 6, 12] in proofs of the
UBs.
(c). Optimum Cases. Our achievable key agreement code is optimum for the following
special cases:




• when the capacity of the public channel exceeds a finite capacity C∗
P1
, which is de-
termined by the DM-SWC. For any DM-SWC, we obtain C∗
P1
and show that it is
finite;
• when the wiretap channel does not exist. This special case coincides with the results
of key agreement models with a common randomness given in publications [18, 21]
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with the following difference. In Subsection 3.3.3, we will prove that the forward key
capacity can be obtained by using one auxiliary RV and using two auxiliary RVs, as
given in [18, 21], is not necessary to achieve the forward key capacity;
• when both Alice and Bob fully know the CSI. This special case was studied in
paper [64], where the authors established the key capacity for special case C
P1
= 0.
Extending their work, we prove that the achieved key capacity also equals the forward
key capacity of the DM model for any C
P1
> 0. That is, the public channel has no
benefit in this case for key generation.
1.8.2 The Gaussian Model
The wiretap channel in the Gaussian model is a G-SWC (see Section 1.6). The CSI is
in the form of AWGI. We assume that realizations of the interference are non-causally
known at the transmitter. In addition to the additive interference, Bob’s channel and










, where ̺ ∈ [−1, 1], σ21 and σ22 are the noise correlation
coefficient, noise variance of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel, respectively. In the
Gaussian model, however, no SI at Bob and Eve is assumed for simplicity of calculations
(see Subsection 5.1.2 for future work).





as a function of C
P1
. Also, we want to determine if the key agreement is feasible if Eve’s
channel is less noisy than Bob’s. Also, we are interested in the effect of the noise correlation
coefficient ̺ on the key generation.
The results of Chapter 4 are partially presented in paper [69]. The main contributions
of this chapter are as follows.








, 0) of the DM model can not be
directly extended to a continuous alphabet with the infinite size. We examine the possibil-
ity of this extension for the Gaussian model in this research. The LB on the forward key
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capacity is established as an extension of the achievable key agreement coding scheme of
the DM model. We apply the weakly (entropy) typicality (see Subsection 2.1.1) for contin-
uous RVs and the generalized Markov lemma24 [71] (see Remark 2.3) for a Gaussian input
distribution to justify the validity of the extension. Based on our achievable key agreement
code, the input distribution on G-SWC is a Gaussian distribution which satisfies the input
power constraint. To construct the transmission signal, we establish a generalized version
of the DPC and we combine it with Wyner’s wiretap strategies [11]. In the ordinary DPC
strategy used by Costa [55] in his model (Figure 1.10), condition E(XS) = 0 suffices to
achieve the (ordinary) capacity as the message is independent of the CSI. However, in our
work, X is to be correlated with S as the generated key is generally correlated with the
CSI, and this correlation helps to increase the achievable key rate. In our achievable key
agreement code, the transmitted signal conveys information about both the CSI and ran-
domization to the receivers. The correlation coefficient between the transmitted sequence
and the CSI sequence determines the weight of each key generation resource, and it is to be
determined according to the transmitter power constraint, the interference average power,
and the limited public channel capacity such that the maximum possible key rate achieves.
We justify that the forward key capacity is positive as long as Bob’s channel is less noisy





, 0). Specifically, we establish that the forward key capacity of a given
Gaussian model equals that of an equivalent Gaussian model with a physically degraded
G-SWC.




, 0). The UBs on the forward key capacity derived for
the DM model are not generally valid for the Gaussian model. This is due to the fact that
the size of alphabets in the DM model is finite, and this fact is applied to establish those
UBs. First, assume that Bob’s channel is less noisy than Eve’s, i.e., σ2 > σ1. To prove the
UB on the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model, we prove the UB for its equivalent
Gaussian model with a physically degraded channel. As the forward key capacity of both
24The author appreciates Prof. Mitran for this important point based on paper [70].
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models are proved to be the same, the UB is also valid for the original Gaussian model
with an arbitrary noise correlation coefficient ̺. The UB is valid for any C
P1
≥ 0. We
will prove this UB by use of Fano’s inequality [2, Thm. 2.10.1], Jensen’s inequality [2],
entropy power inequality [2], and the fact that Eve’s channel is assumed to be a physically
degraded version of Alice’s in the physically degraded G-SWC. Second, assume that Eve’s
channel is less noisy than Bob’s, i.e., σ1 ≥ σ2. We derive another UB on CK(CP1 , 0) which
shows the forward key capacity is always zero in this case.
(c). Special Cases. In this thesis, we prove that the suggested key agreement code is
optimum in the sense that it achieves the forward key capacity in the following special
cases:
• when the SIR goes to zero (and the interference average power is fixed) for any
C
P1
≥ 0. This special case coincides with the results of paper [40] for special case
degraded Gaussian multiple source (see Theorem 1.1 for more details);













≥ 0. In this case,
the forward key capacity is independent of C
P1




→ ∞ for any SIR. In this case, we show that the transmission signal
is asymptotically aligned with the interference to achieve the forward key capacity.
That is, the transmitter amplifies the interference according to its maximum available
power and forwards it to the wiretap channel.
Further, we study the key capacity C
K
(∞,∞) when Eve’s channel is less noisy than
Bob’s, i.e., σ1 > σ2 to determine if key generation is possible in this case. We prove
that C
K





≥ ̺, we construct a key agreement code for key generation by the extension of
Maurer’s method [17], which is originally given for BSCs, to the Gaussian model. Hence,
we achieve a positive LB on C
K
(∞,∞) for case σ2
2σ1
> ̺. Consequently, the key capacity
of the Gaussian model is a function of the noise correlation coefficient ̺.




, 0) for a Gaussian model by using
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MATLABr. With the simulations, the following facts are illustrated as well.





, 0) is a strictly increasing function of C
P1
; however, it is bounded.
• The forward key capacity can be larger than both the secrecy capacity and main
channel capacity (even) when no public channel is available.





, 0) is less than .15% for any C
P1
≥ 0.
1.8.3 The Parallel Work
In a parallel independent work to [72], we learned that Khisti et al. [73,74] have studied the
key agreement problem over our investigated models for the following two special cases.
(a). No Public Channel. For the DM model with no public channel, the authors [74,
Thm. 1] have proven an LB on the key capacity which is the same as Theorem 3.1 when
C
P1
= 0 is relaxed. For this model, a UB on the key capacity is also given in [74, Thm. 2].
The UB is derived with generous assumptions to make an enhanced model (in Alice and
Bob’s favor) as follows. Bob is permitted to know Eve’s received signal, and Alice is per-
mitted to govern the CSI as the second channel input further to her transmission signal.
With these assumptions, Eve’s received signal is a degraded version of Bob’s. Finally, the
secrecy capacity of this model, which can be deduced from (2.16), is reported as a UB on
the key capacity of the model of interest.
For the Gaussian model with a physically degraded G-SWC, Khisti [73, Prop. 2]
achieved an LB on C
K
(0, 0) when the SNR at the main channel is not negative (in dB). In
this special case, the LB of the Gaussian model is obtained from that of the DM model
by direct calculation of the results for continuous Gaussian RVs. In the high SIR (with
the high SNR) regime, this LB coincides our achieved LB (for special case C
P1
= 0), which




(0, 0) by direct calculation of the corresponding UB on C
K
(0, 0) of the DM model
for Gaussian RVs. That UB equals C
K
(∞, 0), which is achieved in [69] and in Theorem 4.2.
(b). Two-Way Public Channel with Unlimited Capacity in both Directions.
In this case, Khisti [73] first studied the DM model. For this model, he achieved an LB on
the key capacity as a maximization of two individual LBs on the key capacity [73, Thm. 3].
The first LB is the LB on the key capacity when C
P1
= 0, which is achieved for the last
case in part (a). The second LB is obtained by “a natural modification of Maurer’s coding
scheme [17, 18]” [73]. The second LB generally requires one forward transmission and one
backward transmission over the public channel.
Using the strategy mentioned in the last case in part (a), a UB on the key capacity
is derived for this case as well. The UB is tight when the outputs of the DM-SWC are
independent given its inputs, i.e., Y → (X,S) → Z forms a Markov chain. If this condition





I(X,S; Y |Z) . (1.38)
Khisti [73] extended the key capacity given in (1.38) to the Gaussian model in which
Eve’s channel is a physically degraded version of Bob’s. For this special case, C
K
(∞,∞)
is reported [73, Prop. 5] by direct calculation of (1.38) for Gaussian RVs.
1.9 Organization of the Thesis
In this introduction, we have reviewed the essential points of information-theoretic secu-
rity in wiretap communication channels with the focus on key agreement models. The
organization of the rest of this thesis is as follows.
• Chapter 2: This chapter justifies the basic models and method that will be exploited
to prove our results. The chapter consists of two main sections: in the first section,
we will define mathematical tools required to establish our results. In the second
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section, we will present the seminal related work of secrecy problems, which will be
served for comparison in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
• Chapter 3: The key agreement problem over the DM model is investigated in this
chapter.
• Chapter 4: The key agreement problem over the Gaussian model is investigated in
this chapter.
• Chapter 5: In this chapter, we will conclude our work. In the conclusion, we will
mention the strategies used in our work. We will also highlight the ties of our research




In the this chapter, we introduce the mathematical methods and fundamental definitions
and models which will be utilized in the next chapters. In this chapter, we survey the
main related secrecy problems in the field of information-theoretic security. One purpose
of this chapter is to review the essential points, results and wiretap strategies introduced
in fundamental research [11, 12]. These strategies form the base of information-theoretic
security. Accordingly, we study the secrecy problem over a discrete memoryless wiretap
channel in Subsection 2.2.1.
Before we declare our key agreement problems, the main points, achievements, and
strategies in significant publications [60,61] are surveyed in this chapter. These publications
study the secrecy problem over wiretap channels with non-causal side information. Their
strategies with novel modifications will be exploited in our problems. In the next chapter,
the results of those papers will be further referred to compare our achieved LBs on the key
capacity with the best known LBs/UBs on the secrecy capacity. To do this, the secrecy
problem over a DM-SWC is reviewed in Subsection 2.2.2. The secrecy capacity over a
G-SWC is surveyed in Subsection 2.2.3 as well.
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2.1 Mathematical Tools
In this section, we present the fundamental definitions and basic lemmas, which will be
used in the next chapters to establish our proofs.
2.1.1 Typicality
Shannon [4] introduced the notion of typical sequences. Two types of typicality are used
in this thesis: Strong typicality [2, Sec. 10.6] and weak typicality [2, Ch. 3]. In this
subsection, we define the strong typicality and the weak typicality. We also state the main
useful lemmas of typical sequences, which are related to our work, without proofs. More
details can be found in references [2, 3, 75].
The weak typicality, which is also known as entropy-typicality [75], is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Weak typicality). Assume ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Let X be an alphabet set with a
finite size. Let x ∈ Xn be a sequence generated i.i.d. according to P(x) =∏ni=1PX(xi). x


















is (Shannon) entropy function. Moreover, Tǫ(PX) is called an ǫ-weakly typical set, which
contains all x ∈ Xn such that x is an ǫ-weakly typical sequence with respect to PX .
Definition 2.1 can be extended for multiple random vectors as follows.
Definition 2.2 (Weak joint typicality). Assume ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and ℓ ∈ N. Let Xi be an
alphabet set with a finite size, where i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Assume an ℓ-tuple of sequences
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(x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ Xn1 × . . .× Xnℓ is drawn i.i.d. according to
P(x1, . . . ,xℓ) =
n∏
i=1
PX1...Xℓ(x1i, . . . , xℓi) .
The ℓ-tuple of sequences (x1, . . . ,xℓ) is said to be ǫ-weakly (jointly) typical with respect













holds for any j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and any 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < ij ≤ ℓ, where function






PXi1 ...Xij (υ1, . . . , υj) log(PXi1 ...Xij (υ1, . . . , υj)) (2.2)
is (Shannon) joint entropy function. Moreover, Tǫ(PX1...Xℓ) is called an ǫ-weakly (jointly)
typical set, which contains all (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ X1× . . .×Xℓ such that (x1, . . . ,xℓ) is ǫ-weakly
(jointly) typical with respect to the distribution PX1...Xℓ .
Remark 2.1. Although weak typicality in Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.2 is introduced
for discrete random sequences, it can be extended to continuous random sequences if the
PMFs and the entropy functions are replaced by the corresponding probability density
functions and the differential entropy functions, respectively [2, 75]. An ǫ-weakly typi-
cal set with respect to normal distribution N ((µ1, . . . , µℓ),Σℓ×ℓ) on Rℓ is represented by
Tǫ(N ((µ1, . . . , µℓ),Σℓ×ℓ)) in this thesis. This notation will be frequently used in Subsec-
tion 4.1.
The strong typicality, which is also known as letter typicality [75], is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Strong typicality). Assume ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Let X be an alphabet set with a
finite size. A sequence x ∈ Xn is said to be an ǫ-strongly typical sequence with respect to
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|X| , : if PX(υ) > 0;
0, : if PX(υ) = 0.
(2.3)
where η(υ|x) is the number of occurrences of the letter υ in vector x. Moreover, T∗ǫ(PX)
is called an ǫ-strongly typical set, which contains all x ∈ Xn such that x is an ǫ-strongly
typical sequence with respect to the distribution PX .
Definition 2.3 can be generalized to define strongly (jointly) typical sequences as follows.
Definition 2.4 (Strong joint typicality). Assume ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and ℓ ∈ N. Let Xi be an
alphabet set with a finite size, where i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. An ℓ-tuple of sequences (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈
Xn1 × . . .×Xnℓ is said to be ǫ-strongly (jointly) typical with respect to distribution PX1...Xℓ





η(υ1, . . . , υℓ|x1, . . . ,xℓ)
n








|X1|...|Xℓ| : if PX1...Xℓ(υ1, . . . , υℓ) > 0;
0 : if PX1...Xℓ(υ1, . . . , υℓ) = 0.
where η(υ1, . . . , υℓ|x1, . . . ,xℓ) is the number of occurrences of the ℓ-tuple letters (υ1, . . . , υℓ)
of sequences (x1, . . . ,xℓ). Moreover, T∗ǫ(PX1...Xℓ) is called an ǫ-strongly (jointly) typical set,
which contains all (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ Xn1 × . . .× Xnℓ such that (x1, . . . ,xℓ) is ǫ-strongly typical
sequences with respect to distribution PX1...Xℓ .
From Definition 2.4, if (x1, . . . ,xℓ) ∈ T∗ǫ(PX1...Xℓ), then any sequences (xi1 ,xi2, . . . ,xij ) ∈
T∗ǫ (PXi1Xi2 ...Xij ), where j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < ij ≤ ℓ.
Remark 2.2. The strong typicality according to Definition 2.3 and Definition 2.4 can not
be extended to continuous random vectors, because counting the occurrences of a given
letter is meaningless in this case.
Markov lemma is a powerful tool for the proofs of Chapter 3. This lemma is stated in
the following.
52
Lemma 2.1 (Markov lemma). Assume discrete RVs (X, Y, Z) ∈ X×Y× Z form Markov
chain X → Y → Z, i.e. PXY Z(x, y, z) = PX(x)PY |X(y|x)PZ|Y (z|y) for any (x, y, z) ∈
X × Y × Z. If for a given (y, z) ∈ T∗ǫ(PY Z), random vector x is drawn according to
∏n
i=1P(xi|yi), then
P{(x,y, z) ∈ T∗ǫ (PXY Z)|(y, z) ∈ T∗ǫ (PY Z)} > 1− δ
where δ → 0 as n → ∞.
In the following remark, we verify if the Markov lemma can be exploited for the Gaussian
model in Chapter 4.
Remark 2.3. According to Remark 2.2, Markov lemma given in Lemma 2.1 does not apply
to continuous RVs. However, Oohama [71] proved that Markov lemma still holds for
Gaussian RVs if strongly typical sets in Lemma 2.1 are replaced by the corresponding
weakly typical sets.
2.2 Wiretap Channels
In this section, we state the preliminary definitions of wiretap channels. These definitions
are necessary to present our problems in the next chapters. We also review the secrecy
problem in some wiretap models that will be recalled in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for
comparison.
2.2.1 Wiretap Channels without Side Information
In this subsection, we define and review the secrecy problem over a memoryless wiretap
channel (with no SI) based on publications [11], [12], [14], and [13].
Secrecy problem over a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WC) is presented in
















Figure 2.1: A discrete memoryless wiretap channel (with no SI).
Definition 2.5 (DM-WC). Recalling Definition 1.7, assume the wiretap channel (Xn,Yn×
Zn,Pyz|x) with one sender (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Eve). The wiretap channel
is called a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (DM-WC) if
• X, Y, and Z are finite sets;




For simplicity, a DM-WC is characterized by (X,Y× Z,PY Z|X).
Based on the discussions given in Section 1.3, an admissible wiretap coding scheme of
a DM-WC for the secrecy problem is formulated as follows.
Definition 2.6. An admissible wiretap code (⌈2nR⌉, n), where code block length n ∈ N
and information rate R ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, consists of the following components:
• a message set M = {1, . . . , ⌈2nR⌉}. Message M is a RV which is uniformly distributed
over M;
• a (stochastic) encoder W : M → Xn at Alice. This encoder maps each message




W(x|M) ≥ 0 : ∀x ∈ Xn, ∀M ∈ M;
∑
x∈Xn
W(x|M) = 1 : ∀M ∈ M; (2.4)
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• a decoder D : Yn → M at Bob. This decoder maps a received signal y ∈ Yn to a
message M̂ ∈ M according to function M̂ = D(y);
As indicated in Sections 1.1 and 1.3, the reliability and security level of messages for
a given admissible wiretap code are measured by the average probability of error function
and (normalized) equivocation rate function, respectively [11, 30], as defined below.
Definition 2.7 (Measurements). Assume an admissible wiretap code (⌈2nR⌉, n) designed
for the secrecy problem according to Definition 2.6.
1. The reliability of message M is measured by the average (block) probability of error






P{D(y) 6= M |M = i} , (2.5)
which is a function of block length n.







H(M |z) , (2.6)
which is a function of block length n.
The main objective of the secrecy problem is to find the capacity-equivocation region
and secrecy capacity of a given model1. These terms are technically defined in the following.
Definition 2.8. A rate-equivocation pair (R,R
E
) is said to be achievable if there exists
an admissible wiretap code (⌈2nR⌉, n) such that
lim
n→∞








1Once the capacity-equivocation region of a given model is characterized, its secrecy capacity can be
derived by an optimization problem. However, the secrecy capacity of a model is usually used as a criterion
to compare it with other models in the field of information-theoretic security.
55
The capacity-equivocation region is the closure of the union of all achievable rate-equivocation
pairs (R,R
E






If the pair (R,R) is achievable, i.e., R
L
= 0, then rate R is said to be (securely) achievable
with respect to the AR condition 1.3 and the AS condition 1.12.
In Definition (1.9), the secrecy capacity is defined; equivalently, the supremum of all
(securely) achievable rates R such that (R,R) is an achievable rate-equivocation pair is
called the secrecy capacity.
The capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity of the DM-WC is character-
ized by Csiszár and Körner [12] as follows.























where U ∈ U and V ∈ V are two auxiliary random variables such that U → V → X →






[I(V ; Y )− I(V ;Z)] . (2.11)
The role of U and V in Theorem 2.1 can be explained as follows: V corresponds to the
total message that can be decoded by Bob; however, U is a portion of that message which
can be retrieved by both Bob and Eve. So, U is not secure by using the wiretap coding
scheme. The other portion of V satisfies the AS condition 1.12 by using the wiretap coding
scheme.
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The secrecy capacity given in Theorem 2.1 can be simplified for some DM-WCs. To
show this fact, let us first assume the following special cases of the DM-WCs2.
• Physically degraded wiretap channels : a memoryless wiretap channel is said to be
physically degraded in Bob’s favor if the PTF of the channel can be factorized as
∀x ∈ X, ∀(y, z) ∈ Y× Z : PY Z|X(y, z|x) = PY |X(y|x)PZ|Y (z|y) , (2.12)
As depicted in Figure 1.4, the Wyner’s model [11] consists of a physically degraded
wiretap channel in which PY |X and PZ|Y are PTF of the main channel and that of
the wiretap channel, respectively.
• Stochastically degraded wiretap channels : a memoryless wiretap channel is defined as
a stochastically degraded wiretap channel in Bob’s favor if its conditional marginal
distributions are the same as those of a physically degraded wiretap channel; that is,
if there exists a PTF P ′Z|Y such that
∀ x ∈ X, z ∈ Z : PZ|X(z|x) =
∑
y ∈Y
PY |X(y|x)P ′Z|Y (z|y) . (2.13)
• Less noisy wiretap channels : This special case is a generalization of physically/
stochastically degraded wiretap channels. The less noisy ordering was introduced by
Körner and Marton [16] to compare two noisy channels as follows.
Definition 2.9 (Less noisy wiretap channel). Bob’s channel is said to be less noisy
than Eve’s channel (less noisy wiretap channel in Bob’s favor) if for every auxiliary
RV U with property U → X → (Y, Z), we have
I(U ; Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) . (2.14)
2In fact, this classification is valid for a memoryless wiretap channel with continuous alphabets as
well [2, 6].
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According to this definition, a physically/stochastically degraded wiretap channel is
a less noisy channel as well; however, the converse in not generally true [6]. Also,
a physically degraded, stochastically degraded, and a less noisy wiretap channel
in Eve’s favor can be defined if Y is switched to Z in (2.12), (2.13), and (2.14),
respectively.
With applying (2.14) to Theorem 2.1, the results given in this theorem can be simplified
for less noisy wiretap channels (and so for degraded wiretap channels) if V = X and U = 0
are relaxed [12, Thm. 3] as follows.
































[I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)] . (2.16)
Theorem 2.2 gives the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity of Wyner’s
model [11] as well. According to [12, Corol. 3], the secrecy capacity of the DM-WC is always
positive unless the DM-WC is less noisy in Eve’s favor.
In a less noisy wiretap channel, if both I(X ; Y ) and I(X ;Z) achieve their maximum
values at one distribution P∗X , then the capacity-equivocation region given in Theorem 2.2





) : 0 ≤ R
E
≤ R ≤ Cm, RE ≤ Cm − Cmw} , (2.17)
where Cm = maxPX
I(X ; Y ) and Cmw = maxPX I(X ;Z) are the capacity of the main channel












Figure 2.2: The capacity-equivocation region for a degraded symmetric DM-WC.
respectively. In this case, the secrecy capacity of the DM-WC is C
S
= Cm − Cmw, which
is given in (1.13) as well. Region C
E
, which is given in 2.17, is sketched in Figure 2.2. An
example of this model is a physically degraded DM-WC in which both the main channel
(from Alice to Bob) and the wiretap channel (from Bob to Eve) are symmetric DMCs [1,2].
According to Figure 2.2, line OA corresponds to the securely achievable rates, in which
point A corresponds to the secrecy capacity. Increasing the information rate above C
S
does
not increase the (normarized) equivocation rate of the communication, and thus leakage
rate R
L
grows linearly as function of R. At point B, the leakage rate is Cmw; in other
words, in average, portion Cm−Cmw
Cm
of the achievable rate satisfies the AS condition 1.12,
and portion Cmw
Cm
of the rate is retrievable by Eve.
2.2.2 Degraded Discrete Memoryless Wiretap Channel with Ran-
dom States
In this subsection, we define a (physically) degraded3 discrete memoryless state-dependent
wiretap channel (DM-SWC) with random states, which are non-causally known at the
transmitter. The secrecy problem over this channel is reviewed in this subsection according
to publications [61, 62]. The model is illustrated in Figure 2.3 and it is defined as follows.
3In this subsection, the wiretap channel is physically degraded in Bob’s favor; however, the results are




















Figure 2.3: A degraded DM-SWC with non-causal CSI at the transmitter.
Definition 2.10 (Degraded DM-SWC). A (physically) degraded DM-SWC in Bob’s favor
with non-causal CSI at Alice is determined by (S,X,Y× Z,PS,PY Z|XS), where
• finite sets X, Y, and Z are the channel input alphabet (from Alice), the first chan-
nel output alphabet (to Bob), and the second channel output alphabet (to Eve),
respectively;
• S is the state alphabet with a finite size; also, random vector s ∈ Sn, which is called




• prior to each block transmission, Alice knows the realization of random vector s;
• the PTF of the channel with the input x ∈ Xn, state s ∈ Sn, and output pair
(y, z) ∈ Yn × Zn is P(y, z|x, s) =
n∏
i=1
PY |XS(yi|xi, si)PZ|Y (zi|yi), i.e., Eve receives a
degraded version of Bob’s signal through a channel with PTF PZ|Y .
An admissible wiretap coding scheme for the secrecy problem over the degraded DM-
SWC is defined as follows.
Definition 2.11. An admissible wiretap code (⌈2nR⌉, n), where code block length n ∈ N
and information rate R ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, consists of the following components:
• a message set M = {1, . . . , ⌈2nR⌉}. Message M is a RV which is uniformly distributed
over M;
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• a (stochastic) encoder W : M × Sn → Xn at Alice. Knowing side information s,





W(x|M, s) ≥ 0 : ∀x ∈ Xn, ∀M ∈ M, ∀s ∈ Sn;
∑
x∈Xn
W(x|M, s) = 1 : ∀M ∈ M, ∀s ∈ Sn; (2.18)
• a decoder D : Yn → M at Bob. This decoder maps a received signal y ∈ Yn to a
message M̂ ∈ M according to function M̂ = D(y).
The measurements given in Definition 2.7 are also applied to the admissible wiretap
codes defined in Definition 2.11. Bounds on the secrecy capacity of the degraded DM-SWC
according to Definition 1.9 is given in the following theorem [61, 62].
Theorem 2.3. The secrecy capacity of the degraded DM-SWC, which is introduced in
Definition 2.10, is bounded by
max
U→(X,S)→Y→Z
min{I(U ; Y )− I(U ;S), I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z)} ≤ C
S




[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;S)] , (2.20)
R2 = max
U→(X,S)→Y→Z
[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z)] . (2.21)
The structure of the achievable wiretap coding scheme is based on double random
binning [6], which is generated by combination of Gélfand-Pinsker’s coding strategy [49]
and wiretap coding strategies [11, 31]. Two upper bounds on the secrecy capacity are
reported in Theorem 2.3: the first one (R1) is the (ordinary) capacity of the main channel
given in (1.32), and the second one (R2) is the secrecy capacity of the DM-WC given
in (2.11). The second UB is derived based on the fact that a (degraded) DM-WC with
input (X,S) is an enhanced channel of the degraded DM-SWC in the sense that the secrecy
61
capacity of the former is not less than the secrecy capacity of the latter.
It is still an open problem if any of the bounds in Theorem 2.3 is tight or not. However,
the LB is proved to be optimal [61] in the following special case.
Corollary 2.1. Assume the main channel capacity of the degraded DM-SWC, which is
given in (1.32), is achievable at input distribution P∗X|SUP∗U |SPS. At this distribution, if






[I(U ; Y )− I(U ;S)] = I(U∗; Y ∗)− I(U∗;S) ,
where I(U∗;S), I(U∗; Y ∗), and I(U∗;Z∗) are calculated at distribution
PY ZXUS = PZ|YPY |XSP∗X|SUP∗U |SPS .
As implied by Corollary 2.1, the side information can assist Alice to (securely) achieve
the main channel capacity with respect to the AS condition 1.12.
2.2.3 Gaussian Wiretap Channel with Additive Interference
As mentioned in Section 1.6, the secrecy problem of a physically degraded Gaussian wire-
tap channel with AWGI was studied by Mitrpant et al. [60,76]. Their model is illustrated
in Figure 2.4. In this subsection, we highlight the main results and ideas of that work.
A (physically) degraded Gaussian wiretap channel with AWGI is defined as follows.
Definition 2.12 (Physically degraded G-SWC). A physically degraded Gaussian state-
dependent wiretap channel (G-SWC) in Bob’s favor (respectively, in Eve’s favor) with















x+ s y = x+ s+ g1
S ∼N (0,Λ)
Eve’s Receiver
M M̂ = D(Y )









xxt ≤ Γ ; (2.22)
• random vector s ∈ Rn, which is known as interference, is drawn i.i.d. according to
S ∼ N (0,Λ);
• the realization of random vector s is known at Alice prior to each block transmission;
• if σ2 ≥ σ1, the channel is physically degraded in Bob’s favor, and then





represents Gaussian noise of the channel, where
g1 ∈ Rn and g′2 ∈ Rn are independent random vectors such that components
of g1 and those of g
′
2 are drawn i.i.d. according to N (0, σ21) and N (0, σ22 − σ21),
respectively;
– y ∈ Rn, and z ∈ Rn are the first channel output (to Bob) and the second
channel output (to Eve), respectively, such that
y = x + s+ g1 , (2.23a)
z = y + g′2 , (2.23b)
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which means that Eve receives a noisy version of Bob’s signal;
• if σ1 > σ2, the channel is physically degraded in Eve’s favor, and then





represents Gaussian noise of the channel, where
g′1 ∈ Rn and g2 ∈ Rn are independent random vectors such that components
of g′1 and those of g2 are drawn i.i.d. according to N (0, σ21 − σ22) and N (0, σ22),
respectively;
– y ∈ Rn, and z ∈ Rn are the first channel output (to Bob) and the second
channel output (to Eve), respectively, such that
z = x + s+ g2 , (2.24a)
y = z+ g′1 , (2.24b)
which means Bob receives a noisy version of Eve’s signal.
An admissible wiretap coding scheme for the secrecy problem over the G-SWC is defined
as follows.
Definition 2.13. An admissible wiretap code (⌈2nR⌉, n), where code block length n ∈ N
and information rate R ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, consists of the following components:
• a message set M = {1, . . . , ⌈2nR⌉}. Message M is a RV which is uniformly distributed
over M;
• a (stochastic) encoder W : M × Rn → Rn at Alice. Having state vector s, the
encoder maps each message M ∈ M to a codeword x ∈ Rn according to conditional




W(x|M, s) ≥ 0 : ∀x ∈ Rn, ∀M ∈ M, ∀s ∈ Rn;
∑
x∈Rn
W(x|M, s) = 1 : ∀M ∈ M, ∀s ∈ Rn; (2.25)
• a decoder D : Rn → M at Bob. This decoder maps a received signal y ∈ Rn to a
message M̂ ∈ M according to function M̂ = D(y).
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The measurements given in Definition 2.7 are also applied to the admissible wiretap
codes defined in Definition 2.13. The secrecy capacity of the (physically) degraded G-SWC
according to Definition (1.9) is bounded in the following theorem [60, 76].
Theorem 2.4. Let C
S
be the capacity of a (physically) degraded G-SWC with non-causally
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(Γ + Λ + σ21)[(1− α)2ΓΛ + σ22(Γ + α2Λ)]
































Also, Cm = R(α∗) is the capacity of the main channel [55]. Then, the secrecy capacity of







Cm : if 0 ≤ Γ ≤ Γl
R(α0) : if Γl ≤ Γ ≤ Γh
RZ(1) : if Γ ≥ Γh .
(2.32)
Mitrpant and Han Vinck [60] applied DPC strategy [55] to construct an achievable
wiretap code based on double random binning. The structure of the double random binning
for the degraded G-SWC is the same as that of the degraded DM-SWC in Theorem 2.3.
To explain this idea, let U = X + αS, where X and S are orthogonal RVs with Gaussian
distributions according to N (0,Γ) and N (0,Λ), respectively; α ∈ R+ is a constant as
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well. Hence, R(α) and RZ(α), which is defined in (2.26) and (2.27) respectively, can be
formulated as [60]
R(α) = I(U ; Y )− I(U ;S) , (2.33)
RZ(α) = I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z) .






Maximum value of RZ(α) and that of R(α) are achieved at α = 1 and α = α∗,
respectively. Also, R(α) and RZ(α) coincide at α = α0. These values of α are given in
Theorem 2.4. According to [55], α = α∗ is the optimum value for the DPC to achieve
capacity Cm = R(α∗). Value of α∗ is independent of variance of the interference Λ. Now,
consider the secrecy problem for the G-SWC, and denote the optimum value of α used in
the corresponding DPC by αopt. The following statements determine the value of αopt as a
function of power Γ (when other parameters are assumed to be fixed).
• 0 ≤ Γ ≤ Γl: In this case Cm = R(α∗) ≤ RZ(α∗), and so secrecy capacity CS = Cm is
achievable with αopt = α
∗. At Γ = Γl, α0 = α
∗ and so R(α∗) = RZ(α∗).
• Γl < Γ ≤ Γh: In this case
RZ(α∗) ≤ RZ(α0) = R(α0) < R(α∗) = Cm , (2.35)
where α∗ < α0 ≤ 1. As α goes from α∗ to 1, RZ(α) increases and R(α) decreases.
In this case, αopt = α0 where these functions coincide, and so CS ≥ R(α0) = RZ(α0)
according to (2.34). At Γ = Γh, α0 = 1, and so RZ(α) ≤ R(1) = RZ(1) for any α.
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(1) αopt, where min{R(α),RZ(α)} is maximized
(2) α∗, where R(α) is maximized
(3) α0 , where R(α0) = RZ(α0)





Figure 2.5: Comparison of optimum values of α (in the DPC) versus SIR in the G-SWC.
• Γ > Γh: In this case
R(α0) = RZ(α0) ≤ RZ(1) < R(1) , (2.36)
where α∗ ≤ 1 < α0. R(α) decreases from its maximum point R(α∗) as α goes from
α∗ to α0, and RZ(1) = max
α








(Γ + Λ + σ21)σ
2
2





according to (2.34) and Theorem 2.4.
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In Figure 2.5, we compare the optimum value α for which the capacity is achieved, i.e.
α∗, with that for which the LB on the secrecy capacity, which is given in 2.34, is achieved,
i.e. αopt. The parameters in this figure are Λ = 1, σ
2
1 = .1, and σ
2
2 = .4. According to
Figure 2.5, αopt is the same as α
∗ for 0 ≤ Γ ≤ Γl. For Γl < Γ ≤ Γh, αopt equals α0 and it is
larger than α∗. For Γ > Γh, αopt = 1 and α
∗ < αopt < α0.
In Figure 2.6, the LB and UBs on the secrecy capacity of the (physically) degraded
G-SWC is sketched [60], where Λ = 1, σ21 = .1, and σ
2
2 = .4 are fixed. In this figure, curve
(1) illustrates the LB on the secrecy capacity for the G-SWC according to Theorem 2.4;
curve (2) is the main channel capacity (from Alice to Bob) of the G-SWC; curve (3) is an
UB on the secrecy capacity claimed by Mitrpant and Han Vinck [60] (it will be discussed
in the following); curve (4) is the secrecy capacity of the corresponding Gaussian wiretap
channel sketched in Figure 1.5 (same parameters Γ, σ21 , σ
2
2, and no interference, i.e., Λ = 0)
according to (1.14).
According to Theorem 2.4, the DPC is optimum for the secrecy problem when Γ ≤
Γl [60]. Mitrpant and Han Vinck [60] also claimed that the LB given in (2.37) is optimum for
Γ ≥ Γh because of the following discussion. Assume Alice is able to govern the interference
as its input. In other words, the interference is a part of Alice’s transmitted signal which
has a fixed power Λ. Thus, the authors [60] deduced that a Gaussian wiretap channel with
transmission power Γ+Λ is an enhanced wiretap channel of the given G-SWC. As the LB
in (2.37) is actually the secrecy capacity of that enhanced channel (replace Γ by Γ + Λ
in (1.14)), the authors concluded that the LB (2.37) is tight.
In Figure 2.6, the LB on the secrecy capacity of the G-SWC is also compared with
the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel (when there is no interference) [13].
This comparison shows that non-causal availability of the interference at Alice enhances
the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel. This notable fact is in contrast with
the fact that the channel capacity of Costa’s model [55] is the same as that of the Gaussian
channel (when there is no interference) [1, 2]. In other words, knowing the interference at
Alice does not affect the main channel capacity of the G-SWC, but it enlarges its secrecy
capacity (comparing with a corresponding Gaussian wiretap channel with no interference).
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(1) A lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the degraded G-SWC
(2) Capacity of the main channel (from Alice to Bob) of the degraded G-SWC
(3) Secrecy Capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel with power (Γ + Λ)
(4) Secrecy Capacity of a Gussian wiretap channel with power Γ




The Discrete Memoryless Model
In this chapter, we study the key agreement problem over a discrete memoryless (DM)
model. The model consists of a wiretap channel with random states and a parallel one-way
public channel in the forward direction with capacity C
P1
∈ [0,∞). The CSI is drawn i.i.d.,
and its realizations are fully and non-causally known at Alice. The goal of this work is to
characterize the (forward) key capacity of the DM model as a function of C
P1
.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we will define the public
channel in its general form, and we will introduce the key agreement problem over a DM
model. In that section, we will technically define an admissible key agreement coding
scheme for the key agreement problem. In Section 3.2, we will state the achieved bounds
on the (forward) key capacity of the model. Finally, we will establish the proofs of the
results in Section 3.3.
3.1 Problem Definitions
In this section, we define the key agreement problem over the DM model. Before we
present the DM model, let us define a two-way (authenticated) public channel with given
capacity in each direction. As a special case, a one-way public channel is also specified in
71
the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Public channel). Assume n ∈ N is time duration, and side information
a and b is available at Alice and Bob, respectively. Let p1 , (P11, P12, . . . , P1n) ∈ P11 ×
P12 × . . .P1n and p2 , (P21, P22, . . . , P2n) ∈ P21 × P22 × . . .P2n be the forward public
message sequence and the backward public message sequence, respectively, where P1τ and
P2τ are the alphabet set of the forward message and that of the backward message at time





noiseless channel between Alice and Bob which consists of a noiseless forward channel from
Alice to Bob with capacity C
P1




• at time instant τ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the forward message P1τ is sent from Alice to Bob
(in the forward direction), and the backward message P2τ is sent from Bob to Alice
(in the backward direction);
• P1τ is a function of all available information at Alice up to time τ − 1, i.e., it is a
(stochastic) function of a and (P21, P22, . . . , P2(τ−1)), where P20 , 0;
• P2τ is a function of all available information at Bob up to time τ − 1, i.e., it is a
(stochastic) function of b, (P11, P12, . . . , P1(τ−1)), where P10 , 0, and (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yτ−1),
if there exists a wiretap channel connected from Alice to Bob with output symbol
Yτ at time τ ;
• p1 and p2 are intercepted by Eve;
• the communication rate over the public channel is subject to














where P1 , P11 × . . .× P1n and P2 , P21 × . . .× P2n.
If C
P2
= 0, the public channel is called a (one-way) forward public channel; if C
P1
= 0,
the public channel is called a (one-way) backward public channel.
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As sketched in Figure 3.1, the DM model consists of two parallel channels: a discrete
memoryless state-dependent wiretap channel (DM-SWC) with non-causally known CSI at
the transmitter and a forward public channel. In the following, the DM-SWC is defined.
Definition 3.2 (DM-SWC). A DM-SWC with known non-causal CSI at the transmitter
is determined by 9-tuple (S,B,E,X,Y,Z,PS(s),PBE|S(b, e|s),PY Z|XS(y, z|x, s)), where
• finite sets X, Y, and Z are the channel input alphabet (from Alice), the first chan-
nel output alphabet (to Bob), and the second channel output alphabet (to Eve),
respectively;
• S is the state alphabet with a finite size; also, random vector s ∈ Sn, which is called




• the PTF of the channel with the input x ∈ Xn, state s ∈ Sn, and output pair
(y, z) ∈ Yn × Zn is P(y, z|x, s) =
n∏
i=1
PY Z|XS(yi, zi|xi, si);
• random vectors s ∈ Sn, b ∈ Bn, and e ∈ En are three-component SI available prior
to each transmission at Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively;
• the three-component SI is drawn i.i.d. according to
P(b, e, s) =
n∏
i=1






PBE|S(bi, ei|si) . (3.2)
In the DM model, Alice governs two encoders: the wiretap channel encoder W and the
public channel encoder F . Randomization at the encoders is permitted. Alice generates
her key with a key generator function K1, and then she sends key agreement signals to Bob
over both the wiretap channel and the noiseless public channel with capacity C
P1
.
The output of the wiretap channel encoder W is a block code with length n, which is
sent in n successive transmissions over the wiretap channel. However, we assume, without
any loss of generality, that the public channel encoder F transmits public message P at
time instant n, i.e., p1 = ( 0, . . . , 0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1) times
, P ). This is due to the following fact. There is no
feedback from Bob to Alice, and Alice’s SI is available non-causally prior to sending the






PY Z|XS(yi, zi|xi, si)
Bob’s Decoder
Eve’s Receiver












One-way public channel with capacity C
P1
P = F(Q, s) P
K
K̂
Figure 3.1: The key agreement problem over the DM model.
nth transmission over the wiretap channel. Hence, transmission of the public message by
successive uses of the public channel has the same effect on key generation as if the whole
public message is sent in a single transmission parallel to nth transmission of encoder W.
Finally, Bob decodes his key at the end of n transmissions over the wiretap channel by
applying a key generator function1 K2 to his received signals (y,b, P ).
Eve has access to e and P from her SI and the public channel, respectively; she also
receives z from the wiretap channel. Having (z, e, P ), Eve does her best to deduce any
information about the keys.
The objective of the key agreement problem is to find the forward key capacity for the
model by using an admissible key agreement code, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. An admissible key agreement code (⌈2nRK ⌉, n), where R
K
∈ R+∪{0} and
code block length n ∈ N, for the DM model consists of the following components:
1The key generator function at Bob is also called a decoder when the public channel is one-way in the
forward direction.
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• a key set K = {1, . . . , ⌈2nRK ⌉}. This set is publicity known to all parties;
• a randomization RV Q with distribution PQ over Q, where Q is an arbitrary set with
a finite size. For randomization, Alice generates a RV Q ∈ Q independent of s;
• key generator function K1 : Q × Sn → K. Observing s, Alice computes her key
K = K1(Q, s);
• wiretap channel encoding function W : Q× Sn → Xn. Alice transmits x = W(Q, s)
over the wiretap channel in n transmissions;
• public channel encoding function F : Q× Sn → P1n, where P1n is assumed to be the
range of function F which is subject to capacity constraint2 (3.1a), where |P1| = |P1n|.
Alice sends public message P = F(Q, s) over the public channel at time instant n;
• key generator (decoding) function K2 : Yn × Bn × P1n → K. At the end of receiving
y, b, and P , Bob decodes his key K̂ = K2(y,b, P ).
The efficiency of an admissible key agreement coding scheme is measured by the av-
erage probability of error, the leakage rate, and the randomness of (K, K̂) as defined in
Definition 1.10.
For a given public channel capacity pair (C
P1
, 0), an achievable rate R
K
is defined in
Definition 1.11, where the admissible key agreement code is introduced in Definition 3.3.
The (forward) key capacity of the DM model can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.4. Recall the admissible key agreement code in Definition 3.3. For a given
public channel capacity C
P1
∈ [0,∞), the supremum of all achievable key rates according
to Definition 1.11 is called (forward) key capacity of that public channel. The forward




, 0), where (C
P1
, 0) is the pair of public channel
capacity.
The ultimate objective of this chapter is to find (or bound) the forward key capacity
of the DM model as a function of C
P1
.
Following Definition 2.9, we extend the definition of the less noisy property to the class
2In fact, we assumed P11 = P12 = . . . = P1(n−1) = {0}.
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of DM-SWCs. To do this, we assume a DM-SWC as a broadcast channel [2] with augmented
input (x, s) and with augmented outputs (y,b) and (z, e). To simplify the notations, we
represent augmented outputs with the new symbolˇon wiretap channel outputs, e.g.,
Y̌i = (Yi, Bi) , (3.3a)
Ži = (Zi, Ei) (3.3b)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 3.5. For a given channel state distribution PS, the state-dependent channel is
said to be less noisy with respect to PS in Bob’s favor if
I(U ; Y̌ ) ≥ I(U ; Ž) (3.4)
holds for every auxiliary random variable U such that U → (X,S) → (Y̌ , Ž) forms a
Markov chain. A special class of less noisy DM-SWCs is the class of (physically) degraded
DM-SWCs for which
PY̌ Ž|XS = PŽ|Y̌PY̌ |XS , (3.5)
holds. A physically degraded DM-SWC is less noisy with respect to any channel state
distribution PS.
3.2 Statement of Main Results
In this section, we declare the main results for the DM model defined in Section 3.1.
Theorem 3.1 (Lower bound on the forward key capacity). Assume the DM model with
public channel capacity C
P1
∈ [0,∞). Define the set
O(C
P1
) , {PXU |S : CP1 + I(U ; Y̌ ) ≥ I(U ;S)} , (3.6)
where U ∈U with cardinality |U| ≤ |S||X| + 3 is an auxiliary RV such that U → (X,S)→
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(Y̌ , Ž). Then, the forward key capacity of the DM model with public channel capacity C
P1





, 0) ≥ max
PXU|S∈ O(CP1 )
[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] . (3.7)
Comparing Theorem 3.1 with Corollary 2.1, we conclude that the key capacity exceeds
both the main channel capacity and the secrecy capacity in some DM-SWCs, which are
specified in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Let C
P1
= 0. Assume a physically degraded DM-SWC according to (3.5).
Assume the main channel capacity of the DM-SWC, which is given in (1.33), is achievable
at input distribution P∗X|SUP∗U |SPS. At this distribution, if I(U∗;S) > I(U∗; Ž∗), then
C
K
(0, 0) ≥ I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)− I(U∗; Ž∗) > C
S
= Cm = I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)− I(U∗;S) ,
where I(U∗;S), I(U∗; Y̌ ∗), and I(U∗; Ž∗) are calculated at distribution
PŽ|Y̌PY̌ XUS = PY̌ Ž|XSP∗X|SUP∗U |SPS .
Moreover, the UBs on the forward key capacity of the DM model are as follows.
Theorem 3.2 (Upper bound on the forward key capacity). Let U be an auxiliary RV such









+ I(U ; Y̌ ) +H(X |S,U) ≥ I(U ;S)
[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] .
Theorem 3.3 (Upper bound on the forward key capacity of a less noisy DM-SWC). Let
U and V be two auxiliary RVs such that (U, V ) → (X,S) → (Y̌ , Ž). If the channel is less
noisy with respect to the given distribution PS in Bob’s favor, then the forward key capacity
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, 0) ≤ max
(U, V )→(X,S)→(Y̌ , Ž)
s.t. C
P1
+ I(U ; Y̌ ) ≥ I(U ;S)
[I(U, V ; Y̌ )− I(U, V ; Ž)] .
As a special case, the following corollary shows that the forward key capacity of a
source-type model given in (1.20), which is originally established in [18, 21], is achievable
by using a single auxiliary RV.
Corollary 3.2. When no wiretap channel exists, i.e., X = Y = Z = {0}, the forward key









+ I(U ;B) ≥ I(U ;S)
[I(U ;B) − I(U ;E)] ,
where U ∈U is an auxiliary RV with |U|≤|S|+ 3.
When the capacity of the public channel becomes unlimited, the forward key capacity
is achieved as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 (Public channel with unlimited capacity). If C
P1
→ ∞, then the forward
key capacity of the model is
C
K
(∞, 0) = max
U→(X,S)→(Y̌ ,Ž)
[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] . (3.8)
Further, if the channel is less noisy with respect to the distribution PS(s) in Bob’s favor,
then the forward key capacity can be simplified to
C
K
(∞, 0) = max
PX|S









(∞, 0) is the maximum forward
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key capacity that can be attained by a DM model with a fixed DM-SWC. However, we do
not demand an unlimited public channel capacity to achieve C
K





is not a strictly increasing function of C
P1
. These facts are established in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.3. For a given DM-SWC, let distribution
P∗XU |S ∈ argmax
PXU|S
[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] ,
where U → (X,S) → (Y̌ , Ž). Define C∗
P
, [I(U∗;S) − I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)]+, which is calcu-








, 0) = C
K
(∞, 0), where C
K
(∞, 0) is given by Theorem 3.4.
Now, consider a DM-SWC in which the CSI is fully known at both Alice and Bob (no
matter if it is fully known at Eve or not). In [64], the (forward) key capacity of this model
is obtained for the special case no public channel as given in (1.36). Based on Corollary 3.3,
we show that the public channel does not help the forward key capacity in this case. That
is, the result of [64] is optimum for any C
P1
≥ 0 as well. In this case, the forward key
capacity is obtained from Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.3 as follows.
Corollary 3.4. If Bob has access to the CSI, i.e., b = s, then the forward key capacity of







, 0) = max
U→(X,S)→(Y,Z,E)
[I(U ; Y |S)− I(U ;Z|S) +H(S|Z,E)] .
3.3 The Proofs
In this section, we prove the results given in Section 3.2 as follows.
79
3.3.1 The Proof of Theorem 3.1
The strategy of the proof is as follows. First, we prove that R
K
= I(U ; Y̌ ) − I(U ; Ž) is
an achievable key rate if PXU |S ∈ O(CP1 ). Proving this fact, the LB is obtained by taking
the supremum on all achievable key rates. On the other hand, |U|≤|S||X|+3 follows from
support lemma [6] as proved in [12, Appendix]. Hence, the size of set U is finite and we
can switch the supremum with the maximum according to Appendix B.
In the following, we prove that R
K
is an achievable key rate with the use of the strong
typicality introduced in Subsection 2.1.1. In Subsubsection 3.3.1.1, the preliminaries of
the proof is expressed where the distribution on RVs for different cases are established.
In Subsubsection 3.3.1.2, we create an admissible key agreement code for the DM model
satisfying the LB given in Theorem 3.1. In Subsubsection 3.3.1.3, we analyze the efficiency
of the admissible key agreement code according to Definition 1.10.
3.3.1.1 Preliminaries
Select set U such that |U|≤|S||X|+3. Given C
P1
, PBE|S , and PY Z|XS from the DM model,
arbitrarily select conditional PMFs PU |S and PX|US to fix
PY ZXUBE|S = PBE|SPU |SPX|USPY Z|XS (3.10)
such that C
P1
≥ I(U ;S) − I(U ; Y,B). From (3.10), Markov chains (B,E) → S → U and
(B,E) → (U, S) → X and (U,B,E) → (X,S) → (Y, Z) are justified. Also, PU (u) =
∑
s∈S
PU |S(u|s)PS(s) is fixed by (3.10), where u ∈ U.
If I(U ; Ž) ≥ I(U ; Y̌ ), then no key rate can be agreed between Alice and Bob, and so
K = {1}; if not, the admissible key agreement code is constructed in the next subsubsection.
3.3.1.2 Key Agreement Code Generation
Sequences u are generated i.i.d. according to PU . For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), randomly pick up
N0 ≤ 2n(H(U)−ǫ) sequences u for the codebook generation. Each sequence u is called a
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codeword. The structure of the key agreement codebook is based on double random bin-
ning as explained below.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the (key agreement) codebook is constructed with N1 enu-
merated bins such that each bin consists of N2 enumerated sub-bins. N0 codewords are
randomly partitioned in all N1N2 sub-bins such that each sub-bin is filled with the same
number of codewords. Let consider each sub-bin as a set of codewords. Denote sub-bin
j located in bin i by the locator set Lij , where i ∈ {1, . . . , N1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , N2}; each





as the set of all codewords placed in bin i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , N1}; each bin has the same
|Ii| = N0N1 codewords. For i ∈ {1, . . . , N1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , N2}, (i, j) is called the label of
codeword u, if u ∈ Lij ; i is also called its bin-label as u ∈ Ii. Finally, the matrix of all















At each block code transmission, the encoder selects a codeword, which is specified
by ũ, from the codebook C. Having s and codeword ũ, transmitted signal x is gener-
ated according to P(x|s, ũ) =
n∏
i=1
PX|SU(xi|si, ũi). At the end of the transmission of the
whole block code, Bob decodes a codeword û from the codebook C. Specifications of the
codebook, the encoding and the decoding functions are individually determined for the
following two cases.







































N0 codewords per codebook
N1 bins per codebook
N2 sub-bins per bin




Bin #1 Bin #2 Bin #N1
Figure 3.2: Structure of codebook C formed with a double random binning strategy.
• Codebook Specifications.
N0 = 2
n(I(U ;Y̌ )−ǫ1), (3.13)
N1 = 2
n[I(U ;Y̌ )−ǫ1−max{I(U ;S)+ǫ0, I(U ;Ž)−ǫ2}], (3.14)
N2 = 2
n[max{I(U ;S)+ǫ0, I(U ;Ž)−ǫ2}−(I(U ;Ž)−ǫ3)], (3.15)
|L| = 2n[I(U ;Ž)−ǫ3], (3.16)
where 1 > ǫ0 > ǫ1 > ǫ > ǫ3 > ǫ2 > 0 are fixed real values.
• Encoding. Let define K1 , {1, . . . , N1}, K2 , {1, . . . , N2}, and assume key set
K = {1, . . . , N1.N2}. Alice generates a uniformly distributed RV Q ∈ K1. Given
s and Q, she picks up codeword ũ at uniformly random from the set {u : u ∈
IQ, (u, s) ∈ T∗ǫ (PUS)}. If the set is void, the encoder randomly sends a codeword
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from set IQ, but an error will be declared at the encoder. Assume ũ ∈ Lij , where
i ∈ {1, . . . , N1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , N2}. Fix a one-to-one function K̃1 : K1 × K2 → K.
Then, K = K̃1(i, j). In this case the encoder sends no public message over the public
channel, i.e., P = 0. From equations (3.14) and (3.15), size of the key set is
|K| = N1N2 = 2n[I(U ;Y̌ )−I(U ;Ž)−ǫ1+ǫ3] . (3.17)
• Decoding. Observing b and receiving y from the DM-SWC, the legitimate decoder
builds the decoding set
D1 = {u : u ∈ C, (u,y,b) ∈ T∗ǫ (PUY B)} .
If |D1| 6= 1 or ũ /∈ D1, the decoder declares an error; if not, K̂ = K̃1(i, j), where
ũ ∈ D1, and (i, j) is the label of codeword û = ũ.
(b). Case I(U ; Y̌ ) < I(U ;S).
• Codebook Specifications.
N0 = 2
n(I(U ;S)+ǫ0) , (3.18)
N1 = 2
n[I(U ;S)−I(U ;Y̌ )+ǫ0+ǫ1] , (3.19)
N2 = 2
n[I(U ;Y̌ )−I(U ;Ž)−ǫ1+ǫ2] , (3.20)
|L| = 2n(I(U ;Ž)−ǫ2) , (3.21)
where 1 > ǫ0 > ǫ1 > ǫ > ǫ2 > 0 are fixed real values.
• Encoding. Let key set K = {1, . . . , N2}. Observing s, Alice picks up codeword ũ at
uniformly random from set {u : u ∈ C, (u, s) ∈ T∗ǫ (PUS)}. The encoder declares an
error if this set is void, and then codeword ũ is randomly chosen from codebook C.
Assume that the label of ũ is (I, J), where I ∈ {1, . . . , N1} and J ∈ {1, . . . , N2}.
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Then, P = I and K = J . Therefore, P ∈ {1, . . . , N1} and K ∈ K. In this case
|P1| = 2n[I(U ;S)−I(U ;Y̌ )+ǫ0+ǫ1] , (3.22)
|K| = 2n[I(U ;Y̌ )−I(U ;Ž)−ǫ1+ǫ2] , (3.23)
due to equations (3.19) and (3.20).
• Decoding. Bob’s decoder knows the bin-label of the sent codeword from public mes-
sage P . Having P , y and b, it constructs the set
D2 = {u : u ∈ IP , (u,y,b) ∈ T∗ǫ (PUY B)} .
An error will be declared by the decoder if |D2| 6= 1 or ũ /∈ D2; if not, then ũ = û
and assume that the label of codeword ũ ∈ D2 is (P, K̂), where K̂ ∈ K. Finally, K̂
is chosen by Bob as his key.
3.3.1.3 Analysis
Any codebook, as a random matrix, has codewords u1, . . . ,uN0 such that each codeword






PU (uij) . (3.24)
We prove that the average probability of error and the average leakage rate over all ran-
domly generated key agreement codebooks vanishes as n → ∞. Then, this turns out that
there exists at least one codebook with small enough probability of error and small enough
leakage rate as n → ∞ due to the random coding argument [2,6]. Specifically, assume that
for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) there exists n ≥ N such that
E(Perror(n)) ≤ ǫ , (3.25a)
1
n
I(K; ž, P,C) ≤ ǫ , (3.25b)
84
where C is a random codebook with distribution (3.24) and E indicates an average over
the random codebook ensemble. Thus, from equations (3.25) we have
2ǫ ≥ E(Perror(n)) +
1
n
















where (3.26) follows from equations (3.25a) and (3.25b). From (3.26), it can be con-












I(K; ž, P,C0) ≤ 2ǫ (3.27)
Therefore, from (3.27) we conclude
Perror(n) ≤ 2ǫ , (3.28a)
1
n
I(K; ž, P,C0) ≤ 2ǫ , (3.28b)
that leads to the approval of the AR and AS conditions according to Definition 1.11.
In the sequel, we prove equations (3.25a) and (3.25b) in part (a) and part (b), respec-
tively to justify the AR and AS conditions. Moreover, we will prove that H(K|ž, P,C) ≥
log(|K|) − nǫ for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) in part (b), and thus the ARN condition, given in Defini-
tion 1.11, is established according to the fact that H(K) ≥ H(K|ž, P,C).
To simplify notations, let define I0 , {u1, . . . ,uN0} as the set of all codewords in this
part. According to Definition 1.10, we examine the following conditions for the proposed
key agreement code.
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(a). The Average Probability of Error. Assume that EV1 and EV2 are error events




P(s)[P(EV1 ∪ EV2|s)] , (3.29)
≤
∑
s ∈ T∗ǫ (PS)
P(s)[P(EV1 ∪ EV2|s)] +
∑




s ∈ T∗ǫ (PS)






s ∈ T∗ǫ (PS)




where the expectation in (3.29) is over all code-books C with distribution given in (3.24);
equation (3.31) follows from the fact that
∑
s /∈ T∗ǫ (PS)
P(s) ≤ ǫ
4
for large enough n ≥ n11(ǫ) [2, Sec. 11.2]. Hence, we focus our attention to s ∈ T∗ǫ (PS).
With this assumption, the terms in (3.32) are evaluated in the following.
Error at the Encoder. Error event at the encoder is
EV1 , {∄u ∈ IQ : (s,u) ∈ T∗ǫ (PSU)} . (3.33)
Now, the first term in (3.32) is bounded as follows:
P(EV1|s) ≤ (1− 2−n(I(U ;S)+ǫ))|IQ| (3.34)
≤ (1− 2−n(I(U ;S)+ǫ))2n(I(U ;S)+ǫ0) (3.35)
≤ exp(−2−n(I(U ;S)+ǫ))2n(I(U ;S)+ǫ0) (3.36)







• (3.34) follows from the fact that the codewords have been generated independently






)) > ǫ (3.38)
• (3.35) holds because 0 < 1 − 2−n(I(U ;S)+ǫ) < 1 and |IQ| = N0N1 ≥ 2
n(I(U ;S)+ǫ0) due to
equations (3.13) and (3.14) as well as equations (3.18) and (3.19);
• (3.36) holds from inequality 1 + a ≤ exp(a) for any real value a;
• (3.37) is valid due to (3.38);
The encoder finally sends codeword ũ based on observation of s. If no error declared at
the encoder (conditioned on EVc1 and given vector s), we have (ũ, s) ∈ T∗ǫ (PUS).
Error at the Decoder. Error event at the decoder is defined as
EV2 , EV21 ∪ EV22 , (3.39)
where
EV21 = {(y,b, ũ) 6∈ T∗ǫ (PY BU)} , (3.40)
EV22 = {∃u 6= ũ ∈ IP : (y,b,u) ∈ T∗ǫ (PY BU)} . (3.41)
Therefore, we have
P(EV2|EVc1, s) = P(EV21|EVc1, s) + P(EV22|EVc21,EVc1, s) , (3.42)
according to (3.39). The first term in the right-hand-side of (3.42) is bounded by the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists n ≥ n21(ǫ) such that P(EV21|EVc1, s) ≤ ǫ4 .
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Proof.
P(EV21|EVc1, s) ≤ P(EV211|EVc1, s) + P(EV212|EVc211,EVc1, s) (3.43)
where
EV211 , {(b, s, ũ) 6∈ T∗ǫ (PBSU )} , (3.44)
E212 , {(y,b, s, ũ) 6∈ T∗ǫ (PY BSU)} . (3.45)
From (3.10), we have U → S → B; from condition EVc1, we conclude (ũ, s) ∈ T∗ǫ (PUS) for
given s; hence, there exists n ≥ n211(ǫ) such that P(E211) < ǫ8 due to Markov lemma [2,
Lem. 15.8.1] and the fact that b is drawn according to
n∏
i=1




From (3.10), we have B → (U, S) → Y ; from condition Ec211(s), we conclude (ũ,b, s) ∈
T∗ǫ (PUΥBS) for given s; thus, there exists n ≥ n212(ǫ) such that P(E212) ≤ ǫ8 due to Markov
lemma [2, Lem. 15.8.1] and the fact that y is drawn according to
n∏
i=1




PY |XS(y|x, s)PX|US(x|u, s) due to equation (3.10).
Thus, the proof of the lemma is completed if n21(ǫ) > max{n211(ǫ), n212(ǫ)}.
The second term in the right-hand-side of (3.42) is bounded as follows:
























P(ũ = u|EVc21, s)[2−n(I(U ;Y,B)−ǫ)(|IP | − 1)]
< [2−n(I(U ;Y,B)−ǫ)2n(I(U ;Y,B)−ǫ1)]
∑
u∈IP






• (3.46) follows from the fact that EVc1 ⊆ EVc12;
• (3.47) is a union bound on (3.46);
• (3.48) follows from [2, Lem. (10.6.2)] for large enough n ≥ n22(ǫ);
• (3.49) follows from |I0| = N0 for the first case according to (3.13), also from |IP | = N0N1
for P ∈ {1, . . . , N1} (the second case) according to equations (3.18) and (3.19);
• (3.50) follows from ∑
u∈IP
P(ũ = u|EVc21, s, P ) = 1;







) > ǫ , (3.52)





for n ≥ n2(ǫ), where n2(ǫ) , max{n21(ǫ), n22(ǫ)}.
Conditions (3.38) and (3.52) have been already satisfied due to the specifications of
the key agreement codebook. From equations (3.32), (3.37), and (3.53), we conclude that
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there exists n ≥ max{n1(ǫ), n2(ǫ)} such that
E(Perror(n)) ≤ ǫ (3.54)
for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1). This equation approves the validity of (3.25a).
(b). The Average Leakage Rate.
Lemma 3.2. For any ǫ5 > 0, there exists n ≥ n5(ǫ5) such that H(u|K, ž, P,C) < nǫ5,
provided ǫ0 > ǫ2 > ǫ.
Proof. Suppose an arbitrary decoder ∆ wishing to retrieve sent codeword ũ from K, ž,
and P as its input information. The output of this decoder is denoted by û. Having K
and P , the label of codeword ũ is uniquely determined with no error according to the
encoding functions, which are publicly known. Hence, decoder ∆ is to find û from the
sub-bin in which ũ is located. No matter what the decoding function of ∆ is, from Fano’s
inequality [2, Thm. 2.10.1], we have
H(u|K, ž, P,C) ≤ H(u|K, ž, P ) (3.55)
≤ B(ϑ) + ϑ log(|L|) ,
≤ B(ϑ) + n(I(U ; Ž)− ǫ2)ϑ , (3.56)
where
B(x) , −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x), (3.57)
ϑ , P(û 6= ũ|K, ž, P ). (3.58)
and (3.56) follows from equations (3.16) and (3.21) as ǫ3 > ǫ2 > 0.
The right-hand-side of (3.56) is valid for any decoder and it is determined by the
decoder’s probability of error ϑ. However, the value of left-hand-side is independent of
decoder ∆, and it is determined by the joint PMF of (u, K, ž, P ). So, any decoder ∆ with
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probability of error ϑ gives a corresponding UB, as a function of ϑ, on H(u|K, ž, P ).
On the other hand, we can claim that there exists a (strongly) jointly typical decoder
∆ for which ϑ ≤ ǫ for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1). This decoder is called ∆∗. The proof of this claim is
similar to that of the AR condition in the last part with the following modifications.
• B,Y , Y̌ , and their corresponding vectors are replaced by E,Z, Ž, and their corre-
sponding vectors, respectively;
• IP is changed to LIJ , where the random pair (I, J) is the label of codeword u
• Markov chain U → (X,S) → Z holds due to (3.10).
Finally, from (3.56) we conclude the lemma for decoder ∆∗ as for any ǫ5 ∈ (0, 1) there
exists a decoder ∆∗ with probability of error ϑ ≤ ǫ such that B(ϑ)+n(I(U ; Ž)− ǫ2)ϑ ≤ ǫ5
holds.
Lemma 3.3. H(u|P,C) ≥ n[I(U ; Y̌ ) − ǫ1], where ǫ1 ∈ (0, 1) was fixed in the codebook
generation.
Proof. Consider C as a random matrix of independently drawn codewords. Let RV I
denote the label of codeword u in codebook C. In other words, I is the row number of
random matrix C in which u is located.
H(u|P,C) = H(u, P |C)−H(P |C)
= H(u|C) +H(P |u,C)−H(P |C)
= H(u) +H(C|u)−H(C) +H(P |u,C)−H(P |C)
= H(u) +H(C|u)−H(C)−H(P |C) (3.59)
= H(u) +H(C|u, I) +H(I|u)−H(I|u,C)−H(C)−H(P |C)









= H(I|u)− log(|P1|) (3.62)
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= log(N0)− log(|P1|) (3.63)
= n[I(U ; Y̌ )− ǫ1] (3.64)
where
• (3.59) holds because P , if it is not zero as in the first case of code-books, is determined
by bin-index of u in C;
• (3.60) holds because I is uniquely determined by u and C;
• (3.61) follows from the following facts:
a. Codebook C is filled with codewords u at uniformly random;
b. Codewords u are drawn independently;
c. H(P |C) ≤ log(|P1|), where
log(|P1|) =
{
0 : if I(U ; Y̌ ) ≥ I(U ;S),
n[I(U ;S)− I(U ; Y̌ ) + ǫ0 + ǫ1] : if I(U ; Y̌ ) < I(U ;S)
(3.65)
due to public message encoding functions.
• (3.62) follows from H(u) = H(uI);
• (3.63) follows from the fact that when C is not given P{I = i|u} = 1
N0
for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , N0}, because a permutation of a codebook containing u results in an-




P(I = i|C,u)P(C|u) is the same for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N0}
(P(I = i|C,u) = 1 if label of u in C is i; otherwise, it is zero.);
• (3.64) follows from equations (3.13), (3.18), and (3.65).
Lemma 3.4. For any ǫ6 ∈ (0, 1), there exists n ≥ n6(ǫ6) such that 1nH(ž|u) ≥ H(Ž|U)−ǫ6.
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Proof.




























(PU(U = u)− ǫ′)
∑
(z,e)∈(Z,E)





≥ n(1− ǫ)H(Z,E|U)(1− ǫ′′) (3.74)
= n(H(Ž|U)− ǫ6) (3.75)
(3.76)
where
• (3.68) distribution PUZE is calculated from (3.10);
• (3.70) η(υ|u) represents the number of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that υ = ui (see
Section 2.1.1 for more details); also,
P(s,x|u)P(z, e|x, s) =
n∏
i=1
PSX|U(si, xi|ui)PZE|XS(zi, ei|xi, si) ,
where PSX|U and PZE|XS are calculated according to (3.10) (see also [53, Page 1634]);
• (3.72) follows from the fact that sequence u is ǫ-strongly typical (see [3, Sec. 2]);
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• (3.74) follows from ∑
u∈T∗ǫ (PU )
P(u) ≥ 1− ǫ;
• (3.75) holds for any ǫ6 ∈ (0, 1) if ǫ′, ǫ′′, and ǫ were selected small enough such that
previous inequalities hold.
Finally, for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we complete the proof as follows:
H(K|ž, P,C) = H(K|ž, P,u,C) + I(K;u|ž, P,C)
= H(u|ž, P,C)−H(u|K, ž, P,C) (3.77)
= H(u|P,C)−H(ž|P,C) +H(ž|u, P,C)− nǫ5 (3.78)
≥ H(u|P,C)−H(ž) +H(ž|u)− nǫ5 (3.79)






H(Ži|Ui)− n(ǫ5 + ǫ6) (3.80)
= n[I(Y̌ ;U)− I(Ž;U)]− n(ǫ1 + ǫ5 + ǫ6) (3.81)
≥ log(|K|)− n(ǫ2 + ǫ5 + ǫ6) (3.82)
≥ H(K)− nǫ (3.83)
where
• (3.77) follows from the fact that K is a function of u for given codebook C;
• (3.78) follows from Lemma 3.2 for n ≥ n5(ǫ5);
• (3.79) holds as H(ž|u,C) = H(ž|u) follows from Markov chain (C, P ) → u → (e, z);
Also, H(ž) ≥ H(ž|P,C);
• (3.81) holds because of the following facts:
a. The first term follows from Lemma 3.3;
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H(Žτ |τ = i) (3.85)
= nH(Žτ |τ) (3.86)
≤ nH(Žτ ) (3.87)
= nH(Ž)
for a uniformly distributed RV τ ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Finally, let Z , Zτ ;
c. The third term follows from Lemma 3.4;
• (3.81) follows from equations (3.13), (3.21);
• (3.82) holds from equations (3.17) and (3.23);
• (3.83) is valid from log(|K|) ≥ H(K) and ǫ > ǫ1 + ǫ5 + ǫ6.
Hence, (3.83) approves the validity of (3.25b).
3.3.2 The Proof of Corollary 3.1
According to Corollary 2.1, we have
C
S
= Cm = I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)− I(U∗;S)
which is also valid if side information is available at Bob or/and Eve3. From Theorem 3.1,
we also understand that R
K
= I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)− I(U∗; Ž∗) is an achievable key rate if the DM-
SWC is less noisy in Bob’s favor. The fact that I(U∗;S) > I(U∗; Ž∗) completes the proof
of this corollary.
3If side information is available at any receiver, an augmented output can be considered at that receiver,
and thus the secrecy capacity can be extended to this case.
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3.3.3 The Proof of Theorem 3.2
The proof of the UB is established in two steps. In the first step, we obtain a UB on the
forward key capacity of the DM model due to the effect of the DM-SWC on the achievable
key rate. In the second step, we derive a constraint imposed by C
P1
due to the public
channel.
First, fix an arbitrarily small ǫ ≥ 0. According to Definition 1.11, a key rate R
K
is achievable if there exists an admissible key agreement code (⌈2nRK ⌉, n), which returns





















where Perror(n), RL(n), X (n) are defined in Definition (1.10). Then, we can derive the UB
in the following two steps.
(a). The effect of the wiretap channel on R
K
. First, we establish the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.5. Let PWUBESXY Z be a joint distribution on W×U×B×E× S×X×Y×Z
such that Markov chains W → (U,B,E) → (X,S) → (Y, Z) and W → (U,B,E, S) → X
hold, where the marginal distribution PBES is fixed. Recalling notations (3.3), define the
function
L(PUSXY̌ Ž|W=wm) , I(U ; Y̌ |W = wm)− I(U ; Ž|W = wm) ,
where wm ∈ W is fixed. Then, there exists a distribution P∗USXY̌ Ž with marginal distribution
PBES such that
I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)− I(U∗; Ž∗) = L(PUSXY̌ Ž|W=wm) , (3.89)
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P∗WUSXY̌ Ž , PBESP∗W |BESP∗U |WBESPX|UBESPY Z|XS (3.90)
where PBES, PX|UBES, and PY Z|XS are marginal distributions of PWUSXBY EZ and
∀(b, e, s) ∈ B× E× S :
P∗W |BES(w|b, e, s) ,
{
1, :If w = wm;
0, :Otherwise.
(3.91a)
∀(u, b, e, s) ∈ U× B× E× S :
P∗U |WBES(u|w, b, e, s) ,
{ PW |BES(wm|b,e,s)PU|BESW (u|b,e,s,wm)
PW (wm) , :If w = wm;
0, :Otherwise.
(3.91b)






1, :If w = wm;
0, :Otherwise.
(3.92)
Moreover, from (3.90) and (3.91b) and (3.92), we have
∀u ∈ U : P∗U(u) = PU |W (u|wm) . (3.93)
From (3.90) and (3.92), for any (wm, u, b, e, s) ∈ W×U×B×E× S (with fixed given wm)
we conclude that
P∗UBES|W (u, b, e, s|wm) = P∗BES|W (b, e, s|wm)P∗U |BESW (u|b, e, s, w)
=
PBES(b, e, s)P∗W |BES(wm|b, e, s)
P∗W (wm)
P∗U |BESW (u|b, e, s, wm)
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= PBES(b, e, s)
(PW |BES(wm|b, e, s)
PW (wm)
PU |BESW (u|b, e, s, wm)
)
= PUBES|W (u, b, e, s|wm)
From this equation, for any (u, b, e, s, x, y, z) ∈ U × B × E × S × X × Y × Z and fixed
wm ∈ W, we have
P∗UBESXY Z|W (u, b, e, s, x, y, z|wm) = PUSXY Z|W (u, b, e, s, x, y, z|wm)
due to Markov chains W → U → (X,S) → (Y, Z) and W → (U,B,E, S) → X and (3.90).
As a result,
L(PUSXY̌ Ž|W=wm) = L(P∗USXY̌ Ž|W=wm) .
On the other hand, from (3.92), which is valid for distribution P∗
WUSXY̌ Ž
, we can redefine
W = {wm} for this distribution, and so I(U ; Y̌ |W = wm)−I(U ; Ž |W = wm) = I(U ; Y̌ )−
I(U ; Ž) at P∗UBESXY Z(u, b, e, s, x, y, z) = P∗UBESXY Z|W (u, b, e, s, x, y, z|wm). Hence, the
lemma is established.
Now, we prove the UB as follows.
nR
K
≤ H(K) + n ǫ
3
(3.94)
≤ I(K; K̂) + n2ǫ
3
(3.95)
≤ I(K;y,b, P ) + n2ǫ
3
(3.96)
≤ I(K;y,b, P )− I(K; z, e, P ) + nǫ (3.97)
























I(Uτ ; Žτ |Wτ , τ = i)] + nǫ
= n[I(Uτ ; Y̌τ |Wτ , τ)− I(Uτ ; Žτ |Wτ , τ)] + nǫ (3.102)




[I(U ; Y̌ |W = w)− I(U ; Ž|W = w)]P
W
(w) + nǫ
≤ n[I(U ; Y̌ |W = wm)− I(U ; Ž|W = wm)] + nǫ (3.104)
= n[I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)− I(U∗; Ž∗)] + nǫ (3.105)
≤ n sup
U→(X,S)→(Y,Z)
[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] + nǫ
= n max
U→(X,S)→(Y,Z)
[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] + nǫ (3.106)
where
• (3.94) follows from (3.88d);
• (3.95) follows from (3.88a) and H(K|K̂) ≤ n ǫ
3
due to Fano’s inequality [2, Thm.
2.10.1];
• (3.96) holds due to data processing inequality [2, Thm. 2.8.1] as K̂ = K2(y,b, P )
and so K → (y,b, P ) → K̂;
• (3.97) follows from (3.88b);
• (3.98) follows from (3.3).
• (3.99) is valid because of the chain rule for mutual information [2, Thm. 2.5.2];
• (3.100) holds from Csiszár-Körner’s sum identity (see Appendix D);






• (3.102) holds as a time-sharing RV τ with a uniform distribution over {1, . . . , n},
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1 ), is applied;
• (3.103) follows from definitions
U , (Uτ , τ) , (3.108a)
W , (Wτ , τ) , (3.108b)
X , Xτ , (3.108c)
Y̌ , Y̌τ , (3.108d)
Ž , Žτ ; (3.108e)
Also, note that Markov chain W → U → (X,S) → (Y̌ , Ž) is valid; U and W are also
reserved for alphabet set of U and that of W , respectively;




(w) = 1 and selection
wm ∈ argmax
w∈W
[I(U ; Y̌ |W = w)− I(U ; Ž|W = w)] ,
and so the equality in (3.104) holds if
∀w ∈ W : w ∈ argmax
w∈W
[I(U ; Y̌ |W = w)− I(U ; Ž|W = w)] ; (3.109)
• (3.105) follows from Lemma 3.5 according to distribution P∗
USXY̌ Ž
for which Markov
chains W → U → (X,S) → (Y, Z) and (U,W,X, Y, Z) → S → (B,E) hold;
• (3.106) follows from Appendix B and the fact that U is a finite set according
to (3.107) and (3.108a) for a given n;







= H(KP )−H(K|P )
= H(KP )− I(K; Y n1 Bn1 |P )−H(K|PY n1 Bn1 )
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≥ H(KP )− I(K; Y n1 Bn1 |P )− nǫ (3.111)
≥ H(KP )− I(KP ; Y̌ n1 )− nǫ (3.112)
≥ H(KP )−H(KP |Xn1 Sn1 )− I(KP ; Y̌ n1 )− nǫ (3.113)































































































H(Xi|Si) +H(Xn1 |Sn1 ) + [
n∑
i=1

























H(Xi|UiSi, τ = i)]− nǫ
= n[I(Uτ ;Sτ |τ)−H(Xτ |UτSτ , τ)− I(Uτ ; Y̌τ |τ)]− nǫ (3.123)
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≥ n[I(Uτ , τ ;Sτ )− I(Uτ , τ ; Y̌τ)−H(Xτ |Uτ , τ, Sτ )]− nǫ (3.124)
= n[I(U ;S)− I(U ; Y̌ )−H(X|U, S)]− nǫ (3.125)
where
• (3.110) follows from public channel capacity constraint given in (3.1a);
• (3.111) holds due to Fano’s inequality [2, Thm. 2.10.1] as well as satisfaction of the
AR condition (1.18a) by the code, because K̂ = K2(Y n1 , Bn1 , P );
• (3.112) follows from substitution Y̌ n1 = (Y n1 , Bn1 ); also, let Y̌i = (YiBi);
• (3.113) holds due to H(KP |Xn1 Sn1 ) ≥ 0;
• (3.114) follows from the mutual information chain rule [2, Ch. 2];
• (3.115) follows from Csiszár-Körner’s sum identity (see Appendix D);
• (3.116) follows from I(Y̌ i−11 ; Y̌i) ≥ 0;
• (3.117) holds due to Markov chains XiSi → Xni+1Sni+1 → Žni+1 and Y̌i → Xni+1Sni+1 →
Žni+1 as the wiretap channel is memoryless;







i+1 → XiSi → Yi holds as the wiretap channel is memoryless;
• (3.119) follows from
n∑
i=1
H(XiSi|Xni+1Sni+1) = H(Xn1 Sn1 ) due to entropy chain rule [2];
• (3.120) is valid due to Definition 3.107;
• (3.121) follows from the fact that Sn1 is drawn i.i.d., and so
n∑
i=1
H(Si) = H(Sn1 );
• (3.122) follows from H(Xn1 |Sn1 ) ≥ 0;








• (3.124) holds as distribution of Sτ does not depend on τ (Sn1 is i.i.d.); also, I(Uτ , τ ; Y̌τ ) ≥
I(Uτ ; Y̌τ |τ), where the equality holds if Y̌ n1 is i.i.d.;
• (3.125) follows from definitions (3.108), also Sτ can be replaced by S as distribution
of Sτ does not depend on τ (S
n
1 is i.i.d.);
As equations (3.106) and (3.125) are valid for any achievable rate R
K
, and any ǫ ∈ (0, 1)
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and a correspondingly large enough n, the theorem is concluded.
3.3.4 The Proof of Theorem 3.3
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let Ui = (P Y̌ i−11 Sni+1) and Vi = (KXni+1); thus, the Markov chain
































I(Uτ ; Y̌τ |τ = i)] ,
= n[I(Uτ ;Sτ |τ)− I(Uτ ; Y̌τ |τ)] (3.128)
≥ n[I(Uτ , τ ;Sτ )− I(Uτ , τ ; Y̌τ )] (3.129)
= n[I(U ;S)− I(U ; Y̌ )] , (3.130)
where
• (3.126) follows from public channel capacity constraint given in (3.1a);
• (3.127) follows from the fact that s is i.i.d. and from Csiszár-Körner’s sum identity (see
Appendix D);
• (3.128) holds as a time-sharing RV τ with a uniform distribution over {1, . . . , n}, which is






1 ), is applied;
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• (3.129) holds because τ is independent of Sτ (s is i.i.d.);
• (3.130) follows from definitions U , (Uτ , τ), Y̌ , Y̌τ , and S , Sτ .































I(Uτ , Vτ ; Žτ |τ = i)] + nǫ (3.133)
= n[I(Uτ , Vτ ; Y̌τ |τ)− I(Uτ , Vτ ; Žτ |τ)] + nǫ
≤ n[I(Uτ , Vτ , τ ; Y̌τ )− I(Uτ , Vτ , τ ; Žτ )] + nǫ (3.134)
= n[I(U, V ; Y̌ )− I(U, V ; Ž)] + nǫ , (3.135)
where
• (3.131) holds due to less noisy property given in Definition 3.5;
• (3.132) follows from Markov chain (K, Y̌ i−11 , P ) → (Xni+1, Sni+1) → Žni+1 (The DM-SWC is
memoryless) and from less noisy property in Definition 3.5 (The second bracket in (3.132)
is always non-negative);
• (3.133) holds because a time-sharing RV τ with a uniform distribution over {1, . . . , n},






1 ), is introduced;
• (3.134) holds due to less noisy property in Definition 3.5, i.e., I(τ ; Ž)− I(τ ; Y̌ ) ≤ 0;
• (3.135) follows from definitions U , (Uτ , τ), V , (Vτ , τ), Y̌ , Y̌τ , and Ž , Žτ .
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3.3.5 The Proof of Corollary 3.2
The proof directly follows from Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 when X = Y = Z = {0} is relaxed.





) defined in Theorem 3.1 contains any arbitrary distribution PXU |S(x, u|s)
without any restriction as I(U ;S) ≤ H(S) ≤ log(|S|) < ∞ always holds. This confirms the direct
part from Theorem 3.1. The converse part is also concluded from Theorem 3.2 as the constraint
on the maximization is relaxed as C
P1
→ ∞.






[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] + nǫ
= max
U→(X,S)→(Y,Z)




[I(X,S; Y̌ )− I(X,S; Ž)] + nǫ , (3.137)
where (3.137) holds from Markov chain U → (X,S) → (Y̌ , Ž) and from less noisy property
stated in Definition 3.5 (The second bracket in (3.136) is always non-negative as a conditional
mutual information is expected value of unconditional ones [12].). On the other hand, upper
bound (3.137) is achievable according to Theorem 3.1 for U = (X,S) as C
P1
→ ∞.
3.3.7 The Proof of Corollary 3.3
The proof is concluded directly from Theorems 3.1 and 3.4 based on the following facts:















= [I(U∗;S)− I(U∗; Y̌ ∗)]+ ≤ H(S) ≤ log(|S|) < ∞ .
3.3.8 The Proof of Corollary 3.4
Let substitute Y̌ = (Y,B) and Ž = (Z,E) in Corollary 3.3. For any distribution PXU |S, we
have I(U ;S) − I(U ;Y, S) ≤ 0; thus, C∗
P











, 0) = C
K
(0, 0). The proof of the corollary is finalized from [64, Thm. 1] and the fact that





In this chapter, we study the key agreement problem over a Gaussian model. The model consists
of a Gaussian wiretap channel with AWGI, which is non-causally known at the transmitter, and
a parallel public channel. This model can be considered as an extension of the DM model studied
in Chapter 3. In Definition 2.12, a physically degraded Gaussian wiretap channel with AWGI is
introduced. In this chapter, we assume a generalized Gaussian wiretap channel with two receivers,
Bob and Eve, such that the channel is not necessarily physically degraded in either Bob’s or Eve’s
favor. In fact, noise at Bob’s channel and noise at Eve’s channel are assumed to be correlated,
which is determined by noise covariance matrix.
In this chapter, we carefully examine the possibility of extending the results of Chapter 3 to
the Gaussian model. Specifically, we justify the extension of Theorem 3.1 by using generalized
Markov lemma [71] for Gaussian RVs (see Remark 2.3). The LB on the forward key capacity is
obtained by using a Gaussian auxiliary random variable. However, the existence of the maximum
value of all achievable key rates, as claimed in Theorem 3.1 and proved in Appendix B, can not
be extended to the Gaussian model because the size of the channel state alphabet is not finite.
Hence, the supremum of all achievable rates will be established in Theorem 4.1 as the forward
key capacity.
On the other hand, the UBs given in Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 do not apply to the
Gaussian model because the corresponding proofs rely on the finiteness of the alphabets of the
RVs in the DM model. For the same reason, we can not claim that the forward key capacity is
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a constant (equals C
K
(∞, 0)) when the public channel capacity is beyond a finite value based on
Corollary 3.3. In fact, our simulations show that the forward key capacity is a strictly increasing
function of the public channel capacity in the Gaussian model.
In lemma 4.2, we justify that the Gaussian model is equivalent to a Gaussian model with a
physically degraded Gaussian wiretap channel as long as the forward key capacity is concerned.
Based on this fact, the forward key capacity is not a function of the correlation coefficient between
noise of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel. Using this equivalence, we prove the UB on the
forward key capacity of the corresponding Gaussian model with a physically degraded Gaussian
wiretap channel, and then we apply that UB to the forward key capacity of the original Gaussian
model. This strategy is similar to obtaining the UB on the capacity of a Gaussian BC [2,6].
On the other hand, we show that this equivalence does not hold when transmissions over
the public channel are permitted in the backward direction. Specifically, we establish that the
backward key capacity vanishes if the Gaussian wiretap channel is physically degraded in Eve’s
favor, but the backward key capacity can be positive even if the Gaussian wiretap channel is less
noisy in Eve’s favor. In this case, we use a strategy similar to Maurer’s method [17], which was
originally offered for a wiretap model where the main channel, from Alice to Bob, and the wiretap
channel, from Alice to Eve, are two independent BSCs. Motivated by this method, we show that
the backward key capacity and thus the key capacity are functions of the correlation coefficient
between noise of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel.
After the UB on the forward key capacity is obtained, we establish the optimality of the
achievable scheme in Theorem 4.2 for the special case of unlimited capacity of the public channel.
We also calculate the forward key capacity for any public channel capacity in low SIR and high
SIR regimes.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we will present the Gaussian
model. In this section, we will technically define an admissible key agreement coding scheme for
the model and the objective of the problem. In Section 4.2, we will declare our main results. We
will simulate our results for a Gaussian model with given parameters in Section 4.3. Finally, we
will establish the proofs of our results in Section 4.4.
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4.1 Problem Definitions
We consider a Gaussian model with three parties: a sender (Alice), a legitimate receiver (Bob),
and an eavesdropper (Eve). As depicted in Figure 4.1, the model consists of a public channel be-
tween Alice and Bob according to Definition 3.1 and a Gaussian state-dependent wiretap channel
(G-SWC) defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (G-SWC). A G-SWC with non-causal SI at the transmitter and no SI at the
receivers is determined by (Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2 , ̺) ∈ R+
4 × [−1, 1], where




xxt ≤ Γ ; (4.1)
• random vector s ∈ Rn, which is known as interference, is drawn i.i.d. according to N (0,Λ);





represents Gaussian noise of the channel, where g1 ∈ Rn and
g2 ∈ Rn are Gaussian noise of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel, respectively. The










where ̺ is called the noise correlation coefficient;
• y and z are the first channel output (to Bob), and the second channel output (to Eve),
respectively, such that
y = x+ s+ g1 , (4.2a)
z = x+ s+ g2 ; (4.2b)
• the realization of random vector s is known at Alice prior to each block transmission1.
Alice and Bob wish to agree on a common secret key by transmission(s) over the Gaussian
model in presence of Eve. To do this, Alice and Bob exploit an admissible key agreement code
defined as follows.
Definition 4.2. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the time index. Recall the characteristics of a public






Xi = Wi(Q1, s, P (i−1)21 )
Interference





nz = x+ s+ g2
g1
g2













Figure 4.1: Key agreement over the Gaussian model.
channel from Definition 3.1. An admissible key agreement code (⌈2nRK ⌉, n), where R
K
∈ R+∪{0}
and code block length n ∈ N, for the Gaussian model consists of the following components:
• a key set K = {1, . . . , ⌈2nRK ⌉}. This set is publicity known to all parties;
• two randomization RVs with distributions PQ1 and PQ2 over Q1 and Q2, respectively,
where Q1 and Q2 are arbitrarily finite sets. For randomization, Alice and Bob generate RV
Q1 ∈ Q1 and RV Q2 ∈ Q2, respectively, such that Q1, Q2, and s are mutually independent.
Also, Q2 is independent of y;
• public channel encoding functions
(at Alice) F1i : Q1 ×Rn × (P21 × . . .× P2(i−1)) → P1i , (4.3a)
(at Bob) F2i : Q2 ×R(i−1) × (P11 × . . . × P1(i−1)) → P2i . (4.3b)
Alice and Bob transmit forward public message P1i = F1i(Q1, s, P (i−1)21 ) and backward
public message P2i = F2i(Q2, Y (i−1)1 , P
(i−1)
11 ) over the public channel at time instant i
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subject to capacity constraints










• wiretap channel encoding function Wi : Q1×Rn×(P21× . . .×P2(i−1)) → R. Alice generates
Xi = Wi(Q1, s, P (i−1)21 ) and transmits it at time instant i over the wiretap channel such
that average power constraint (4.1) is met;
• key generator functions2
(at Alice): K1 : Q1 ×Rn × P2→K , (4.5a)
(at Bob): K2 : Q2 ×Rn × P1→K . (4.5b)
At the end of all transmissions, Alice and Bob compute K = K1(Q1, s,p2) and K̂ =
K2(Q2,y,p1), respectively.
As illustrated in the following remark, a physically degraded G-SWC as defined in Defini-
tion 2.12 is a special case of the G-SWC given in Definition 4.1.
Remark 4.1. In Definition 4.1, if ̺ = σ1σ2 then I(X + S;Z|Y ) = 0 and the G-SWC is a physically
degraded in Bob’s favor according to Definition 2.12. Similarly, if ̺ = σ2σ1 then I(X + S;Y |Z) =
0 and the G-SWC is a physically degraded in Eve’s favor according to Definition 2.12. See
equations 4.108 for more details.
The Gaussian model with a physically degraded G-SWC in Bob’s favor (respectively, in Eve’s
favor) is sketched in Figure 4.2 (respectively, in Figure 4.3).
When the public channel is one-way in the forward direction, the functions introduced in
Definition 4.2 can be simplified as follows with an abuse of the notions.
Definition 4.3. Assume no public channel is available from Bob to Alice, i.e., C
P2
= 0. Let








Xi = Wi(Q1, s, P (i−1)21 )
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Xi = Wi(Q1, s, P (i−1)21 )
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x+ s






y = z+ g′1
g2 g′1













Figure 4.3: Key agreement over a physically degraded Gaussian model in Eve’s favor.
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Q2 = 0 and p2 = 0. In this case, the key generator functions are specified by
(at Alice): K1 : Q1 ×Rn→K (4.6a)
(at Bob): K2 : Rn × P1→K , (4.6b)
where Alice and Bob generate the keys according to K = K1(Q1, s) and K̂ = K2(y,p1), respec-
tively. In this case, the public channel encoder at Alice is also denoted by function
F : Q1 ×Rn → P1 , (4.7)
where she sends public message p1 = F(Q1, s) over the public channel in n transmissions. The
wiretap channel encoder is also represented by function
W : Q1 ×Rn → Rn , (4.8)
where Alice transmits signal x = W(Q1, s) over the wiretap channel in n transmissions.
When C
P2
= 0, the assumptions Q2 = 0 and p2 = 0 in Definition 4.3 impose no loss on the
forward key capacity due to Lemma 4.1 and Definition 3.1, respectively.
An admissible key agreement code for the Gaussian model is defined in Definition 4.2. For the
Gaussian model, the efficiency of an admissible key agreement code is measured by the average
probability of error, the leakage rate, and the randomness of (K, K̂) as introduced in Defini-
tion 1.10 when b = e = 0 is relaxed and P , (p1,p2)3.




), an achievable rate R
K
is defined in Def-
inition 1.11, where the admissible key agreement code is introduced in Definition 4.2. The key
capacity of the Gaussian model can be also defined as follows.
Definition 4.4. Recall the admissible key agreement code in Definition 4.2. For a given public
channel capacity C
P1
∈ [0,∞) and C
P2
∈ [0,∞), the supremum of all achievable key rates ac-
cording to Definition 1.11 is called the key capacity of that public channel. The key capacity is










) is the pair of public channel capacity.
3As mentioned in Subsection 1.4.1, P is a one-to-one function of all transmitted signals over the public
channel during n-time slot transmissions.
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, 0) according to Definition 4.4. Also, we investigate
C
K
(∞,∞) when Eve’s channel is less noisy than Bob’s. We also study the effect of ̺ on the key
capacity.
4.2 Statement of Main Results
In this section, we focus on a Gaussian model with a G-SWC (Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2 , ̺) as defined in Sec-
tion 4.1. This section consists of two subsections: in Subsection 4.2.1, we investigate the forward
key capacity of the model; and in Subsection 4.2.2, we study effects of the public channel feedback
on the key capacity when Eve’s channel is less noisy than Bob’s.
4.2.1 Forward Public Channel
In this subsection, we assume the public channel is one-way in the forward direction, i.e., C
P2
= 0.





The following lemma allows to relax randomization Q2 = 0 at Bob when CP2 = 0.
Lemma 4.1. Randomization at Bob does not increase the forward key capacity of the Gaussian
model.
When the public channel is in the forward direction, the following lemma justifies that the key
capacity of a G-SWC as defined in Definition 4.1 equals to the key capacity of its corresponding
physically degraded G-SWC.
Lemma 4.2. Recall Definition 2.12. The forward key capacity of the Gaussian model equals the
forward key capacity of the Gaussian model with a physically degraded G-SWC (Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2) in
either Bob’s favor (if σ22 > σ
2
1), as sketched in Figure 4.2, or Eve’s favor (if σ1 ≥ σ2), as sketched
in Figure 4.3.
In the following theorems, we establish the LB and the UB on the forward key capacity of
the Gaussian model. To do this, we first prove the bounds on the forward key capacity of the
equivalent physically degraded model and then we apply the results to the actual Gaussian model
according to Lemma 4.2.
116
Theorem 4.1 (Lower bound on the forward key capacity). Let σ22 > σ
2
1. Assume the Gaussian
model with public channel capacity C
P1

































[(1− ρ2)(1− γ)2ΓΛ + σ22(Γ + γ2Λ + 2ρ γ
√
ΓΛ )](Γ + 2ρ
√
ΓΛ + Λ + σ21)
[(1− ρ2)(1− γ)2ΓΛ + σ21(Γ + γ2Λ + 2ρ γ
√
ΓΛ )](Γ + 2ρ
√
ΓΛ + Λ + σ22)
)
(4.10)

























, 0) . (4.12)
As a special case, an achievable key rate on the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model in
low SIR regime can be calculated from Theorem 4.1. Using Lemma 4.2 together with Theorem 1.1,
which is originally proved by Watanabe and Oohama [40], the optimality of the achievable key
agreement code is illustrated. Hence, the forward key capacity in low SIR is given by the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Assume σ21, σ
2































is the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model when
C
P1
→ ∞ and Γ → 0.
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When the public channel has unlimited capacity, the following important theorem proves that
C
K
(∞, 0) is optimally achievable. Further, C
K
(∞, 0) gives a UB on the forward key capacity,
which is a non-decreasing function of C
P1
.
Theorem 4.2 (Key capacity for unlimited public channel capacity). Let σ22 > σ
2
1. If CP1 → ∞,
then the key capacity of the model is
C
K






















, 0) is upper bounded by
C
K




, 0) . (4.15)
When (power) signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) is high enough, C
K
(∞, 0) is asymptotically
achievable by the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. Let σ22 > σ
2
1. In high SIR regime, i.e.,
Γ






















A natural question regarding forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is that if Bob’s
channel is required to be less noisy than Eve’s channel such that the key generation is possible.
The following corollary answers this question.




1 ⇔ CK (CP1 , 0) > 0 . (4.17)
4.2.2 Two-Way Public Channel
In this subsection, we assume the public channel is two-way, but Eve’s channel is less noisy than
Bob’s channel, i.e. σ21 ≥ σ22 . We are interested in bounds on CK (∞,∞).
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Although condition σ22 > σ
2
1 is required to have a positive forward key capacity according to
Corollary 4.3, this condition might be unnecessary for key generation when the public channel
is two-way, i.e., C
P2
> 0. In the following theorem, we focus on the key capacity of a Gaussian
model when Eve’s channel is less noisy than Bob’s channel. This theorem proves that Lemma 4.1
can not be extended to general case when a feedback from Bob to Alice exists, i.e., C
P2
> 0.
Theorem 4.3. Let Eve’s channel be less noisy than Bob’s channel, i.e., σ21 ≥ σ22, in the Gaussian
model.
(a) If the G-SWC is a physically degraded Gaussian wiretap channel in Eve’s favor as sketched
in Figure 4.3, i.e., ̺ = σ2σ1 , then
C
K
(∞,∞) = 0 .












Part (a) of Theorem 4.3 is an extension of the key capacity of a degraded DM model, as
given in (1.26) by Ahlswede and Csiszár [18], to the Gaussian model with a physically degraded
G-SWC in Eve’s favor. Part (b) of Theorem 4.3 is an extension of Maurer’s scheme [17] to the
Gaussian model with the backward public channel.
Comparing Theorem 4.2 with Theorem 4.3, we understand that the key capacity is a function
of the correlation coefficient of noise (̺) when the backward public channel exists. However, the
forward public channel is independent of ̺. The characterization of the key capacity for any
̺ ∈ [−1, 1] remains as an open problem for future work.
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4.3 Simulations
In this section, we illustrate simulation results for a Gaussian model with a forward public channel.
Assume a Gaussian model with parameters
{
σ21
Λ = 0.1 ,
σ22
Λ = 0.4 .
(4.18)
In our simulations σ21, σ
2
2 , Λ are fixed, and the desired plots are sketched as a function of SIR,
i.e., (ΓΛ)dB . In the following, we consider the concepts behind each figure:




, 0) is simulated in this figure for 5
different values of C
P1
. The UB on the key capacity is also sketched in this figure according
to Theorem 4.2. This UB is the maximum achievable key capacity over the Gaussian model
with any C
P1
≥ 0. for a given G-SWC. According to this simulation, inequality
R
K















(0, 0) = .9478 ,
C
K
(∞, 0) = .9491 .
(4.20)
Hence, we observe that R
K
(0, 0) is .137% less than C
K
(∞, 0), which is the maximum achiev-
able key capacity for the given G-SWC. This difference is even less for other values of C
P1
according to (4.19). Moreover, |R
K
(0, 0) − C
K





, 0) for any C
P1

















= 1 bit/trans. .
This fact was established before in Corollary 4.2. Hence, the public channel has negligible
contribution in key generation in high SIR regime.
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• Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6: Assume (γ∗, ρ∗) is the optimum4 value of the pair (γ, ρ) in the
sense that the supremum of (4.11) is obtained. Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 exhibit γ∗ and
ρ∗ versus SIR, respectively, for 6 values of C
P1
. According to these figures, both γ∗ and ρ∗
are increasing functions of C
P1
for any SIR. Specially,
∀ (Γ
Λ




(γ∗, ρ∗) = (1, 1) .
Moreover, both γ∗ and ρ∗ are increasing functions of SIR (ΓΛ) for any CP1 ≥ 0. Specially
∀ C
P1




(γ∗, ρ∗) = (1, 1).
• Figure 4.7: Assume the Gaussian model with C
P1
= 0 (the G-SWC alone). In this figure,
we compare the (ordinary) capacity of the main channel [55], the known LB on the secrecy
capacity [60], and the LB on the key capacity given in Theorem 4.1. Obviously, the secrecy
capacity is upper bounded by the main channel capacity. However, as it is illustrated in
this figure, R
K
(0, 0) exceeds the ordinary capacity of the G-SWC when (ΓΛ)dB < −8.5 dB.
In this region, this means that
C
S
≤ Cm < RK (0, 0) ≤ CK (0) ,
where C
S
and Cm are the secrecy capacity and the main channel capacity of the G-SWC,
respectively. In other words, the key capacity in low SIR regime is generally greater than
both the main channel capacity and the secrecy capacity as it can be generated with assis-
tance of the interference.
• Figure 4.8: According to the achievable scheme stated in Theorem 4.1, the Gaussian model
demands an unlimited public channel capacity to achieve C
K
(∞, 0), which is the maximum
achievable key capacity for a given G-SWC. This fact was shown in (4.19) as well. This
is in contrast with the DM model in which C
K
(∞, 0) is achievable by using a finite public
channel capacity. However, with a finite public channel capacity in the Gaussian model,
4In this section, we seek the optimum values based on simulations which is subject to computational
approximations.
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the achieved key rate can be significantly close to C
K
(∞, 0). Specifically, let ζ (in percent)
be the relative difference between C
K

































× 100 < ζ . (4.21)
According to this figure, the minimum required C∗
P1
versus SIR is sketched for three values
of ζ. Based on this figure, we show that there exists a finite public channel capacity
C∗
P1




, 0) approximately equals C
K
(∞, 0) in








, 0) achieves C
K
(∞, 0), which























× 100 < ζ , (4.22)
























































































































































































































































(1) LB on the secrecy capacity
(2) LB on forward key capacity




Figure 4.7: Comparison of key capacity, secrecy capacity and capacity of the G-SWC.
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(∞, 0) within tolerance ζ .
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4.4 The Proofs
The detailed proofs of the results given in Section 4.2 are established in this section as follows.
4.4.1 The Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let C
P2
= 0 due to the assumption of this lemma. Having (z, e, P ), the security and randomness
of K does not depend on K̂ according to Definition 1.10. Also, K does not depend on Q2. Hence,
using a randomization at Bob has no effect on the security and randomness of K.
On the other hand, K = K1(Q1, s), x = W(Q1, s), and p1 = F(Q1, s). Hence, Markov chain
K → (Q1, s) → (p1,y) → (Q2,p1,y) → K̂ holds as Q2 is independent of (Q1, s,p1,y) according
to Definition 4.2. Hence, (p1,y) is a sufficient statistic [2, Sec. 2.9] of (Q2,p1,y) for K̂. Hence,
we conclude that randomization at Bob (Q2) does not decrease the average probability of error
P{K̂ 6= K}.
As a result, the randomization at Bob does not enhance the reliability, the security level, and
the randomness of (K, K̂) as defined in Definition 1.10. Hence, Q2 = 0 is relaxed when forward
key capacity is investigated.
4.4.2 The Proof of Lemma 4.2
Recalling Definition (4.3), let first justify the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. P(K, K̂) and P(K, z,p1) are uniquely determined by probability density functions5
P(y|x + s), P(z|x + s), P(s), and probability mass function P(Q1).
5With an abuse of the notations in this section, P is also used as a probability density function for
continuous RVs.
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P(y|x + s)P(Q1)P(s) dy ds (4.25)
where
• (4.23) is valid because Q1 and s are independent;
• (4.24) holds as x = W(Q1, s) and p1 = F(Q1, s) are deterministic functions of (Q1, s);
• (4.25) follows from the fact that K̂ = K2(y,p1) = K2(y,F(Q1, s)) and Markov chain
(K,Q1, s,x) → (x+ s) → y.































P(z|x + s)P(Q1)P(s) ds (4.28)
where
• (4.26) holds because Q1 and s are independent;
• (4.27) follows from Markov chain p1 → (Q1, s) → K and from the fact that x is a deter-
ministic function of (Q1, s);
• (4.28) holds due to Markov chain (K,Q1, s,x,p1) → (x+ s) → z.
Finally, equations (4.25) and (4.28) establish the lemma.
According to Definition 1.10, the reliability of the pair (K, K̂) is determined by P(K, K̂), and
its security level and randomness are uniquely characterized by P(K, z,p1).
According to Lemma 4.3, the reliability, security, and randomness of (K, K̂), as defined in
Definition 1.10, depend on joint distribution P(p1,y, z,x, s, Q1) but only through the conditional
marginal distributions P(y|x+s), P(z|x+s), P(s), and P(Q1). Hence, we conclude the following
statement.
First, let σ2 > σ1. Based on Lemma 4.3, if z is replaced by z
′ = y + g′2, where g
′
2 is drawn
i.i.d. according to N (0, σ22 − σ21) independent of g1, the efficiency of an admissible key agreement
code does not change. Second, let σ1 ≥ σ2. Based on Lemma 4.3, similarly, if y is replaced by
y′ = z+ g′1, where g
′
1 is drawn i.i.d. according to N (0, σ21 − σ22) independent of g2, the efficiency
of an admissible key agreement code does not change. As a result, the forward key capacity of
a Gaussian model equals that of its corresponding Gaussian model with a physically degraded
wiretap channel.
4.4.3 The Proof of Theorem 4.1
We first examine if we can extend the proof of Theorem 3.1, which is given in Subsection 3.3.1,
to that of Theorem 4.1 (subject to possible modifications).
The mutual information function can be defined for continuous RVs by using the concept of
quantization with asymptotically small error (see [77, Lem. 5.5.1], [2, Ch. 8], and [6, Page 23] for
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more details). Assume that (X,Y ) ∈ R2 is a pair of continuous RVs which is drawn according to
probability density function P(x, y). Then, the mutual information function between X ∼ P(x)










dx dy . (4.29)
Recall the definitions of typicality in Subsection 2.1.1. According to Remark 2.2, the strong
typicality used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 can not be defined for continuous RVs. However,
the definition of weak (entropy) typicality can be applied to both discrete and continuous RVs
according to Remark 2.1.
On the other hand, equations (3.37) and (3.51) still hold if the statements of strong typicality
are replaced by those of weak typicality. However, the validity of Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 relies
on the the validity of Markov lemma, which is not generally true for weak typicality. However,
according to Remark 2.3, the Markov lemma can be generalized for Gaussian input distributions
based on weak typicality [70].
With applying weak typicality and generalized Markov lemma [71], the proof of Lemma 3.1
and that of Lemma 3.2 can be extended to the Gaussian model subject to finding a Gaussian
input distribution satisfying average power constraint (4.1). Once these lemmas are established,
the AR, AS, and ARN conditions will be approved by following the lines of Subsection 3.3.1.
To complete the proof by using this approach, we seek an admissible key agreement code to
generate the claimed achievable key rate as well as to produce signal x according to a Gaussian
distribution satisfying constraint (4.1).







α , γ + β . (4.30b)
Also, let
X = T + βS , (4.31a)
U = T + αS , (4.31b)
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where T is a Gaussian RV generated according to T ∼ N (0,Γ0 − β2Λ) such that T and S are
independent, i.e., E(TS) = 0. Hence, from (4.31a), X is a Gaussian RV drawn according to
X ∼ N (0,Γ0) such that E(XS) = βΛ = ρ
√
Γ0Λ. Also, from (4.31b), U is a Gaussian RV drawn
according to U ∼ N (0,Γ0 + (α2 − β2)Λ).
Equations (4.31) will be later used for generation of x by using generalized DPC. By apply-
ing (4.30b), equations (4.31) can be merged into
U = X + γS , (4.32)
where the correlation coefficient between X and S is ρ ∈ (−1, 1).
If x is generated i.i.d. according to X ∼ N (0,Γ0) (as we demonstrate it in the sequel), the
channel outputs y and z are also i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors because of equations (4.2) and
the fact that s, g1, and g2 are i.i.d. Gaussian vectors. Hence, distributions of Xi, Si, Yi, Zi, G1i,
and G2i do not depend on time instant i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, we have
Y = X + S +G1 (4.33a)
Z = X + S +G2 (4.33b)
where G1 ∼ N (0, σ21) and G2 ∼ N (0, σ22) are AWGN.
I(U ;S), I(U ;Y ), and I(U ;Z) are computable from equations (4.32) and (4.33). To do this,
we first need the following expressions.
E(U2) = E(X2) + γ2E(S2) + 2γE(XS)
= Γ0 + γ
2Λ + 2ρ γ
√
Γ0Λ , (4.34a)
E(US) = E(XS) + γE(S2)
= ρ
√
Γ0Λ+ γΛ , (4.34b)
E(Y 2) = E(X2) + 2E(XS) + E(S2) + E(G21) + 2E((X + S)G1)
= Γ0 + 2ρ
√




E(UY ) = E(X2) + (1 + γ)E(XS) + γE(S2) + E(G1X) + γE(G1S)
= Γ0 + ρ(1 + γ)
√
Γ0Λ + γΛ , (4.34d)
E(Z2) = E(X2) + 2E(XS) + E(S2) + E(G22) + 2E((X + S)G2)
= Γ0 + 2ρ
√
Γ0Λ + Λ+ σ
2
2 , (4.34e)
E(UZ) = E(X2) + (1 + γ)E(XS) + γE(S2) + E(G2X) + γE(G2S)
= Γ0 + ρ(1 + γ)
√
Γ0Λ + γΛ . (4.34f)
where equations (4.34c), (4.34d), (4.34e) and (4.34f) hold from the fact that (G1, G2) is inde-
pendent of (X,S). We use [2, Thm. 8.4.1] to calculated entropy of a (multivariate) normal
distribution. Thus, from equations (4.34), we have


































2Λ + 2ρ γ
√
Γ0Λ )(Γ0 + 2ρ
√
Γ0Λ + Λ+ σ
2
1)



















2Λ + 2ρ γ
√
Γ0Λ )(Γ0 + 2ρ
√
Γ0Λ + Λ+ σ
2
2)






Now, we revise the admissible key agreement code given for the DM model to obtain an
admissible key agreement code for the Gaussian model. In the Gaussian model, codewords u are
generated i.i.d. according to U ∼ N (0,Γ0 + (α2 − β2)Λ). Having I(U ;S), I(U ;Y ), and I(U ;Z),
the key agreement codebook of the Gaussian model is constructed with the same specifications
as those of the DM model (see Subsection 3.3.1). The key generator, encoding and decoding
functions of the Gaussian model are similar to those of the DM model with the difference that
the strong typicality rule used in those functions is to be replaced by the weak typicality rule for
the Gaussian model.
A revealed random vector s is weakly typical due to AEP [2, Thm. 8.2.2] with high probability
as n → ∞, i.e., P{s ∈ Tǫ0(N (0,Λ))} > 1 − ǫ0 for any ǫ0 ∈ (0, 1) and block length n ≥ n0(ǫ0).
This is equivalent to
| 1
n
sst − Λ| ≤ ǫ′0 , (4.38)
where ǫ′0 = 2 ln(2)Λ ǫ0 according to Lemma C.1.
Having s, Alice selects codeword ũ from the key agreement codebook such that the pair







) for 0 < ǫ0 ≤ ǫ1 < 1 and n ≥ n1(ǫ1). If no error
declares at the encoder6 such codeword ũ exists in the codebook. According to Lemma C.2
and (4.31b), this joint typicality leads to
| 1
n
tst| ≤ ǫ′1 (4.39)
where ǫ′1 =
ǫ1 ln(2)
α [3(Γ0 − β2Λ) + 2α2Λ] and
t = ũ− αs . (4.40)
Once codeword ũ is selected, signal x is generated by
x = t+ βs (4.41)
= ũ− γs (4.42)
6As mentioned at the beginning of the proof, equations (3.37) and (3.51) are still valid if weak typicality
is applied for their proofs. So, the probability of error at the encoder vanishes as n → ∞.
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where (4.42) follows from equations (4.30b) and (4.40). From (4.42), we conclude that x is a
Gaussian vector as ũ and s are i.i.d. Gaussian random vectors. x is also i.i.d. according to
X ∼ N (0,Γ0) due to equations (4.31) and (4.42). Moreover, ǫ1-weak typicality of (ũ, s) leads to
ǫ2-weak typicality of (x, ũ, s) for 0 < ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2 < 1 and n ≥ n2(ǫ2) due to (4.42) [2, Thm. 15.2.1].
Hence x ∈ Tǫ2(N (0,Γ0)), which is resulted in
| 1
n
xxt − Γ0| ≤ ǫ′2 (4.43)
for ǫ′2 = 2 ln(2)Γ0 ǫ2 due to Lemma C.1. If
ǫ ≥ ǫ′2 (4.44)
holds, power constraint (4.1) is met from (4.43) as Γ0 = Γ − ǫ. On the other hand, (4.44) is















sst − Λ| (4.46)






≤ ǫ3 , (4.49)
where
• (4.45) holds due to equations (4.41) and (4.30a);
• (4.46) holds due to triangle inequality [78];
• (4.47) follows from equations (4.38) and (4.39);
• (4.48) follows from β <
√
Γ0
Λ due to (4.30a) and the fact that ρ ∈ (−1, 1);








Equation (4.49) shows the essential difference between our strategy with that of ordinary
DPC [55]. Let θ be the angle between vectors x and s. In DPC [55], x and s are asymptotically
orthogonal, i.e., cos(θ) → 0 as n → ∞. However, in our strategy, cos(θ) → ρ as n → ∞.
Eventually, we provide a Gaussian distribution for the channel input satisfying the power con-
straint (4.1). As mentioned before, the proof can be completed with the lines of Subsection 3.3.1
when generalized Markov lemma [70, 71] for the Gaussian distribution is applied in place of the











[(1− ρ2)(1− γ)2Γ0Λ+ σ22(Γ0 + γ2Λ+ 2ρ γ
√
Γ0Λ )](Γ0 + 2ρ
√
Γ0Λ + Λ+ σ
2
1)
[(1− ρ2)(1− γ)2Γ0Λ+ σ21(Γ0 + γ2Λ+ 2ρ γ
√
Γ0Λ )](Γ0 + 2ρ
√
Γ0Λ + Λ+ σ22)
)
is achievable subject to
C
P1






(1− ρ2)(1− γ)2Γ0Λ+ σ21(Γ0 + γ2Λ+ 2ρ γ
√
Γ0Λ )






where Γ0 = Γ− ǫ for a given ǫ ∈ (0, 1). The LB on the forward key capacity is also obtained by





4.4.4 The Proof of Corollary 4.1
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we prove that the key rate given in (4.13) is
achievable. In the second part, we show that the key rate coincides the forward key capacity
given in Theorem 1.1.
(a). The Direct Part. Let
ρ = 1 +
2σ21










Recalling Theorem 4.1, we prove that (γ, ρ) ∈ O(C
P1





















(1− ρ2)Λ + 2σ21(1 + ρ)

















Λ (1 + ρ)
(1− ρ2)(ΓΛ + 2ρ
√
Γ













(1− ρ2)(1 − γ)2ΓΛ + σ21(Γ + γ2Λ+ 2ρ γ
√
ΓΛ )
(1− ρ2)Γ(Γ + 2ρ
√




• (4.53) follows from (4.51);
• (4.54) follows from (4.52);
From (4.54), we conclude (γ, ρ) ∈ O(C
P1













[(1− ρ2)ΓΛ + 2σ22Γ(1 + ρ)](Λ + σ21)








[(1 − ρ)Λ + 2σ22 ](Λ + σ21)





































• (4.55) follows from (4.10) and (4.52);
• (4.56) follows from (4.51).
From (4.57), we conclude that the key rate (4.13) is achievable, whereC
K











(b). The Converse Part. The converse part follows from Theorem 1.1 and Lemma 4.2 as
follows.
First, assume that the G-SWC in the Gaussian model is physically degraded in Bob’s favor,
i.e., ̺ = σ1σ2 . Hence,
E(G1G2) = σ21 (4.58)
When Γ → 0, Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to S, S+G1, and S+G2, respectively. Consequently,







Λ Λ + σ21 Λ + σ
2
1








due to the fact that S is independent of (G1, G2) as well as (4.58). Recalling Theorem 1.1, we
have






















where (4.60a) and (4.60b) follow from (4.59).
From Theorem 1.1 and equations (4.60), we conclude that the achievable key rate (4.57) is
the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model when ̺ = σ1σ2 and Γ → 0. On the other hand,
from Lemma 4.2, we conclude that the forward key capacity (4.57) is valid for a Gaussian model
with Γ → 0 and any ̺ ∈ [−1, 1].
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4.4.5 The Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof consists of two parts: in the first part, we prove the direct part (achievability) of the
theorem; in the second one, we derive its converse part (optimality).
(a). The Direct Part. Let γ = 1 and ρ = 1 − δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1). Assume δ → 0; thus,









σ21(Γ + Λ + 2
√
ΓΛ )
δ Γ(Γ + 2
√
ΓΛ + Λ+ σ21)
)
. (4.61)
is met. To satisfy this condition, select C
P1
(as a function of δ) large enough such that condi-
tion (4.61) is met for the given δ ∈ (0, 1). In other words, (1, 1 − δ) ∈ O(C
P1













σ22(Γ + Λ + 2(1− δ)
√
ΓΛ + σ21)





is an achievable key rate according to (4.10), where δ → 0, δ > 0, as C
P1
→ ∞. As a result, the
following LB on C
K






















(b). The Converse Part. We prove a UB on the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model
with a physically degraded G-SWC (Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2) in Bob’s favor. According to Lemma 4.2, the
UB on the forward key capacity is valid for its equivalent Gaussian model with the G-SWC
(Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2 , ̺) as defined in Section 4.1.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the time instant. According to (2.23), for a physically degraded G-SWC
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in Bob’s favor (σ22 > σ
2
1), we have
Yi = Xi + Si +G1i (4.64a)
Zi = Yi +G
′
2i , (4.64b)
where G1i ∼ N (0, σ21) and G′2i ∼ N (0, σ22 − σ21) are independent. We first establish the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the time instant and define
Υi , E((Xi + Si)2) . (4.65)
Assume a G-SWC with average power constraint (4.1) and the interference average power Λ.





Υi ≤ Γ + Λ+ 2ρ
√
ΓΛ , (4.66)
where the equality holds if Xi ∼ N (0,Γ) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.


























where (4.67) follows from




E(X2i ) = E( 1n
n∑
i=1
X2i ) ≤ Γ due to average power constraint (4.1).
Also, the equality in (4.67) holds if Xi ∼ N (0,Γ) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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• (4.68) holds due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [80] (E(XiSi))2 ≤ E(X2i )E(S2i );




















• (4.70) holds as Si ∼ N (0,Λ) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• (4.71) holds due to average power constraint (4.1).








Applying (4.72) to (4.67), the lemma is approved.
Fix an arbitrarily small ǫ ≥ 0. According to Definition 1.11, a key rate R
K
is achievable if
there exists an admissible key agreement code (⌈2nRK ⌉, n), which returns (K, K̂), for the given









≤ H(K) + n ǫ
3
(4.73)
≤ I(K; K̂) + n2ǫ
3
(4.74)








≤ I(K;y,p1)− I(K; z,p1) + nǫ (4.77)























































































































































σ22(Γ + Λ + 2ρ
√
ΓΛ + σ21)









σ22(Γ + Λ + 2
√
ΓΛ + σ21)






• (4.73) and (4.74) follow from the lines of (3.94) and (3.95), respectively, which are valid
in the Gaussian model as well;
• (4.75) follows from data processing inequality [2, Thm. 2.8.1] due to K → (Q2,y,p1) → K̂;
• (4.76) follows from the fact that Q2 is independent of (K,y,p1) when CP2 = 0;
• (4.77) follows from (3.88b), where P is a one-to-one function of p1 and e = 0 in Defini-
tion 1.10;
• (4.79) follows from the proof of (3.101), which is valid for the Gaussian model as well,
where P is a one-to-one function of p1 as well as Y̌i = Yi and Ži = Zi for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}






• (4.80) follows from Markov chain
Wi → Ui → (Xi, Si) → Yi → Zi (4.93)
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which is valid due to definition Ui , (K,Wi) and equations (4.64) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
• (4.81) and (4.82) follow from data processing inequality [2, Thm. 2.8.1] due to (4.93);
• (4.83) follows from data processing inequality [2, Thm. 2.8.1] due to (Xi, Si) → (Ui, Yi) →
Zi, which is valid because of (4.64) and (4.93), i.e.,
I(Xi, Si;Yi|Ui)− I(Xi, Si;Zi|Ui) = I(Xi, Si;Yi, Zi|Ui)− I(Xi, Si;Zi|Ui, Yi)− I(Xi, Si;Zi|Ui)
= I(Xi, Si;Yi|Ui, Zi)
≥ 0 ;
• (4.84) follows from equations (4.64), where G2i = G1i +G′2i;
• (4.85) follows from the fact that G1i and G2i = G1i +G′2i are independent of (Xi, Si);
• (4.86) follows from entropy of normal distributions [2, Thm. 8.4.1] and (4.64b);
• (4.87) follows from 22~(Yi+G′2i) ≥ 22~(Yi) + 22~(G′2i) due to entropy power inequality [2,
Thm. 17.7.3] and the fact that G′2i is independent of Yi in (4.64b);
• (4.88) follows from the fact that ~(Yi)− 12 log(22~(G
′
2i) + 22~(Yi)) is an increasing function




2 − σ21)) [2, Thm. 8.4.1] is fixed; it also follows from
~(Yi) ≤ 12 log(2πeE(Y 2i )) due to [2, Thm. 8.6.5] as E(Yi) = 0 with the equality when
Yi ∼ N (0, E(Y 2i ));
• (4.89) holds due to E(Y 2i ) = Υi+σ21 according to (4.65) and the fact that G1i is independent
of (Xi, Si);
















is an increasing function of ξ ∈ R+ ∪ {0} due
to σ22 > σ
2
1 ; then, it is valid because of Lemma 4.4 for some −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1;









is an increasing function of ρ




4.4.6 The Proof of Corollary 4.2

























according to Theorem 4.2.
Second, for any fixed C
P1









(1− ρ2)(1 − γ)2ΓΛ + σ21(Γ + γ2Λ+ 2ρ γ
√
ΓΛ )
(1− ρ2)Γ(Γ + 2ρ
√
ΓΛ + Λ+ σ21)
)
= −∞ ;
hence, (γ, ρ) ∈ O(C
P1
) according to (4.9). Therefore, we obtain the following LB on the key

















for γ = 1 and ρ → 1. Eventually, equations (4.94) and (4.95) confirm the corollary.
4.4.7 The Proof of Corollary 4.3
The proof consists of two parts: in the direct part, we prove that if σ22 > σ
2
1 then CK (CP1 , 0) > 0;
in the converse part, we prove that if σ21 ≥ σ22 then RK ≤ nǫ, for any achievable forward key rate
R
K
and arbitrarily small ǫ ≥ 0.
(a). The Direct Part. We show that for any C
P1














(1− ρ2)(1− γ)2ΓΛ + σ21(Γ + γ2Λ+ 2ρ γ
√
ΓΛ )
(1− ρ2)Γ(Γ + 2ρ
√

























(ΓΛ + σ22Γ)(Γ + Λ + σ
2
1)
















which is positive when σ22 > σ
2





(b). The Converse Part. We prove a UB on the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model
with a physically degraded G-SWC (Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2) in Eve’s favor. According to Lemma 4.2, the
UB on the forward key capacity is valid for its equivalent Gaussian model with the G-SWC
(Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2 , ̺) as defined in Section 4.1.
According to (2.24) and Definition 4.1, for a physically degraded G-SWC in Eve’s favor
(σ21 ≥ σ22), we have
y = z+ g′1 (4.96)
where g′1 is independent of (Q1, s,g2), and it is distributed i.i.d. according to N (0, σ21 − σ22) .
Fix an arbitrarily small ǫ ≥ 0. According to Definition 1.11, a key rate R
K
is achievable if
there exists an admissible key agreement code (⌈2nRK ⌉, n), which returns (K, K̂), for the given ǫ
such that equations (3.88) are met.
Assuming σ21 ≥ σ22 , we derive a UB on the achievable key rate RK , when CP2 = 0, in the
following. We can restart from (4.78) because this step is valid when σ21 ≥ σ22 as well.
nR
K
≤ I(K;y|p1)− I(K; z|p1) + nǫ
= I(K;y|p1)− I(K;y, z|p1) + I(K;y|p1, z) + nǫ
= −I(K; z|y,p1) + I(K;y|p1, z) + nǫ
= −I(K; z|y,p1) + I(K;g′1|p1, z) + nǫ (4.97)




• (4.97) follows from (4.96);
• (4.98) is valid because g′1 is independent of (Q1, s,g2), and so it is independent of K =
K1(Q1, s), x = W(Q1, s), p1 = F(Q1, s) and z = x+ s+ g2 according to Definition 4.3.
Hence, if ǫ → 0, equation (4.99) proves that the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model
with a physically degraded G-SWC in Eve’s favor, i.e., σ21 ≥ σ22 , vanishes. Using Lemma 4.2, we
can extend this result to the Gaussian model with a G-SWC having parameters (Γ,Λ, σ21 , σ
2
2 , ̺),
where σ21 ≥ σ22 and ̺ ∈ [−1, 1], as specified in Definition 4.1.
4.4.8 The Proof of Theorem 4.3
Recalling Definition 4.2 for the notations, we prove this theorem in the following two parts.
(a). Part (a) of Theorem 4.3. To prove this part, we need the following lemma, which is
proved in [3, Lem. 17.18].
Lemma 4.5. For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, assume that P1i is a function of A, E, and P i−121 ,
(P21, P22, . . . , P2(i−1)), while P2i is a function of B, E, and P
i
11 , (P11, P12, . . . , P1i). Then
I(A;B|E) ≥ I(A;B|E,p1,p2) ,
where p1 , Pn11 and p2 , P
n
21.
Fix an arbitrarily small ǫ ≥ 0. According to Definition 1.11, a key rate R
K
is achievable if
there exists an admissible key agreement code (⌈2nRK ⌉, n), which returns (K, K̂), for the given ǫ
such that equations (3.88) are held.
As the channel is assumed to be physically degraded in Eve’s favor, (4.96) holds. Using this






≤ H(K) + n ǫ
3
(4.100)
≤ I(K; K̂) + n2ǫ
3
(4.101)




≤ I(K;y,p1,p2, Q2) + n
2ǫ
3
≤ I(K;y,p1,p2, Q2)− I(K; z,p1,p2) + nǫ (4.103)
= I(K;y, z,p1,p2, Q2)− I(K; z|y,p1,p2, Q2)− I(K; z,p1,p2) + nǫ
= I(K;y, Q2|z,p1,p2)− I(K; z|y,p1,p2, Q2) + nǫ
≤ I(K;y, Q2|z,p1,p2) + nǫ
≤ I(K,Q1, s;y, Q2|z,p1,p2) + nǫ
= I(Q1, s;y, Q2|z,p1,p2) + nǫ (4.104)
≤ I(Q1, s;y, Q2|z) + nǫ (4.105)




I(Q1, s;Yi|z, Y (i−1)1 ) + nǫ
≤ nǫ (4.107)
where
• (4.100) follows from (3.88d);
• (4.101) follows from (3.88a) and thus H(K|K̂) ≤ n ǫ3 due to Fano’s inequality [2, Thm.
2.10.1];
• (4.102) holds due to data processing inequality [2, Thm. 2.8.1] as K̂ = K2(Q2,y,p1) and
so K → (Q2,y,p1) → K̂;
• (4.103) follows from (3.88b), where P is a one-to-one function of (p1,p2) and e = 0 in
Definition 1.10;
• (4.104) follows from the fact that K is a deterministic function of (Q1, s,p2);
• (4.105) follows from Lemma 4.5, where A, B, and E in this lemma must be substituted
by (Q1, s), (Q2,y), and z, respectively;

















Figure 4.9: Key generation over a Gaussian model with a backward public channel.
• (4.107) follows from the fact that for any given i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Zi, Yi = Zi+G′1i is inde-
pendent of (Q1, s, (Z1, . . . , Zi−1, Zi+1, . . . , Zn), Y
(i−1)
1 ) because the G-SWC is memoryless
and physically degraded.
Hence, if ǫ → 0, equation (4.107) proves that the key capacity C
K
(∞,∞) of a Gaussian model
with a physically degraded G-SWC in Eve’s favor, i.e., σ21 ≥ σ22, vanishes.
(b). Part (b) of Theorem 4.3. First, let define independent Gaussian vectors g, g′1, and
g′2, which are drawn i.i.d. according to N (0, ̺σ1σ2), N (0, σ21 − ρσ1σ2), and N (0, σ22 − ρσ1σ2),
respectively. Then, the Gaussian noise vectors can be written as
g1 = g + g
′
1 , (4.108a)
g2 = g + g
′
2 . (4.108b)
This is due to the fact that the distribution of a pair of jointly Gaussian RVs is uniquely de-
termined by a covariance matrix. From (4.108), if ̺ = σ1σ2 then g
′
1 = 0 (in probability) and the
channel is physically degraded in Bob’s favor. Similarly, if ̺ = σ2σ1 then g
′
2 = 0 (in probability)
and the channel is physically degraded in Eve’s favor (see Remark 4.1).
The proof is justified as follows according to Figure 4.9. According to Corollary 4.3, no key
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rate can be agreed by using the G-SWC alone because Eve has an advantage over Bob on the
G-SWC. Hence, Alice sends nothing in our key agreement scheme, i.e. x = 0. Bob generates
a Gaussian wiretap codebook [13]. He generates the key according to randomization RV Q2,
which is uniformly distributed. Bob treats Q2 as a message and encodes it into codeword u by
using the Gaussian wiretap codebook. Observing y = s+ g1 from the wiretap channel, he sends
p2 = u + y = u + s + g1 over the public channel in the backward direction. Alice, who knows
s, calculates v = p2 − s = u + g1. On the other hand, Eve, who receives z = s + g2 from the
wiretap channel, is able to obtain p2 − z = u+ g1 − g2 = u+ g′1 − g′2 according to (4.108).
As a result, the public channel from Bob to Alice can be considered as a Gaussian wiretap
channel7 according to Figure 1.5, where Bob is the sender and Alice and Eve are the receivers.
Also, the transmission signal of the Gaussian wiretap channel is u, and Alice and Eve receive
u+ g1 and u+ g
′















according to (1.14), where Ω is the variance of U (u is generated i.i.d. according to U ∼ N (0,Ω)).
This secure rate can be treated as an achievable key rate between Alice and Bob, i.e., R
K
(∞,∞) =
R. When the capacity of public channel is unlimited in the backward direction, Ω → ∞ gives
the maximum achievable key rate by the proposed scheme, and the result of this theorem is
concluded.
According to the proposed key agreement code, p2 − z is a sufficient statistic of z,p2 for key
K conditioned on key agreement codebook C, i.e., I(K;p2 − z|C) = I(K;p2, z|C). This fact,
which is proved below, approves that the justification, as explained above, for the security of the
code is correct.
H(K|z,p2,C) = H(K|p2 − z,p2,C)
= H(K,p2|p2 − z,C)−H(p2|p2 − z,C)
= H(K|p2 − z,C) +H(p2|K,p2 − z,C)−H(p2|p2 − z,C)
= H(K|p2 − z,C)
7The Gaussian wiretap channel is introduced as a physically degraded channel in paper [13]; however,




In this work, we have investigated two information-theoretic key agreement problems: the key
agreement over a discrete memoryless (DM) wiretap model, and the key agreement over a Gaus-
sian wiretap model. The key is to be agreed between the sender (Alice) and the legitimate receiver
(Bob) in presence of eavesdropper (Eve). Each model consists of a state-dependent wiretap chan-
nel with non-causal side information in parallel with a public channel. The CSI is fully known at









are the capacity of public channel in the forward direction and
backward direction, respectively (see Definition 3.1 for more details).
For the DM model, we have derived two UBs on the forward key capacity. The UB given in
Theorem 3.2 is valid for any DM model; however, the UB given in Theorem 3.3 is established
for a DM model in which the wiretap channel is less noisy in Bob’s favor. Each of these upper
bounds is in a form of a maximization problem subject to a constraint which is imposed by the
limited capacity of the public channel.
In Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, X is drawn according to conditional PMF PX|US when (U,S) is
given, and so X is a stochastic function of (U,S) in general. Hence, H(X|U,S) 6= 0 in general in
Theorem 3.2. This fact is in contrast with the fact that X suffices to be a deterministic function
of (U,S) in (1.32) according to [49]. In other words, randomized generation of transmitted signal
X from (U,S) can generally enhance the key capacity, but it has no effect on the main channel
capacity.
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For each of the DM model and Gaussian model, we have achieved an LB on the forward key
capacity, i.e., when C
P2
= 0, as a function of C
P1
∈ [0,∞). The achievable key agreement code
exploits two resources in key generation: the first resource is a random generator at Alice, and
the second one is the random channel state sequences. As demonstrated in Section 2.2, the CSI
is capable of enhancing the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel with random states. However,
we have shown that the positive effect of the CSI on the forward key capacity is generally more
than that of the secrecy capacity because the random CSI, which contains no information about
the message in the secrecy problem, is a valuable resource in key generation. Hence, the forward
key capacity of a wiretap channel with random states is generally larger than its secrecy capacity.
With the use of the public channel, contribution of the CSI in key generation may be intensified
according to our achievable key agreement code.
For the DM model, however, the forward key capacity is not generally a strictly increasing
function of the public channel capacity over interval C
P1
∈ [0,∞). For every discrete memoryless
state-dependent wiretap channel, there exists a finite public channel capacity C∗
P1
such that the




,∞). This capacity is determined
by the wiretap channel. As a matter of fact, this saturation in key generation is due to the state
alphabet set which is finite, and so the entropy rate of the CSI (as a source) can be described
with a finite number of bits. Hence, the contribution of the CSI in key generation does not grow
if the capacity of the public channel exceeds some finite value, i.e., C∗
P1
.
On the other hand, the achieved LB on the forward key capacity of a Gaussian model is a
strictly increasing function over interval C
P1
∈ [0,∞) at any SIR ΓΛ ∈ R+ because of our simula-
tions. This is due to the fact that the size of state alphabet set is infinite, and the entropy rate of
the CSI (as a source) can not be described (error free) with a limited number of bits. Hence, the
contribution of the interference (CSI) in key generation can be increased if the public message,
which is correlated with the CSI, is sent over the public channel. According to our achievable
scheme, the public message improves Bob’s knowledge about the interference more than Eve’s,
and thus it regenerates the achievable key rate. However, neither Bob nor Eve can retrieve the
channel state vector (without error) unless the capacity of the public channel goes to infinity. In




→ ∞, the optimum solution for the key generation is to amplify the interference
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at the transmitter according to its maximum power Γ and to forward it to the wiretap chan-
nel. In this case, the number of codewords exponentially goes to infinity. The codewords are
partitioned into subcodebooks such that each subcodebook represents a wiretap codebook of a





is selected at random among codewords which are weakly typical with the released channel state
sequence at Alice. Then, the label of its subcodebook is sent over the public channel. Hence, the
achievable key rate equals the securely achievable rate by the subcodebook. We have proven that
this strategy achieves the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model. According to (1.14), we
have calculated the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model as
∀ (Γ
Λ
) ∈ R+ : C
K













where σ21 and σ
2
2 are noise variance of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel, respectively.
The LB on the forward key capacity for any C
P1







as Γ → ∞. This forward key capacity asymptotically equals (5.1) when Γ′ → ∞.
This comparison justifies that the public channel has negligible contribution in the key genera-
tion in high SIR regime. On the other hand, that forward key capacity asymptotically equals the
secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel1 (with the same parameters and no interference)
given in (1.14) as Γ → ∞. Hence, the random generator as the first resource of key generation
takes the dominant role over the interference as the second resource of key generation in high
SIR regime. In low SIR regime, the second resource of key generation becomes dominant over the
first one because the transmitted power is considerably less than the interference average power.
In this regime, the public channel significantly assists Alice and Bob for the key generation.
In the Gaussian model, we have proven that the forward key capacity is positive if and only
if Bob’s channel is less noisy than Eve’s channel, i.e., σ22 > σ
2
1. When CP2 = 0, the correlation
coefficient ̺ between noise of Bob’s channel and that of Eve’s channel has no effect on the forward
key capacity. Hence, the forward key capacity of a given Gaussian model is the same as that
of an equivalent Gaussian model with a physically degraded wiretap channel (see Chapter 4 for
more details). Based on this fact, a UB on the forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is
1Random generator is the only resource to provide security in a Gaussian wiretap channel (without
interference) [13].
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calculated, which equals C
K
(∞, 0) as given in (5.1).
On the other hand, we have shown that the key capacity is a function of ̺ in the Gaussian




) ∈ R+ ×R+ if the wiretap channel is
physically degraded in Eve’s favor, or equivalently
∀ (Γ
Λ
) ∈ R+ : C
K
(∞,∞) = 0 , (5.2)
when ̺ = σ2σ1 . However, the key capacity is positive provided ̺ <
σ2
2σ1
even if Eve’s channel is less
noisy than Bob’s. For this special case, we have extended Maurer’s strategy [17], which is given
for a binary symmetric wiretap channel, to the Gaussian model.
For the achievable forward key rate of the Gaussian model, we have applied a Gaussian input
distribution on the Gaussian wiretap channel in our achievable key agreement code. The input
sequence x is correlated with the state sequence s, where x is generated according to the general-
ized DPC strategy. The correlation coefficient ρ between X and S is a function of C
P1
. In other
words, sequence x can be expressed as sum of two sequences, i.e., x = t + βs from (4.41). The
first sequence, t, which is (asymptotically) orthogonal to s, conveys the information about the
output of the random generator (the first resource of key generation at Alice) to the receivers.
The second sequence, βs, conveys the information about the interference (the second resource of
key generation at Alice) to the receivers. These pieces of information assist Alice and Bob, who
is suffering from less noise than Eve, in key generation as mentioned above. Although the second
sequence (βs) is beneficial in the key agreement problem, it is useless in Costa’s problem [55].
The reason is the agreed key is dependent on the CSI, but a message is independent of the CSI,
and so β = 0 in [55].
5.1 Future Work Directions
In this section, the future research directions based on this research are offered, which can be
followed by ambitious researchers in the field of information-theoretic security.
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5.1.1 Bounds on the Forward Key Capacity of the Gaussian
Model
By simulations, we have shown that the LB on forward key capacity of the Gaussian model is a
strictly increasing function of the public channel capacity. However, the mathematical proof of
this conjecture is still required. Also, the LB is achieved by applying Gaussian input distribution
to the wiretap channel. We have proven that this input distribution is optimal when C
P1
→ ∞
as well as when ΓΛ → ∞. However, the Gaussian distribution may not be optimal for all model
parameters.
On the other hand, the UB on the forward key capacity is loose in low SIR regime. To derive
a tighter UB, we suggest treating supremum of equation (4.91) over set of eligible values of ρ.
The set of eligible ρ’s is a subset of set [0, 1] which is to be determined by a constraint imposed
by public channel capacity C
P1
(when it is finite), and thus obtaining this set is our next future
work.
5.1.2 Gaussian Models with Side Information at All Parties
In the Gaussian model, we assumed no SI at Bob and Eve for simplicity of calculations. An
extended key agreement problem of this work is to suppose Gaussian SI correlated with the CSI
at both Bob and Eve, e.g., the SI is a noisy version of the CSI. We suggest using a similar
achievable key agreement scheme that is given in Chapter 4 for this new model. To do this, we
can assume a Gaussian wiretap channel with augmented outputs in the same way that we applied
this method in Chapter 3.
In this thesis, the CSI is also assumed to be fully known at Alice. A generalized version of
this key agreement problem is to suppose that the SI at Alice is dependent on the CSI but it is
not equal to the CSI (the CSI is partially known at Alice).
The generalization of the results of this thesis for the Gaussian model in which noisy versions
of the interference is available at parties is offered as future work.
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5.1.3 Key Agreement over Wiretap Models with a Two-Way
Public Channel
The main focus of this thesis is on the forward key capacity. However, we will continue this





For the DM model, the achieved LB on the forward key capacity given in Theorem 3.1 is
also an LB on the key capacity. When the capacity of the public channel is unlimited in both
directions, the key agreement problem was studied by Khisti [73]. As explained in Section 1.8,
an LB on the key capacity of this model is obtained in [73, Thm. 3]. Using the strategy of this





[I(X,S; Y̌ )− I(Y̌ ; Ž)], C
K
(∞, 0)} , (5.3)
where C
K
(∞, 0) is given in Theorem 3.4.
For the Gaussian model, we have studied the key capacity when Eve’s channel is less noisy
than Bob’s channel in this work. As given in Theorem 4.3, we have proven that the key capacity
is a function of noise correlation coefficient ̺. We have also calculated an LB on C
K
(∞,∞) when
̺ ≤ σ22σ1 . Further, for case ̺ =
σ2
σ1
, we have established that the key capacity vanishes as given
in (5.2). However, bounds on the key capacity is still open for other values of ̺ as well as for
finite values of C
P2
.
5.1.4 Reliability-Exponent and Security-Exponent of the Key
Agreement
The reliability-exponent and security-exponent are defined in Definition 1.12. The reliability-
exponent and security-exponent determine how fast the average probability of error Perror(n)
given in (1.15) and security index S(n) given in (1.30) goes to zero, respectively.
In this work, we have used joint typicality (see Section 2.1.1) for encoding and decoding in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. However, a jointly typical decoder is not optimal in the sense of
minimizing the average probability of error. In fact, this suboptimal decoder can achieve the
key capacity in some special cases (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). A maximum likelihood (ML)
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decoder [6, Page 72], on the other hand, is an optimal decoder to obtain minimum average prob-
ability of error. This means that the reliability-exponent2 of a ML decoder is generally better
than that of a jointly typical decoder. However, jointly typical decoding is preferred for ease
of analysis as long as the block length is sufficiently large. This is why Cover and Thomas [2]
developed this method for the multi-user information theory.
The lemmas used for (jointly) typicality to analyze the AR condition and the AS condition in
Chapters 3 and 4 justify the asymptotic behavior of those conditions. In other words, although
typical sequences are very intuitive and efficient for sufficiently large block length, they can not
be used to derive the exponents [81].
Large deviation theory [2, Ch. 11] deals with small probability events with (usually) an expo-
nentially vanishing probability. The method of types [3, 81] is a powerful tool in large deviation
theory to derive the security-exponent and reliability-exponent in the DM model. According
to this method, sequences with a given length n are partitioned into classes according to type
(empirical distribution). Next, an (error) event can be decomposed into its intersections with the
type classes. Adding the probability of these intersections, the probability of the (error) event
is acquired. The exponent of this probability is determined by the exponential asymptote of the
largest intersection probability because the number of the type classes increases polynomially
with n (the number of sequences of each type grows exponentially with n). To bound an intersec-
tion probability, it is sufficient to bound the cardinality of the corresponding intersection because
of the equiprobable property (according to a memoryless probabilistic model) of sequences inside
each type class (see Sanov’s theorem [2, Thm. 11.4.1] for specific details).
Motivated by Gallager [1], Tzu-Han et al. [82] applied an ML decoder to derive the reliability-
exponent for his key agreement model.
As an extension of this work, we suggest evaluation of the reliability-exponent and the security-
exponent using the demonstrated methods. Also, publications [82, 83] are constructive for this
objective.
2When the public channel is available in the forward direction, the security-exponent is independent of




Relation between Entropy Functions
of Agreed Keys
Lemma A.1. Let (K, K̂) ∈ K2 be a pair of agreed keys that satisfy the AR condition. Also,
assume that |K| < 2nc for a positive constant c. For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there exists n ≥ N(ǫ), where
N is a function of ǫ, such that
1
n
|H(K|T )−H(K̂|T )| < ǫ , (A.1)




H(K, K̂ |T ) = 1
n






H(K̂|T ) + 1
n
H(K|K̂, T ) (A.3)
On the other hand,
1
n









(B(ǫ1) + ǫ1 log(|K|)) , (A.6)
≤ 1
n
(ǫ2 + cnǫ1) , (A.7)
≤ ǫ , (A.8)
where
• (A.5) follows from Fano’s inequality [2, Thm. 2.11.1], and ν , Pr{K 6= K̂};
• (A.6) holds due to the AR condition, i.e., ν < ǫ1 for any ǫ1 > 0 and n ≥ N(ǫ1);
• (A.7) follows by selection of a small enough ǫ2 such that B(ǫ1) < ǫ2; also, it follows from
assumption |K| < 2nc;
• (A.8) is valid by appropriate selection of ǫ2 for a given ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and n ≥ N(ǫ) ≥ N(ǫ1).
Similarly, for every ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and n > N(ǫ) we have
1
n
H(K|K̂, T ) ≤ ǫ. (A.9)
Hence, the proof is completed by applying equations (A.8) and (A.9) in (A.3).
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Appendix B
Existence of Maximum Values
In this appendix, we prove that the maximum value given in Theorem 3.1 exists. In fact, the





, 0) ≥ sup
PXU|S∈O(CP1 )
[I(U ; Y̌ )− I(U ; Ž)] . (B.1)
However, the supremum can be replaced by the maximum due to the proof given in this appendix.
For the proof, we need the following lemmas, which are established in book [84].
Lemma B.1. If F is a continuous function on a compact set1 O, then F has an absolute
maximum and an absolute minimum on set O.
Lemma B.2. If set O is a closed and bounded set in RN , where N ∈ N, then set O is compact.
Recalling (3.7), set O(C
P1
) is a closed and bounded set in R|X|.|U|.|S| due to the following facts.
• Each element PXU |S ∈ O(CP1 ) can be written as a vector in R
|X|.|U|.|S|. Hence, set O(C
P1
)
can be considered as a subset of R|X|.|U|.|S|, where sets S and X are finite alphabet sets in
the DM model as well as set U because |U|≤|S||X|+3. Also, any element PXU |S ∈ O(CP1 )
is bounded as 0 ≤ PXU |S ≤ 1. Hence, set O(CP1 ) is a bounded set in R
N , where N =
|X|.|U|.|S|.
1Definition of a compact set is given in [84, Sec. 4.8]. However, we will prove compactness of set O(C
P1
)
by using Lemma B.2.
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• Function I(U ;S)− I(U ; Y̌ ) is a continuous and bounded function because
−H(Y̌ ) ≤ I(U ;S)− I(U ; Y̌ ) ≤ H(S) ,
where H(Y̌ ) and H(S) are finite in the DM model. Also, the inequality, which is not in a
strict form, in C
P1




As a result, set O(C
P1
) is a compact set due to Lemma B.2. On the other hand, function
I(U ; Y̌ )−I(U ; Ž) is a continuous function on compact set O(C
P1
), and thus it attains its absolute
maximum value in the set O(C
P1
) according to Lemma B.1. Hence, supremum in (B.1) can be
replaced by maximum as in (3.7).
162
Appendix C
AEP for Gaussian Random Vectors
This appendix is originally taken from [76, Sec. 2.4] with some modifications.
Lemma C.1. If x is a random vector drawn i.i.d. according to X ∼ N(0,Γ0), then the following
two statements are equivalent for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ′ = 2 ln(2)Γ0 ǫ:
(a) x ∈ Tǫ(N (0,Γ0)) ,
(b) | 1nxxt − Γ0| ≤ ǫ′ .
Proof.
x ∈ Tǫ(N (0,Γ0)) ⇔ (C.1)
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2 ln(2)Γ0 ǫ ≥ |
1
n
xxt − Γ0| ⇔ (C.6)
ǫ′ ≥ | 1
n
xxt − Γ0| , (C.7)
where equations (C.2) and (C.3) follow from definition of weak typicality [2, Sec. 8.2] and entropy
of a normal distribution [2, Thm. 8.4.1], respectively.
Lemma C.2 (Lemma 2.11 [76]). Let t and s be two sequences of i.i.d. random variables T ∼
N (0, σ20), and S ∼ N (0,Λ), respectively, such that T is independent of S. Let u = t + αs for











t ∈ T2ǫ(N (0, σ20)), and
| 1
n







This appendix contains an essential identity in the field of network information theory. This
identity is credited to Csiszár and Körner according to their publication [12]. This identity is
usually beneficial to derive upper bounds in several network information-theoretic problems. The
identity is given as the sake of reference in the following lemma.
Lemma D.1 (Csiszár-Körner’s sum identity [12]). Let Y, Z, and T be alphabet sets. Assume that
random vector (Y n, Zn, T ) ∈ Yn × Zn × T is generated according to a joint distribution function
PYnZnT . Define Y 01 , Znn+1 , 0. Then, the following identity holds:
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1;Yi|Y i−11 , T ) =
n∑
i=1
























I(Y i−11 ;Zi|Zni+1, T ) , (D.5)
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where
• (D.2) and (D.4) follow from the chain rule for mutual information [2, Thm. 2.5.2];
• (D.3) follows from switching the order of summations;
• (D.5) follows from replacing dummy variable j with i and from the fact that Y 01 = 0.
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